The well-being of London and its hinterland as a World City will depend heavily on its effective transport offer, both main lines and other transport modes. So transport investment for the future to support the spatial and human dimensions should be as much about the context and philosophy of what and why expenditure on railways is being prioritised, as about the hardware elements of new projects.
As noted in London 2050 Part 3, transforming the existing railway will be a large-scale challenge, as well as having to gear for some new main lines. The scope of the challenge is not a marginal change in operating practices and priorities. It is a system-wide restructuring to accommodate a fundamentally different scope, where the railway can reliably and consistently offer much higher capacities and provide a trusted, even appreciated, umbilical for the future London and Home Counties economies.
This could have profound implications for the focus and priorities of railway organisations and their management, the degrees of central Government involvement, staffing levels and staff relations, dialogue with passengers and passenger information, specification and delivery of quality standards, and the relationships with residents, business communities and stakeholders including local authorities and others.
The scale of new investments will be a large-scale test in terms of vision, planning, design, engineering, project capacity, efficiency and then on all delivery fronts. Will the rail industry have the capacity to deliver all this (and elsewhere than London, as well)? Will there ever be a weekend without engineering works in the future, other than a few pre-Christmas weekends a year when shopper volumes require Network Rail to stop their engineers!?
More generally, given the foreseeable scale of required investment, how can National Rail (and particularly Network Rail in what ever form that mutates towards) create more of a 24/7 transport offer, for what is already a 24/7 city? Internal industry alliances will need to be of the strongest character. Better skills and training should be an intrinsic requirement.
Devolution as a model for London 2050?
It is also relevant to consider whether Transport for London’s devolution proposition should be promoted and adopted around London as a strategic transformation, at any rate for inner suburban National Rail services. While the politics of devolution might lie outside a narrow definition of infrastructure, acceptance of the merits of that policy may be a fundamental in enabling such transformation to be authorised.
The fundamental difference in the offer between a revenue-risk-taking railway franchise, and TfL’s concession model, is that the former focuses management priority on yield management as well as quality train operations. A concession allows the specifying authority to take the GDP risks and to define the railway purposes as part of the wider spatial economy. The specifier can promote a service delivery alliance with the chosen operators, to enable the wider consumer benefits (passenger miles per £, or perceived quality, or area economic growth) to be given their head.
Looking forwards, with the much greater reliance on National Rail being the economic umbilical, the concession approach could be the better means for delivering the right outputs and outcomes, of intrinsic benefit to the Home Counties economies as well as to London.
A test for the next decade will be how TfL can demonstrably add passenger benefits and value to existing radial main line corridors, starting with the West Anglia network. The policy case for ‘Overgroundising’ most of the inner suburban services may hang on this, along with better political overtures to neighbouring local authorities and a supportive position from central Government. Part of London 2050’s spatial capacity and adequate accessibility may rely on being able to take the inner routes to new levels of capacity and quality whilst also accommodating additional outer commuting flows.
Major corridor capacity gaps
With a conventional railway approach, the forecasts show substantial gaps on most main line corridors before capacity relief schemes are brought forward, as set out in the commentary above. The underlying questions are:
- How much more capacity, above 2031 levels, can be squeezed from existing main lines?
- Can a digitised National Rail network (moving block signalling, automatic train operation, use of European Train Control System – ETCS – on a significant scale) avoid the need for some extra main line tracks or routes?
- If the capacity gap is too great, what will be the optimum choice for new main lines?
Four new main lines?
In the worst case, the potential requirement based on the capacity gap analysis, using Network Rail’s own figures, would be for 4-5 new main lines:
- Potential for combined new GW/SW main line, possibly via Heathrow.
- West Anglia 4-tracking.
- New Great Eastern main line (this might be combined with WAML, via Stansted).
- A new Crossrail-type railway to relieve the Fenchurch Street lines and the full Crossrail 1.
- At least one new main line through South East or South London, even after unused commuter capacity on HS1 was taken up.
A Network Rail perspective
The policy situation could be different from Network Rail’s perspective. Network Rail is using 2043 as its dateline rather than 2050, but we are talking about comparable passenger numbers even if inner suburban volumes might be greater.
Network Rail has now announced that it is seeking complete use of electronic train control systems nationally by 2029, to increase line capacities and improve efficiencies. This ambitious new date for transfer of the bulk of main line signalling to new technology was highlighted in a presentation at the Institution of Civil Engineers on 2nd October 2014.
If you think that the London Bridge project isn’t easy, it will be a piece of cake compared to replacing signalling across Britain, and especially on intensively-used railways such as in the London and Home Counties area. Also the impact of weekend resignalling works or whole-line possessions could be considerable for the next decade and a half.
Whether or not the desired rate of change is feasible, it raises the question whether such new technology can robustly avoid the need for more additional main lines within the next few decades. It will be a matter of termini capacity as well as along the route.
The key constraints might be train and passenger handling at termini, and at critical junctions. Automatic train operation may assist service densification, and Thameslink will be an early example to test this approach across Central London. London 2050 also references the East London Line as an early candidate to raise service frequencies to 24tph.
The perpetuation of mixed traffic railway policies for many London main lines, because of existing flows and a legal requirement on Network Rail to be able to accommodate rail freight, also sits uneasily against the desire to maximise the passenger handling capacity of the network, not least at busy periods of the day.
Throwing money at freight bypasses of London gets you so far, but no one has yet addressed the implications for, for example, the main orbital networks which see many protected but unused freight slots preventing a high frequency orbital passenger service. Contrast the permitted Overground frequencies on ELL versus WLL, SLL and NLL. Maybe a slot pricing regime will need to be developed to encourage more rational use of slots. London 2050 includes reference to strategic rail capacity and potential relief of cross-London corridors, but only costs a programme for CP5.
The Great Western main line as a capacity test?
A test of the elbow room achievable on existing corridors would be the benefits of electronic signalling when applied to GWML. This is being resignalled as part of Great Western electrification. Full application is expected in the mid-2020s with lineside signalling removed then.
Would full (ETCS Level 3 ?) operation allow 24-26tph on the fast lines between Reading and London, at speeds of 110-140 mph? If not, GWML planning might have to start looking at a new main line, as 20tph was the maximum previously thought feasible between Reading and London by the 2020s, in the 2011 LSE RUS.
London 2050 also references the desirability by 2029 of transferring Heathrow Express to the Great Western relief tracks to get better long distance and outer suburban capacity on the fast tracks, with a more frequent, semi-fast Crossrail Express to replace HEX. Great Western through peak period services from the Henley and Bourne End branches would have to be replaced by connecting shuttles.
The politics of changing service patterns
The politics of such changes could be challenging. The recent decision in favour of retaining through Thameslink Wimbledon services, with consequential loss of maximum Thameslink Central London capacity, shows that railway planning will remain at risk of decisions by other parties which cause sub-optimal capacity outcomes.
A similar planning desire, to get the most effective capacity from what we’ve got, will apply throughout London. There will also be hard choices. Is it reasonable to place more reliance on HS1 unused capacity, for extra commuter services from Kent to avoid South East London bottlenecks – but only directly to Stratford SAZ and St Pancras. Or would the directness of a new main line tunnel within South East London, to the heart of desired destinations such as the City and West End, be a preferred passenger and political option? Also, would HS1 with its own commercial interests at heart be more keen to sell additional commuting or international capacity?
In respect of the Brighton Main Line and around South London, how far can resignalling, rebuilding junctions and respecifying services be adopted in order to maximise capacity, before there is a backlash in terms of loss of choice of termini and lack of through routes? The alternative offer might have to be very strong, or unassailable in terms of gross capacity not otherwise achieved.
What the new main lines might amount to
With a ‘worst case’ scenario, the following new main line options might merit discussion:
- HS2, Crossrail 2 as a regional scheme, Crossrail-WCML and difficult service restructuring on the Great Western Main line are all essential if basic route capacities are to remain adequate at Paddington, Euston and Kings Cross.
- The GWML is pointing to capacity pressures that are difficult to address by 2031, and could be impossible by 2050 with conventional solutions. The SWML exhibits similar problems and similar service characteristics. Might the two benefit from a single new main line calling also at Heathrow?
- Both the West Anglia and Great Eastern main lines are 2-track, far too close to London. Both would benefit from 4-tracking, and in the case of GEML, could merit a new main line as well – even though there are capacity limits at Liverpool Street terminus. Combining a new GEML high speed route from Colchester to Stansted, with WAML 4-tracking towards London, could be a more economical solution. Whether the existing GEML could become a new cross-London railway is a separate matter, which might be relevant for Liverpool Street total capacity.
- The Fenchurch Street corridor and Crossrail 1 appear to need a separate new railway to relieve them, even when excluding the likely knock-on impact of additional housing within Greater London, such as in East London. (The Mayor proposed a Crossrail 3 heading via Barking Riverside towards a Thames Estuary Airport.)
- Similar changes in demand from South East and South London, and their Kent and Surrey/Sussex hinterlands, suggest one additional Thameslink Express or Crossrail railway, perhaps towards the City (and/or Canary/Stratford SAZs?), plus high-capacity use of the Victoria main line approaches including the potential for 12-car trains towards Old Oak Common, to connect BML to HS2.
- A South East relief main line might be like a Thameslink 2, given the characteristics of its catchment, and if the Bakerloo Line were extended to Lewisham (or beyond?) to relieve the inner South East London capacity gap.
- The previous RUS thinking of a separate tunnel from South London towards Victoria might not be required, but BML operations would need to be slick, with extra platforms at Clapham Junction as well as East Croydon, and with a likely need for better services to Old Oak Common.
- A decision in favour of Gatwick for an Airport Hub could accelerate matters beyond Network Rail’s present vision for recasting BML operations, and put greater emphasis on through services to OOC for connection with HS2.
In the worst case, that would be one new main line a decade, in addition to HS2 and Crossrail 2. London would require a main line ‘production line’, with appropriate funding.
It’s not as though rail planners are unaware of the pressures, more that they haven’t spelt out the potential scale of National Rail requirements. The Mayor’s February 2012 Rail Vision on ‘investing in rail services in London’ said that beyond 2020 (page 35):
In the longer term new National Rail lines will be required to address capacity issues into the Capital. High Speed 2 will be the first of any new lines, but it is likely that others will also be required.
Requirements at termini and for terminal approaches are not considered in the discussion above, apart from Liverpool Street. More through running with cross-London tunnels (but by which service groups, in what directions?) could be the solution to avoid additional terminal reconstruction.
Are ‘intercity’ services such as Bristol and Norwich these days really just fast outer-suburban operations so capable of diversion underground in London? Operators don’t like the idea of long dwell times for trains, at stations with limited platform capacity – maybe four-track underground stations could address that?
As usual with London travel demand, there is more capacity pressure foreseen from the east and south than from the west and north, causing an imbalance in possible service volumes and potential recipient catchments on different sides of London. Crossrail 1 has faced this problem.
Capacity pressures and electoral timing
The prospect of influential voters cubed out of GWML and SWML trains, or out of existing and potential UKIP-land commuter services from Clacton, Rochester, Thanet etc, could present an interesting future political challenge. That would sit alongside Sir Peter Hendy’s carefully-phrased warnings that public dissent could boil over if transport capacity is not there when it’s needed. Will the politics of transport capacity and quality rise several notches?
The next General Elections are in 2015, 2020 and 2025. Mayoral elections are in 2016, 2020 and 2024. The political conjunction of the planets in 2020 is particularly interesting, and may well be preceded by a Spending Review in 2019. For London 2050 to be on track, a Mayor needs a significant uplift in London’s funding levels by 2019-20.
By then, too, it may have been possible for TfL to make the case for some further devolution of inner suburban rail services, alongside franchise rebidding dates, and particularly for networks south of the River which have high passenger volumes.
So there is all to press for in the period to 2020.
How to address the HS1-HS2 gap?
These pointers also ignore the eventual requirement – by the 2030s if not sooner – for an East-West connector railway between HS1 and HS2. London 2050 referenced this is its airport mapping as a connector between Old Oak Common and north of St Pancras, although the Government has dropped that part of HS2 for the time being.
Much of the underlying policy justification would be for through international trains for north of London origins and destinations, though the actual per-hour frequency of those is likely to be very low. It could be better value to see which combinations of east/southeast and west/northwest corridors could help by being a cross-London limited stop railway serving a complete London & Home Counties catchment, on which timetable slots could be reserved for some through international trains.
Alternatively a separate, limited stop express railway would be required. In London there would of course be calls for it to do more for commuters as well.
What is London 2050 calling for?
The London 2050 elements involving Network Rail are set out at the foot of this article. In some cases these represent schemes which are already emerging from the planning processes, to anticipate further crowding, and to respond to the desire for new links. Also, some of the stated estimates are only for expenditure foreseen in CP5, and not for subsequent Control Periods, so that larger-scale funding would be required for a complete London 2050 programme.
For the main lines and Crossrails, the list for existing lines represent about £1 billion excluding rolling stock (presumably leased?) and related line adjustments and stabling sidings, for basic schemes to 2031. Roundly £5 billion (a very incomplete figure) is suggested for schemes which overlap beyond 2031 with further capacity needs. We haven’t counted HS2 in that estimate, although it has WCML capacity benefits. For projects with high intrinsic benefits for London 2050, there is another very incomplete £1 billion.
Outside an area-specific envelope are Crossrails 2 and 3, taken as roundly £20 billion each, so £40 billion in total. That sum nevertheless excludes, in the worst case, the bulk of the new main lines which might be required, where a further £10-20 billion per line (say £40-60 billion overall) might be a working basis for budgeting.
Overall, to move National Rail infrastructure towards London 2050 levels of capacity could require in excess of £110 billion, once everything including the cost of continuing programmes is identified. There also some other missing items, in the view of the author, which are discussed below and would add to that sum.
Project timescales
There will be a concern about the funding capacity to deliver simultaneously in the 2020s HS2 Phases 1 and 2, and Crossrail 2. On top of that, Network Rail may now be seeking large-scale funding for national re-signalling (where no costs are included above). So the prioritisation mindset for many schemes could look to the 2030s or 2040s.
Yet to try to compress all the aspired or unavoidable projects into the following two decades might stretch delivery capacities, and also act as economic blocks if London’s jobs and population forecasts moved at a different (possibly faster) pace. So it might be necessary to consider how some other projects could be got under way even while HS2 and Crossrail 2 were themselves still being built. Planning, design and authorisation for additional projects would certainly need to be addressed in that period.
London 2050 is explicitly looking at some schemes sooner, such as WAML 4-tracking and BML plus South London, both of which could be ca. £1 billion each. All the extra works associated with Old Oak Common, such as an Overground station and Crossrail-WCML, point towards £700m, well before any longer term Outer Orbital. As discussed, the main upgrades for the GWML beyond basic resignalling, are also in the 2020s.
What priority for ‘Overgroundisation’?
Arguably the project showing the greatest level of new thinking is the proposed restructuring of the South London inner services, by re-organising routeing and infrastructure. This is above all TfL showing its colours – “We need higher tph, higher capacity, and it can’t be done by perpetuating low frequency ‘round the corner’ services”. So this points to more interchange between corridors, with improved internal frequencies on each corridor.
Those parts of the Overground where they are the ‘orbital tube’ merit more consideration. London 2050 is looking to intensify jobs and population in the Inner London areas as well as Central London, if policy options such as the Satellite Activity Zones or an expanded Central London are taken forward. Early introduction of further route capacity may be a high priority, as 5-car trains will not prove to be enough. (The Jubilee Line experience was that the capacity gain of adding a seventh car was used up within 10 weeks!) TfL is planning for higher NLL, WLL and ELL frequencies over later years, and eventually on GOBLIN.
There is a separate update article on London Overground in preparation for London Reconnections, so comments will be reined in here, and limited to the Outer Orbital, aka ‘R25’.
The role of an Outer Orbital is interesting. Could it be a relief for the inner orbitals, as well as a local relief of outer suburban road networks and a spatial stimulus in its own right? There are environmental standards to be considered as well. The year 2050 is Britain’s deadline under the Climate Change Act to cut carbon emissions by 80%. Meeting this requires more than a little planning (see Nick Nuttgens’s comments, in London Evening Standard letters, 30th July 2014).
To do nothing other than increase radial capacity in the outer suburbs might put those areas at relative disadvantage even if the larger passenger volumes were radial. An Outer Orbital could also be beneficial to help reduce capacity pressures at radial bottlenecks and interchanges.
The suggestion of a Hounslow-OOC-Brent Cross Service, alongside the desire to create a number of new interchanges between GOBLIN and radial railways, might point to the creation of an “Outer Crescent”, even if at this stage the business case for a full Outer Orbital could not be made. It is possible that that would require additional line capacity under the Hampstead Ridge, to link between the Midland Line and GOBLIN. The Deputy Mayor is keen on better rail links across the Thames in East London for cross-river connectivity. Might one of those be Barking Riverside to Thamesmead, and further around SE London?
If the South London elements were harder to justify, would there be merit in a larger scale approach to Tramlink extensions than London 2050 is currently foreseeing? At present only Crystal Palace, Sutton and South Wimbledon appear to feature there.
Surface access to airports
Surface access to London’s airports will move up the priority scale once there is clarity about the preferred airport Hub. The London 2050 approach to airport planning and surface access priorities has of course been skewed by the Mayor’s preference for an inner Thames Estuary Airport. With the Airports Commission having ruled this out, the choices move to Heathrow or Gatwick, so London 2050 in its final form will need to play catch up and define priorities for surface access schemes for those airports.
In the case of Heathrow, three schemes are listed as set out in the Annex to this article. These are the Western and Southern rail accesses to Heathrow, and the substitution of Heathrow Express by a more frequent but somewhat slower Crossrail Express. Schemes maximising the use of the existing railway route capacity under the airport will be critical. It is the Great Western main line which will bear the brunt.
The potential for a Crossrail Express service to replace HEX might be an unavoidable solution even if Heathrow Airport Holdings Ltd doesn’t like it. The agreement would probably come at a price, meanwhile the Western Rail Access scheme is gathering pace. In its petitioning about HS2, HAHL shows a preference for a replacement HEX train depot to be at Langley near Slough, which would be well placed for WRAtH.
In the case of Gatwick, London 2050 references the extensive proposals by Network Rail to upgrade the Brighton Mainline. However these were proposed without the certainty of a Gatwick Hub. If a hub were to happen then additional capacity might be required, which could stretch BML to or beyond its limits.
It is plausible to think that better connecting services between HS2 at OOC and a Gatwick Hub would be desirable. It is also important to bear in mind how better rail access could play an part in reducing the additional environmental load with an airport hub. A further factor, also important in influencing airport road traffic volumes, would be the railway’s ability (or not) to offer 24/7 services, to attract aviation staff to rail and away from car.
Gaps in London 2050’s discussion of transport supply
The following gaps may be relevant:
- Additional stations: there is a very limited offer suggested so far, just two stations. This may not be enough to support the wide range of Opportunity Areas.
- Station entrances: with the foreseen increase of main line commuting by over 70%, many busy stations may struggle to cope adequately with such increased passenger volumes. There is a station decongestion programme, but additional multiple entrances/exits may be required for resilience, maintaining and reducing passenger access times, and to avoid crowding and station control delays.
- Staffing: we have commented elsewhere in this article about the increased reliance on well trained and skilled staff that a much busier railway will require. Actual staff numbers may need to increase rather than reduce, although where they are located, for example in stations, might be more visibly on the front line than in back offices. This could become vital in order to assure punctual train departures and handle additional passenger flows. A much busier railway will need everything working in its favour to maintain punctuality and quality information, and staff support will be essential.
- The role of stations: with the increased reliance on the rail network as the umbilical for inner and central London commuting, there could be consideration within London 2050 to promote suburban stations as the hub of the local community.
- New main lines: the biggest gap in London 2050 mainline thinking is the absence of acknowledgment that some new main lines are likely, with the forecasts appearing inexorable even with some optimism about what electronic signalling and automatic train operation can offer. Such lines will be needed for London as a World City with its own expectations for capacity. Schemes already being advocated such as Crossrail 2 could be intensely busy even by the 2030s.
- The devolution dateline: The opportunity for devolution of some of the main lines’ inner suburban services starts again before 2017, particularly with the sequence of high passenger volume franchises with South West Trains, South Eastern, and the reprise of Great Northern Thameslink Southern.
It is London 2050’s potentially incomplete and underpriced transport shopping list (even if projects were just priced notionally at this stage), and the lack of reference to some unavoidable high ticket projects, which characterise its omissions. The Outer Orbital ‘R25’ scheme hasn’t had its costs published, for example, although it appears to involve significant infrastructure requirements across South London.
There will be Spending Reviews most likely under the next Government in 2016 and 2019. The conjunction of various political electoral dates have been discussed already. This leads to the obvious question about what could be authorised and delivered by the end of CP6 in 2024. That will be the third critical milestone, after 2016 and 2019-20. The priorities for that will need to be defined by Summer 2016 to go into the Initial Industry Plan for CP6, to be published in Autumn 2016. This isn’t far away.
Overall, it feels as though London 2050 has pulled some main line punches. Devolution of the inner suburban networks to TfL is required to make these services more responsive and more efficient but the detail in London 2050 doesn’t put this forcefully. The failure to achieve approval for a TfL concession for the Southeastern’s inner suburban network was a warning that achieving high capacity and quality improvements on National Rail might be an uphill task.
The existing franchise operators will, of course, be tasked in any future contracts to achieve greater passenger capacities and better passenger standards, but the passenger perceptions and wider benefit impacts of such operations could fall short of the higher levels of quality that should be set for every aspect of the rail service, and could be set consistently as a unified brand across London.
A much greater reliance on the railway as a basic means of getting around does need to be reinforced by such quality measures. In political terms there has been concern expressed about a “democratic deficit” with a TfL Board having relatively little input from out-of-London local authorities. Could that be resolved by an inner suburban steering group?
The danger is in having to give something to everyone. How mature could such discussions be, how much might each party be willing to contribute to the common weal rather than acting as a road block unless demands are met? TfL had given explicit assurances in respect of Southeastern that it was not about capacity reduction outside London. As we have seen, in practice much more capacity will be needed. TfL needs to be seen as part of solutions which benefit the nearby Home Counties as well as within London.
Conclusion
The London 2050 consultation concludes at the end of October 2014. The immense reliance on the National Rail system in London to accommodate up to 80% more passengers has been made clear in London 2050 Parts 3 and 4. These have critiqued the strengths and weaknesses of how the London 2050 Transport Support Paper has focussed on the main lines. There are weaknesses with some important projects not being either identified, or prioritised for a time scale, which the jobs and population volumes might require. Not all funding requirements are identified.
Some of the infrastructure and institutional issues may not be easy to value, in terms of conventional transport analyses, benefit-cost ratios and WebTAG appraisal. The Deputy Mayor, Isabel Dedring, who is overseeing the London 2050 policies, made it clear on 22nd October to an audience including Campaign for Better Transport and Railfuture, that politically and in wider economics, it is credible economic growth which matters more than a narrower transport appraisal. So the Deputy Mayor was making the case for something like Gross Value Added business case assessment.
The other big gap in London 2050 is potentially the failure to discuss the scale of institutional change that the main lines may require in order to deliver the required capacity, and also the absence of a philosophy as to why such institutional change will be so important for the London and Home Counties’ future economies. The underlying test which the final version of London 2050 will have to address, is about National Rail’s capacity to adapt and improve at every level, not just the physical measure of additional passengers per hour.
Appendix: London 2050 schemes for National Rail
Key: Schemes with a yellow background are those where the goal is largely to deliver required 2031 capacity. Schemes in green look beyond a 2031 capacity date, so can help with the forecast long term capacity gap. A blue background shows that the scheme is heavily focused on London 2050 expectations. CP numbers are Network Rail’s quinquennial Control Periods, with CP5 = April 2014 to March 2019, CP6 = April 2019 to March 2024, etc.
| London-wide: | |
|---|---|
| £147m | New stations for opportunity areas, initial list of two for CP5: Beam Park, Brent Cross Cricklewood. |
| £103m | Continuing programme of station congestion relief, CP5 element costed, to accommodate growing demand and unlock access to growth areas. |
| £103m | Continuing programme of Access for All investment, CP5 element costed, to support accessibility and inclusion. |
| £206m | Continuing programme of line speed and journey time improvements, CP5 element costed, to unlock system capacity. |
| £206m | Strategic rail freight capacity including potential relief of corridors within London, input costed for CP5, continuing programme. Benefits achieved by reallocating slots for use by passenger trains. |
| £16bn | HS2 project, CP7, 2026. This is of immediate benefit by creating commuting capacity on the existing WCML. HS2 will also underpin London’s economic growth objectives, and is also part of the intended stimulus for the rest of the UK economy. |
| £100m | Crossrail 1 @ 30 tph, CP7, 2029, congestion relief and 25% extra Crossrail capacity through Central London. |
| £12-20bn | Crossrail 2 project, CP8, early 2030s [potentially now accelerated to CP7, late 2020s]. Widespread London capacity relief incl NE and SW London corridors, enabling 100,000 new rail trips in peak period. |
| £20bn | Crossrail 3, CP9-10?, 2040+. Similar proposition to Crossrails 1 and 2, in terms of costing and train frequency. Mayoral priority shown on airport map as Waterloo-London Bridge, Canary Wharf, East London, Inner Thames Estuary airport. TSP notes “would need to determine this is the most appropriate cross-London route”, “business case untested as yet”. |
| West London: | |
| £750m | Western Rail Access to Heathrow, CP6, Government/Network Rail support. |
| £85m | Crossrail 1 and Heathrow Express merger to accommodate fast lines capacity increase London-Reading, CP8, 2030. £20m works, £65m trains. |
| North West London: | |
| In above | See HS2 project above, for relief of WCML capacity gap. | £150m | Crossrail 1 –WCML link, CP7, 2026, to congestion relief at Euston and assist HS2 construction. |
| £???m | Chiltern Line electrification & longer trains, CP6, for 50% passenger growth by 2050. |
| £25m | Chiltern Line new service, CP6, to connect with Thames Valley rail services at Ealing or Old Oak Common. |
| North London: | |
| £???m | High capacity trains on Moorgate route services, CP6. |
| North East London: | |
| £700m+ | West Anglia 4-tracking Copper Mill to Broxbourne, CP6, pre-Crossrail 2, allows up to 8 tph. |
| £60m | West Anglia 10-car suburban trains, to reduce peak crowding, CP6, +25% capacity. |
| East London: | |
| £2m | Call International trains at Stratford “ASAP” to support economic growth. |
| £???m | GEML Southend Line, 12-car and +2 tph, CP6, +10% capacity, incl ETCS signalling. |
| £???m | GEML Bow Junction remodelling, 12-car and +2 tph, CP7, +10% capacity. |
| £???m | c2c, more 12-car trains and/or high density interiors, CP6, +10-20% capacity. |
| South East London: | |
| £???m | More 12-car Southeastern inners, CP5, +20% capacity. |
| £0m | Expand HS1 Javelin services, CP6, +10-20% capacity. A priority if there were an Inner Thames Estuary airport. Use existing stock better. |
| £100m | Crossrail 1 extended to Dartford and Ebbsfleet, CP8, 2030. £100m plus rolling stock. Reduces crowding on London Bridge lines. Ebbsfleet Garden City not mentioned. |
| South London: | |
| £???m | More 10-car Southern inners, CP7, +10% capacity. |
| £1 bn | Extensive range of Brighton Main Line junction works throughout route, and platform works at East Croydon, Clapham Junction, West Croydon, Victoria, CP6, +15-20% capacity. This also addresses remaining 2031 concerns not solved in the LSE RUS. |
| In above | South London inner route investment and service changes – creates high capacity inner network, moving from 12 to 20 tph, CP7, +66% capacity. |
| South West London: | |
| ~£400m | Waterloo International re-use, incl 12-car, 20 tph trains on Windsor lines, CP6, +25% capacity. SWML Woking Junction grade separation, Crossrail 2 later, +17% capacity. |
| £700m? | South London rail link to Heathrow, CP8, ca. 2030, studies under way. Case to be reviewed when there is a decision on Airport Hub. Former Airtrack scheme was £700m. |
| Overground works: | |
| £???m | Overground offpeak frequency improvements, programmed. |
| £115m | GOBLIN electrification, CP5, already authorised, Summer 2017 completion. |
| £165m | Barking Riverside, CP6, go-ahead expected for 2020 completion. |
| £130m | ATO on ELL (CP6, 2024) for higher frequency services up to 24 tph. |
| £400m | Further Overground service increases and more train lengthening, in next decade and beyond (NLL/WLL/ELL 6-car in CP7, GOB 6 tph in 2040 £???m @ £20m, NLL/WLL 12tph in 2040 @ £???m) |
| £550m | Overground station at Old Oak Common HS2 and Crossrail interchange, CP7, 2026. |
| £25m ea | Strategic Overground interchanges in increased connectivity and facilitate orbital travel by rail, programme proposed, incl: Camden Town-Camden Road, Brockley High Level, Brixton High Level, Seven Sisters-GOBLIN, Junction Road-Tufnell Park (GOBLIN), GOBLIN-Crossrail (is this Forest Gate-Wanstead Park or elsewhere?), Penge stations, also (non-Overground) Catford. |
| £300m | Outer Orbital route: Hounslow-Brentford-Acton-OOC-Neasden-Brent Cross, CP9-10?, 2040+, SW-W-NW orbital passenger corridor. |
@WW- interesting. The parallels with HS2 are striking – there, what is most urgently needed is ensuring that the business case stands up, so – DfT parachutes in Alison Munro,one of their cleverer and more pragmatic economists; in the case of XR2, it’s the planning case which is in doubt, so….
People may be interested to know that Network Rail have just published a new consultation on Improving Connectivity on its ideas for moving to more regular service connections or better through services. Although the case study is on the Anglia region it does affect London as it covers the West Anglia line and the Great Eastern main line. It does have specific issues for WAML 4 tracking, rebuilding Edmonton Green station, changing interchange at T Hale and making Romford a “hub station”. I have given it a very brief skim but have spotted one thing that will delight a certain poster – a proposal to reinstate the Low Hall Farm curve. 🙂 It’s a public consultation on the principles so some may wish to respond.
WW
Thanks for that.
Looks as if Crossrail2 to Stansted has been abandoned, which no one will object to.
More controversial is the plan to make the Enfield Town service a shuttle from Edmonton Green. Then again, it seems the only away to deliver 4tph.
Early bid for Crayonista of the year from NR
1. Cambridge … possible future connections could be integrated at a later date. These might include East West Rail or other reopenings such as to Marks Tey or Huntingdon.
2. The geography of the GEML and its branches limits the possibilities for providing wider connectivity to and within this area. Rail journeys such as Chelmsford to Southend, or those towards Cambridge and Stansted Airport, involve lengthy detours and therefore remain uncompetitive. New and reopened lines, such as:
Sudbury to Cambridge, Braintree to Stansted Airport, Chelmsford to Stansted Airport and Chelmsford to Wickford (with possible extension to Thames Haven) would transform many of these uncompetitive journeys.
3. Double track to Stansted options: Option 2 comprises a new southern access link diverging from the WAML between Harlow Mill and Sawbridgeworth and no alterations to the existing tunnel.
Posted too soon.
4 Further reopening, between Bedford and Northampton, would provide a considerably shorter, and already partially electrified, cross country route to the West Midlands.
Note the big road movements where parallel railways used to be:
Norwich – Lynn & Colchester or Chelmsford/ Cambridge
Not quite so much parallel (on this map) to the GN?Ge Jt though – presumably all on M11 – M1 routing?
And the big road traffic flow Cambridge – Huntingdon/Peterborough.
Some interesting ideas although I think that diverting the Ipswich-Peterborough service to operate Newmarket-Peterborough instead loses a direct link between too many large towns. The idea of reopening the curve at Newmarket in itself is a good idea especially if it were to be combined with a new station at Soham to allow a Cambridge-Soham-Ely service to operate.
@Greg T
“Note the big road movements where parallel railways used to be:
……………………………
Not quite so much parallel (on this map) to the GN/GE Jt though ”
The “Joint Line” is very much still open and being upgraded to allow more freight. Pity they closed the Lincoln avoiding line in the 1980s though – and even more so that the City Council snapped up the land and built on it – so that all that extra freight will have to cross the High Street on the level.
timbeau
… until the city council re-compulsorily purchase the land, to hand it back … in about 15-20 years time?
Perhaps ….
Worse is the closure of March=Spalding, which is actually easier to undo, if the political will is there – just for once, the money is not the problem …..
The publication and timing of this document for consultation seems somewhat bizarre, which has caused a certain amount of consternation down here in the boon-docks of East Anglia, where it could easily be sub-titled, worsening connectivity for many!
If this was a simply an abstract concept paper it would be less worrying but the timing and inference that it might inform decisions on the new East Anglia franchise means it demands greater scrutiny.
That said there are some worthwhile proposals, such as the once in generation opportunity to grade separate Bow Junction. These are however more than cancelled out by the lack of rigour in many of the other proposals, which in some cases just seem the random musings of a frustrated crayonistas.
The authors seem to show little understanding of the market in which rail operates and the role it can play. It can never attempt to compete on the multitude of smaller ‘cross-country’ flows and is best placed doing what it does best, moving volume, (passengers or goods at appropriate speeds). That said there is always room for improvement and some of the regional journey opportunities are neither easy or quick currently in this part of the world.
Many of the suggestions in the document seem to have not been well thought out and lack the evidence base that NR’s (and even DfTs) planning documents usually have. The concept of creating random new interchanges which actually result in many worsened journey opportunities, such as Newmarket, are just bizarre, not least because passengers don’t like changing. Replacing the currently through journey from Frinton to Colchester Town with one with two changes is unlikely to stimulate demand, even if the railways of East Anglia could be run like Swiss clockwork.
Probably the most bizarre suggestion (but particularly relevant to Londonconnections readers), is the Romford super-hub. Whilst acknowledging that Romford is not as well served by longer distance services as perhaps it could be, the suggestion that everything should call seems astounding. It seems to fail to recognise that Crossrail will improve the service offer and perhaps should not TfL be persuaded to run some of its 12tph services fast from Romford to Shenfield to improve connectivity. The suggestion that Romford is ‘well placed’ to become a hub station for area C, without fully defining where area C covers, the map showing it seems to disappear of the edge of page. It seemingly ignores the fact that there are many other stations in area C that have direct trains to where the greatest demand is; i.e. Central London. Romford and the surrounding area’s draw as an employment hub is nothing compared to Central London or Docklands/Stratford and never will be. But what is happening in the near future is the opening of the Romford ROC which will require many Network Rail (and TOC) staff to move there from Stratford and other locations, draw your own conclusions!
All of this would matter less if the document could be viewed in isolation but the timing is very puzzling. The result is in my view a very confusing picture for bidders for the next East Anglia franchise, there is NR’s Route Study, which is competent and naturally London centric, the somewhat light-weight franchise consultation and then this. The result in my view are inconsistencies and mixed messages, what does the state want for the next franchise? One example being Liverpool Street – Norwich services which until this was issued the clear suggestion was faster, fewer stops, new(er) trains. This consultation suggests that the fastest journeys could be delivered by a service from Kings Cross via Cambridge. Is this really the message the that financiers of new rolling stock for the existing route and bidders for the franchise really want to hear?
@ Alfie1014 – a rather evil thought has wandered through my mind and I wonder if Network Rail’s planners have been spending too much time with those crazy Dutchmen who run the existing Anglia franchise. The Dutch railway system operates around the principle of a tiered service structure and a core timetable and also works on a connectional basis. Draw your own cynical conclusions!
An alternative view is that this consultation is a way of sifting ideas and gathering public reaction early so that the DfT can weigh public reaction to this connectional concept vs other things like faster services to Stansted and Norwich. I can certainly see people being attracted by higher frequencies and improved connections. I agree that people will not like enforced connections where through services presently exist although the wider question is how many have direct experience of the connectional railway that runs in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Higher frequencies and easy guaranteed connections can work well but you need a very robust infrastructure and timetable to allow it. I’ve not reviewed the ins and outs of the plans in East Anglia but I am puzzled about some of the plans in the London area and don’t think they are very consistent or in line with the objectives of other bodies like TfL.
A somewhat novel idea of dealing with capacity and housing issues (costs) in central London has been presented in http://www.citymetric.com/transport/want-make-london-housing-affordable-again-lets-try-closing-every-tube-station-centre-town — close all zone one tube stations.
Not sure this is actually that logical!
also, “Mayor Paxman” :-O
@Alfie 1014 and WW
Having had a skim through Improving Connectivity I can, as a mere layman, see both strengths and weaknesses in it. I found that it helped enormously to have read the Foreword where I learnt that these ideas come from a particular viewpoint, the signaller, one who may not always have a very high profile view. Whilst the likes of the Netherlands and Switzerland have a culture in which tiers of connections work there would be much hard work outside of the normal remit of the railwayman for it to be successfully introduced here. That is not to say it is impossible, in the same way that changing the way we use railways is not impossible, just very hard work.
I do not have the expertise to be able to analyse the document and judge how workable their schemes are. However, I am of the belief that just because we have always done something a particular way does not mean that it could not be done better another way, even if there is some discomfort in the transition.
@Alfie, WW and James Bunting
We already have a network which, rather than having infrequent services from everywhere to everywhere else like Southern’s metro services, operates on a connectional basis. Some of you may even have used it.
It’s called the London Underground.
Jim Steer ( of Steer Davies Gleave) calling for “new line to Stansted Airport”
http://www.harlowstar.co.uk/New-rail-line-London-Stansted-Airport-necessary/story-26073681-detail/story.html
Err … where is he going to put it?
As a Transport Planner, surely he knows the difficu;ty of using caryons (or even felt-tip pens) in restricted spaces?
While London Bridge gains the headlines despite problem occurring elsewhere.
News tonight of crowding problems yet again at Oxford Circus no doubt made worse by Central Line closure at TCR .
See – http://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/hundreds-caught-in-rush-hour-crush-at-oxford-circus-10089331.html
It seems no mention of upgrade to Oxford Circus has yet been made .
Perhaps we should begin by building direct links from surrounding shops into the station as at nearby Bond Street Station where West One Shopping Centre provides escalator link to the station that makes Jubilee Line stair free and similar arrangement at Oxford Circus could provide the same to Bakerloo and Victoria Lines which have escalators to pplatforms.
One possibility might be to use the site occupied by BHS and develop it with a new entrance to station with escalators and step free lifts !
It does beg the question as to billions are better invested in major interchanges than road tunnels that have a fraction of the capacity ?
Not sure whether this is the right place to start this particular hare, but it will not have escaped illuminati that today’s announcement of a “new intercity franchise for the West of England” has profound implications for london commuter services . The franchise is to comprise the FGW West of England services (breakpoint with the rest of GW unclear) plus the SWT Salisbury – Exeters . This will almost certainly lead to the replacement of the 159s with HSTs and if that happens,given the poor acceleration of the cl43s, we may expect quite a loss of line capacity between London and Woking. Moreover, my spies in SWT are even now considering whether they will need to knock out the Woking stops from the Exeters to prevent a second loss of capacity on restarting from Woking… This is, ofcourse,what comes from politicians interfering in technical matters. You know it makes sense and that Dr Pangloss is always right.
BTW,I am expecting the CMA to have field day.
@Graham H
CMA? I shan’t even hazard a guess…
@LBM -the Competition and Markets Authority (Competition Commission as was). One of their particular obsessions is with places where franchises fail to deliver competition (Newark and Grantham are the latest alleged monopoly deserts apparently because the non-EC operators fail to operate services that go to the same places as EC; insane, but true, I fear). In this case, Exeter will be the CMA’s casus belli.
BTW, I estimate the loss of paths if HSTs wend their way down the SW mainline as about 4 tph – not a negligible amount.
I can see little good coming from this.
Assuming Stagecoach don’t get the franchise, they will be losing one of their premium routes – and TfL are chipping at the other end of the market.
I also remember when the SW Exeter line was run by the Western Region, and how run-down it became as it played second fiddle.
Meanwhile, if First don’t get the franchise, you can say goodbye to reliable connections in Cornwall. Why wait for a late connection when the incoming service is run by another operator who will have to pay any compo due.
What happens if you shorten the HST’s by a coach, or even two? One would assume the acceleration would improve a little.
However, it is not unknown for Exeter from W’loo trains to consist of three units – nine coaches at present, which raises problems. [ Though they usually shorten to 3 or 6 cars beyond Salisbury ]
The other way arounnd the problem would be to run more trains ( except there isn’t the capacity?) with the first only going as far as Salisbury & the second catching it up there, having travelled non-stop from London.
Err ….
@ Graham H – I appreciate you have a contacts network that I don’t possess but are you sure it’s a new franchise? The official HMT Budget 2015 document refers solely to the new Direct Award for Great Western and NOT a new separate franchise. Mr McLoughlin is due to announce it within days. It also mentions looking at how modernise the Waterloo – Exeter route but no commitments beyond that. I really do not see the logic, at this time, in breaking up FGW or the SWT franchises. There is simply too much work going on to make fundamental change sensible. Around 2018/19 is when both franchises are up for retender and the DfT may well wish to reshape things then.
See page 47 of
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413949/47881_Budget_2015_Web_Accessible.pdf
I accept I may be wrong here and you may well be right but let’s see what Uncle Patrick says in the next week or so.
@WW -I agree – I’m merely reporting what the bid teams have found out so far – there’s nothing in the public domain at the moment beyond the single sentence in the Chancellor’s statement. If he’s merely announcing the GW re-let, then the wording is odd and it’s no news at all (not that that would stop a politician saying something, of course). Quite happy to be wrong -indeed,for the reasons cited by timbeau, I’d like to be wrong! But you’re right, we need some harder facts before we speculate too much.
As far as I can tell, nothing is actually confirmed other than First group taking over the franchise in 2019. Everything else is up for negotiation still according to DFT. But £7 million was awarded for a detailed study of increasing capacity on Exeter – Salisbury line for control period 6.
Some of course are looking at full double tracking, but I’m sure that some others have said double tracking to Westbury and some more loops would allow a half hourly express service and some sort of expanded local service, so the expresses could drop the smaller stations.
At this stage there is no indication of HST’s on the Salisbury route, and no one who has been mulling over a change of franchise has brought up changing trains.
If they do redraw the franchise map any change to Salisbury route may wait for the improved infrastructure works.
Of course SWT, has recently announced a big increase of services over the Salisbury line.
South West Trains unveils plans for new West of England services
Major timetable improvements being proposed for Somerset, Dorset and Devon
New half-hourly services between Waterloo and Yeovil
New connections between Yeovil Junction and Yeovil Pen Mill
Bruton and Frome connected to London Waterloo for the first time ever
Additional services from Exeter to Honiton
1850 Waterloo to Salisbury extended to Yeovil Pen Mill via Gillingham
New services planned from Dec 2015 subject to consultation and regulatory approval
and
Half-hourly train service from London to Tisbury, Gillingham, Templecombe, Sherborne and Yeovil Junction between 15:20 and 19:20
More than doubling the existing train service at Yeovil Pen Mill with an additional 18 South West Trains’ services every day
17 trains every day connecting Yeovil Junction and Yeovil Pen Mill
Connecting Bruton directly with London for the first time (4 trains per day)
Offering Castle Cary, Bruton and Frome direct services to/from Basingstoke, Woking and Clapham Junction (4 trains per day)
Yeovil Junction, Sherborne and Templecombe have 2 additional trains in the mid-afternoon – 13:50 from London Waterloo and 15:53 from Yeovil Junction
2 trains per hour from Exeter to Honiton during the Exeter evening peak
Yeovil Pen Mill will have 7 direct trains from and 3 trains to London Waterloo each weekday.
Network Rail have also begun talking about grade separating Basingstoke and Woking Junctions, with Basingstoke first.
I suspect that the Salisbury route will remain the ‘secondary route between the South West and London, but like Chiltern provide a much appreciated cheaper, if slower route into London.
Please see link below to Rail site which gives details of Chancellors speech today –
http://www.railmagazine.com/news/2015/03/18/chancellor-announces-funding-to-develop-rail-projects-further
It seems GWR franchise will be extended to 2019 and approval of Croxley Link are included.
Announcements re new station at Brent Cross have been made but no detail yet.
@Melvyn – again, the curious actual wording in the speech,which bears little resemblance to the Rail report -but there you are…
Please see link to newspaper report on announcement re new Brent Cross Station Thameslink I presume –
http://www.thisislocallondon.co.uk/news/londonnews/11864306.Cash_pledge_for_new_station_at_Brent_Cross/
@Greg Tingey: What happens if you shorten the HST’s by a coach, or even two? One would assume the acceleration would improve a little.
Someone has already had that idea – the HSTs displaced by GWML electrification are heading to the new Scotrail franchise where they will be shortened and take over intercity routes there.
Okehampton – Tavistock – Bere Alston?
Or just the last half?
I have a quick question in regards to Rational Plan’s comment on FGW franchising;
I can’t understand why on our railways, they don’t just leave the current TOC’s with one identity, such as Great Western, West Coast or South Eastern and just have an operator run it behind the scenes like how London buses are run. Apart from the logos on the buses, all London buses are red. And too the casual observer it would appear there is no change of company. I don’t understand why they can’t give the railways a more uniform look by making National (British?) Rail the overarching company, while having NSE style route identities franchised by private companies? Things are getting a bit ridiculous over on the East Coast where 125s have a rake of NXEC livered mk 3s with East Coast branding, and a East Coast livered power car with Virgin branding..
@ Rational Plan 22:23
A very interesting post, thank you
Anyone with any local knowledge/connections will immediately see, without any necessity to feel cynicism, that LibDem seats are being targeted with this announcement. The Tories will need to win back seats such as Frome if they have any chance of being re-elected in May. The area’s public transport has been allowed to atrophy for so long, somebody in office (and hopes to remain so), must have had a Damascene conversion recently.
[Totally unacceptable and irrelevant political comment deleted. PoP]
@ MT Even London buśes have had differences applied by operators with cow horns on some and blue skirts on others to distinguish different bus company operators . While buśes normally also carry name and address details of bus company operating the route.
Things were different when buśes were first privatised with companies like Grey Green using their own colours on buśes but a campaign to keep London buśes red was successful and TFL routes have to be red .
@MT – the – THE – key thing about franchising the railways is that both the bidders and the Treasury assumed that branding is all important. A further point is that DfT are utterly, hopelessly and intransigently wedded to the view that there is no such thing as a British railways system, witness the attitude to fares, rolling stock, connexions, ticketing structures, information, system development etc . This contrasts with,for example, TfL’s views on transport in London. Having said this,some operators have nowrealised that branding can be toxic if it goes wrong and some groups such as Stagecoach have downplayed their branding somewhat.
I don’t know if this is the best place to post this on, but Enfield and Haringey will be contributing £250,000 each towards STAR.
A further £5 million is being reallocated to the scheme from the discarded Bexley roundabout project.
I believe Network Rail’s contribution is in the region of £150 million.
Rational Plan 22.23 – I think you meant that First Group is taking the Great Western franchise through to 2019 (as per the intent confirmed by the DfT last October), which is also what I think the Chancellor was “confirming”. The wording may be curious, but neither the speech nor the document say anything about post-2019 franchise arrangements and might just be a way to get rail in the south west into the announcement (alongside, say, references to pairs of intelligent fridges).
Any claimed connection between the recently-floated concept of this south west franchise with two routes to London and the actual Budget announcements appears tenuous at best to me.
However it is, perhaps, notable that the end-dates for the FGW direct award (starting September this year) and the current SWT franchise are a just a month apart in 2019.
Is it possible that SWT could find itself split in three in or after that year, with its diesel routes going to this new south west franchise and inner suburban services being subsumed into TfL/Crossrail 2? Just wondering.
Come to think of it, the first iteration of the south west franchise concept that I saw only included the Great Western route to London. Not sure if that the Waterloo route is a subsequent addition or simply an omission from the early report.
Graham H 13.03 – indeed, it was noticeable in the first round of franchising that public and media ire against the railways always seemed to be directed at Virgin and Connex: the only two franchisees that did not use geographical references as their primary identities.
(Obviously there were exceptions, such as the storm about South West Trains’ driver management capabilities, but this was in response to a specific event rather than a general antipathy.)
@Caspar
Curious also that the new East Coast franchise is being branded by the minority partner – despite the majority partner being reasonably well-regarded in the eastern counties – and that the competition lawyers are investigating Stagecoach’s new monopoly of all services at Grantham and Newark, rather than the rather more lucrative Anglo-Scottish one.
STAR Stratford-Tottenham-Angel Road rail line, a proposed improvement to a 4 tph turn up and go frequency to increase capacity to Enfield Borough and the Upper Lea Valley. The planned first step in a long-term four-tracking of the Lea Valley main line to Broxbourne.
@LBM, and Anon at 13:24
Re STAR: Many more details and costings available in this public report to Enfield Cabinet on 11 March.
https://governance.enfield.gov.uk/documents/s50514/FINAL3315sharonamendedMWAngelRoadStationPart1ReportFINAL2%202%203.pdf
Looks like £120m+ for 3 miles of new line (albeit a single track), new bay platforms at Stratford, extra platforms and Access for All footbridges at Tottenham Hale and Northumberland Park, and a new station to be called Meridian Water, to replace Angel Road.
This compares with Croxley Link £284m for 1.9 miles and 2 stations…!
I think that SWT has discovered that there is quite a bit of potential in the more rural part of their territory.
I’ve heard that their Waterloo to Bristol route is doing quite well, but whether that is the improved connections for the towns between Bath and Salisbury to the M3 towns and not just London is argued over. But it seems that rural routes that go a long distance and connect to major towns and rail hubs do better than local shuttles that link to the nearest junction.
I doubt that any recent expansion of service is down to political pressure per se, as non of it is the franchise commitment and there are no additional subsidies. So that leaves looking at new growth potential of expanding west country towns.
The only real limit is capacity constraints on the Mainline inwards from Basingstoke.
The only solution to that is crossrail 2 and some flyovers.
@Rational Plan
Correct. SWT is finding good profitability with the West of England main line. The additional train mileage arising will be funded within SWT for the weekdays changes, though the Sunday extra trains depend on DfT approval.
The inter-urban nature of the post-Fiennes WoE route is attractive to users, and contrasts with the pathetic intermediate stations service west of Newbury on the GW main line (no useful train at all from Frome to the county town, Taunton, for example), and still no station at Somerton or Langport, which are obvious places to serve.
Whether the GW offer will change, we will have to see in next week’s Direct Award agreement between DfT and FGW.
Meanwhile, the initiation of a twice a day service between Waterloo and Frome/Bruton might be a hint of SWT’s wider ambitions with the main South Western refranchise in about 2018.
@ Castlebar 12:05
‘The Tories will need to win back seats such as Frome if they have any chance of being re-elected in May.’
According to a well-placed Lib Dem of my acquaintance, they have given up on Somerton & Frome and are concentrating their resources on trying to hold Chippenham.
@Anonymous
19 March 2015 at 15:49
The LD PPC at Somerton and Frome this time is David Rendel – the 24/7 MP for Newbury when dealing with Newbury bypass issues – so no simple shoo-in for any other party.
Don’t think we are wanted by the moderators to get too excited about (a) politics (b) this far from London, so suggest we close this particular thread!
[Indeed. Thank you Anonymice. LBM]
@Anonymice – whilst we must all surely agree that we shouldn’t get bogged down in West country politics, the discussion about SWT is certainly relevant to this thread and I wouldn’t support closing it – merely sconcing the political commentators.
@Graham H
No problems there!
Having seen the consultation, you may wish to be aware that, so far as the South West is concerned, the new SWT service offer isn’t a perfect reopener for Yeovil Pen Mill-Junction. There would be virtually no trains until after 1pm then approx hourly, which is unbalanced as an offer. The last direct train from Waterloo to Frome via Bruton would be at 12:50, so scarcely a day out in town! There’s still time to comment if you wish to, back to SWT (I assume to Phil Dominey). I wonder if adjustments are possible.
The wider issue is whether the enlarging commuting catchment west of Basingstoke – have you seen Andover’s growth recently? – would better be served by SWT or by a new South West franchise. 12-car trains will soon be needed on this currently diesel railway. Salisbury already offers about 2,000 commuters in the peaks.
My view is simple – keep it with SWT, as if electrified at least as far as Salisbury, it will need to be integrated with the existing Sir Herbert Walker railway, and that will probably prove to be the most efficient solution. The key may be who gets their hands on Salisbury depot.
@Anonymice – I guess the problem in improving the service much more is the lack of suitable stock. I doubt if the 159s can operate as 12s, alas, anyway. There are a number of issues relating to electrification, however (even though inevitable and desirable):
– it isn’t yet on NR’s planning horizon and therefore no medium term funding prospects
– the third rail v O/h controversy will rear its ugly head, particularly if it involves – as it should perhaps – taking the third rail to Exeter. (This less important these days with dual voltage stock but can still be a cause for bunfighting)
– the business case for going beyond Salisbury has always been the weaker half of the ploy.
GH – yes.
The ‘electric spine’ is now looking at via Laverstock for Southampton-Midlands freights, so expect OLE there, which also makes Waterloo-Salisbury passenger infrastructure low net cost.
There are other collateral statements around, try this:
http://m.andoveradvertiser.co.uk/news/11843614.Boost_for_Andover_s_train_users_as_Network_Rail_announce__electrification_assesment_/
With so much dual voltage stock around, and with the increased efficiency of overhead, and with icing problems in winter, the overhead/third-rail issue should be an open-and-shut case. If the rule isn’t “no new third-rail except on chords of max length 0.5 km”, then it ought to be.
Ian J
Why do you think I asked the question – been done (or proposed once) why not again?
Melvyn
IIRC when buses went “private” in London, didn’t “first” paint some yellow? With a giant red “f” logo – that looked for all the world like a huge zit. [ Hence the revolting joke of “first pus” of course, euw. ]
Graham H
A further point is that DfT are utterly, hopelessly and intransigently wedded to the view that there is no such thing as a British railways system, witness the attitude to fares, rolling stock, connexions, ticketing structures, information, system development etc
And, unless & until it can be dinned into their heads that this is totally wrong (Which it is) nothing major will improve, in this field – I think.
Prognosis for a change is – what?
MC
That “STAR” news is potentailly good stuff – all they need to do now is speed up the desperate slow trundle between Tottie Hale & Stratford…
GH/Anonymice
Indeed, electrification as far as Salisbury must give a reasonable bcr ratio, given that traffic?
@Anonymice – yes,though it would be most helpful if the electric spine could “settle down” – in my experience, failure to define a project and then dally with alternatives has always been naysayers’ biggest weapon (think Avon Metro, Picc-Vic, etc)
One other risk will arise if the rumoured WoE all-diesel franchise actually materialises – you can imagine the DfT arguments – concentrating specialist skills where they are most needed, flexibility in stock allocation, increase in operational risk etc etc – none of which is very logical. The argument from the naysayers will then be about tainting the purity of the all-diesel fleet.
@Malcolm -I agree and should have made my point more clearly and forcefully. It’s the ac/dc electric spine debate which will be a source of delay, as above.
I must admit I have been thinking about whether the class 442s, soon to be surplus to GatEx, would be suitable for Waterloo – Exeter, pushpulled by 67s, at least West of Woking.
I can think of all sorts of negatives but none worse than HSTs.
Or am I simply Hornbying, a practice quite as despicable as crayoning?
@Greg T -the last time that Salisbury-Exeter electrification was looked at seriously(c1988), the savings from going as far as Salisbury gave a very positive financial return. The problem then was that going on to Exeter had – then – very low traffic which turned the case negative. Splitting the service at Salisbury led to substantial disbenefits (financial and economic) because of the volume of cross-Salisbury traffic. At that time, dualmode operation wasn’t considered and as I recall, there were no suitable vehicles left to do a REP/cl 31 operation as had been done before
When I went to NSE, revisiting the case would have been a priority after we had agreed the strategic development plan, but privatisation supervened as with so much else. As answer=42 suggests, dual mode operation has become a possibility again (indeed, 67+442 was considered by one of the bidders for Uckfield). Performancewise, that would seem to comparable with cl 159 and so no loss of capacity.
Building a Brent Cross Station doesn’t mean anyone will stop there – cf. Stratford ‘International’ (sic) – indeed stopping Thameslink services there would actually reduce overall capacity because of the additional dwell time (and why on earth would Midland even consider stopping there?)
Quarts and pint pots, come to mind.
@Alison W – Exactly so. A little while back,I was advising the developers promoting Cricklewood New station. They wanted a self-financing station that would be funded by station charges. They really couldn’t understand that the charges would have to be so high that there was every incentive not to stop there;the extra traffic simply wouldn’t recover those costs. The problem is compounded by the Travelcard effect,where it is fiendishly,if not impossible, to demonstrate that the Travelcard pot would be enlarged by the addition of extra stations to the system, and even more difficult to demonstrate to specific operators that their specific share of that pot increases in line with the costs of stopping..
@Graham H
“there were no suitable vehicles left to do a REP/cl 31 operation as had been done before”
I think you mean Class 33, but I would have thought in 1988 there would be suitable stock – after all, the Gatwick Express was launched around that time and was operating push pull with 73s and Mark 2s.
An unpowered version of a 442 and with a 73 to push it to the limit of electrification where a 33/1 left over from the Weymouth operation would have done the trick. If new stock was not within budget, the East Coast Main Line was about to get a nice new fleet of mark 4s, so a cascade of stock was possible (assuming the existing Wloo-Exeter stock was for some reason unsuitable).
Redundant diesels were two a penny as the new class 58s and 60s came on stream.
@timbeau – well, there weren’t any spare “unpowered” 442s or 73s. As I recall, the cost of doing anything at all for Salisbury-Exeter, whether by cascade or conversion, was such that the business case wouldn’t carry it.
Actually, Graham H, I’d go further and suggest that *no* scheme for additional stations (or services) lying wholly within the zonal area can be expected to generate additional funding to pay towards its costs.
Anyone who needs to travel is already doing so, and they will – almost without fail – be using a zonal ticket of some description. As such, proving a new station for them to use will just give them an alternative, a choice, rather than make them am entirely new customer of ‘the system’ as a whole.
Yes, over an extended timescale, people may choose to move to a particular area based on the new transport facilities, but that isn’t a short-term effect.
(I think I’ve just argued for no improvement in London region services which don’t go outwith the GLA area. Damn!)
@Alison W -tell it not in Gath,but you are right – unless you can find a developer who is happy/can beheld over a barrel to contribute, or you can demonstrate the additional benefits are highly positive (and for the reasons you state, that is tricky).
@Graham H
No spare 442s in 1988, indeed: they had only just been built. Couldn’t the production run have been extended?
@AlisonW: Yes, over an extended timescale, people may choose to move to a particular area based on the new transport facilities, but that isn’t a short-term effect.
…although in the case of new housing which will only be built if there is a station, the short term effect would be fairly measurable. The time-honoured way of doing it would be for the railway company itself to build the housing and get the benefits of the increased land value itself, of course, but that only seems to happen in Japan these days.
“The time-honoured way of doing it would be for the railway company itself to build the housing and get the benefits of the increased land value itself”
Other than the Metropolitan Railway, did any other companies do this on any large scale?
@timbeau
‘Couldn’t the production run have been extended?’
Note precisely. The 442s recycle the electrical equipment of the REPs and all REPs were so treated. Moreover, as Graham says, there would have been no business case for so equipping Waterloo-Exeter.
The Edinburgh – Glasgow shuttle was run in the late 1980s in a similar way to GatEx: class 47 + Mk IIIs + Mk II driving trailer. I was an intermittent user of the service, which suffered from frequent (at least for me) train failures. The replacement equipment was class 158, so a similar solution to that found for Waterloo-Exeter.
@timbeau well, yes,you could have built some more 442s but the cost would have sunk the case, which was pretty close anyway. There are a couple of interesting – well, interesting to me – observations on Salisbury-Exeter first time round.
One, as with the contemporary replacement of the Regional fleet, the cost of operating locomotives compared with dmus was understood to be exorbitant,which is what militated against the “propelling” option. Fashions in costings have changed (it would be useful to know why) and the Uckfields,as noted, were seen as distinct targets for that form of operation.
Two, at that time,useage for the Salisbury-Exeter section was low and certainly there were factions who would have been prepared to close it. Splitting the service (ie electrifying the Salisbury-Basingstoke section, and leaving the stretch to Exeter as a diesel shuttle ) would probably have been the most cost-effective, if passenger-unfriendly option. However, at that time, it would have left the section very exposed to the closers and a through service blunted their attack. Onc you wanted a through service on policy grounds,159s became inevitable.
Even in the early ’90s, however, traffic was beginning to pick up west of Salisbury, and the need to attach the orphan to a good family was much less;equally,though, splitting the service wold have made even less sense.
@Answer = 42
“Note precisely. The 442s recycle the electrical equipment of the REPs and all REPs were so treated”
I know, but I was suggesting extending the production run to include “an unpowered version of a 442 to operate with a 73”
The Edinburgh-Glasgow push-pull services used converted Class 47s controlled from the DBSO through signals over the lighting circuits, quite different from the full EP-type multiple unit operation for which the Bournemouth and Gatwick services were equipped, along with the class 33s and 73s which worked them. By 1988 the Southern had twenty years of experience of controlling both Sulzer and EE engines over EP circuits.
Beyond Salisbury with push-pull would seem to be a viable option, then, given that extending the “juice” to “S” has a good business case?
So what stock does one use?
Push-pull-fitted 442’s seem to fit the bill, but what motive power does one attach/detach at “S”?
67? 68?
@Ian J 0449
“The time-honoured way of doing it would be for the railway company itself to build the housing and get the benefits of the increased land value itself,”
Further to me at 0658: I found a reference. The Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 required railways to sell off surplus lands within ten years of the time given for completion of the work in the line’s enabling Act. For some reason the Metropolitan was given an exemption from this.
@Graham H 0824: I think we crossed – I take your points
Timbeau
Thanx. I’d forgotten about those lighting circuits. Given that the stock was fairly new, one would have that a Southern-type solution could have been implemented. But IIRC it was the 47s rather than the control circuits, that gave the problems.
Your ‘unpowered 442s’ could have been converted early MkIIs with MU-type control as you describe and driving positions. Cheaper than new but probably still would have required diesel propulsion thoughout.
‘probably still would have required diesel propulsion thoughout.’
Or maybe not; The REPs were overpowered to propel 4TCs. Could the same have been possible with 442s plus an unpowered version?
@Graham H, et al:
Are there any clearance issues that would make installing OHLE problematic between Salisbury and Exeter? I don’t recall the route having many bridges and tunnels, though it has been over twenty years since I used the line. I do recall it being mostly single track back then and running through an awful lot of open countryside, which suggests that the DC option might actually be more expensive given the additional power supply infrastructure that requires.
That said, I think it makes sense for electrification of that route to be done later, as the GWML electrification project winds down. That will be bringing the knitting at least as far west as Bristol and Cardiff. Electrifying Bristol to Exeter would be a logical next step. If Basingstoke to Salisbury is electrified during that period, the case for electrification of the SWML route from there to Exeter is easier to justify, as it would otherwise be an ‘island’ of diesel between two electrified networks.
Vivarail’s D-Train project might be a good fit in the meantime.
On a related note: would OHLE be at all viable for the Dawlish sea wall section south of Exeter?
@Anomnibus – I’m not aware of any major bits of infrastructure that would hinder OHLE clearances; ac with dual voltage stock would be the logical option – as you say, the extra substations required for long distance dc are often the cost killer (as with SW non-power upgrade,and Reading-Reigate electrification).
Dieselislands are certainly expensive but I can foresee HMT taking a dim view of electrifying to Exeter twice…
@Graham H
“I can foresee HMT taking a dim view of electrifying to Exeter twice…”
They did it to Cambridge – extending from both Royston and Bishops Stortford in the same project. And to Edinburgh – from Carstairs and from Hitchin.
A=42
” REPs were overpowered to propel 4TCs. Could the same have been possible with 442s”
A REP had four power bogies to power a twelve car train (REP-TC-TC). A ten-car 442 formation of similar length also has the very same four power bogies (two under each centre car in each five car set).
If you wanted to do a REP-TC system between Exeter, Salisbury and London you would have to have a number of “double power” 442s (with four power bogies) to work with the unpowered ones. You would need more of the latter as they go all the way to Exeter, whilst the powered ones would only shuttle between London and Salisbury. The fastest trains from London to Salisbury currently take nearly 90 minutes – allowing for some faster running with electric power you could possibly manage three hours for the round trip with tight layovers at each end.
There were 15 REPs, and therefore sixty power bogies. 48 of them are now under the twenty-four class 442s. Assuming all the REP motors were still serviceable, that leaves twelve – enough for only three double-powered 442s – just enough for an hourly service, but with no maintenance overhead.
@timbeau – the extension to Cambridge via Hitchin was remarkably cheap and apparently genuinely cost -saving. although as one senior NSE personage put it to me subsequently,smirking awhile, “We did construct rather a long headshunt towards Hitchin from Cambridge as part of the LST scheme”
@ Alison W / Graham H – surely the fundamental point is the “self financing” aspect required by the developers for Brent Cross? While I am not saying there aren’t difficulties with revenue allocation and “forcing” operators to stop I disagree with the premise that journey volumes are fixed and there’s no generation effect. The Brent Cross redevelopment is enormous and will generate extra work, shopping and residential journeys. Worse much of it is predicated on massive road improvements with only minimal public transport investment – a new NR station and a revamped Brent Cross bus station plus a bit of money for more bus service volume is all that’s covered. Meanwhile TfL are giving the developers a “free hand” to spend over £260m on improvements to TfL and Borough roads. That’s already resulted in Mayor’s Questions about how that concept is going to be managed.
You’ll be telling me next that there are no journeys to and from Stratford International DLR despite a massive housing and retail development being metres away. The point is that in the short term there is definitely a need for financial support for new infrastructure but that’s why we have business cases and social cost benefit analysis. We clearly can add railway stations in London and we can clearly afford to do so Langdon Park on the DLR is a good example. It was funded and it’s busy throughout the day – far busier than expected. Mr Arquati wrote a paper about its impact on development and housing.
http://www.tps.org.uk/files/Main/bursary/award2013/David_Arquati.pdf
It’s a no brainer and why there is no obvious policy objective to do it or to actually build, rather than talk about, improved interchanges I don’t know.
It’s also why I am so narked at the ludicrous policy change that we only do transport improvements if the private sector opens its cheque book having got a whole load of disused public land on the cheap. Completely the wrong way to do things. Developers should be *forced* to put in the capital and running cost funding as an absolute condition of their development. If they don’t like it then tough.
@timbeau – (Off topic) Personally, I await re-use of use eight EE507 traction motors, as used on Southern Electric stock, incorporated in the 5-BEL unit being restored, hopefully to run on the main line later this year:
http://brightonbelle.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=200113
@WW -Don’t get me wrong: I share your views about the insistence on stations as self-financing. I didn’tmean that stations do not have a generative effect; of course they do. The difficulty is that the matching revenue effect is very very difficult to allocate to specific operators (amongst other reasons because it’s spread more widely,of course, than just for the operator serving the new station, and because there will always be a degree of journey substitution). Since the Travelcard pot is distributed by negotiation amongst dozens of players, the debate about reallocation following the opening of a new station is likely to be full of handy combustible material lying around.
@Graham H
” the extension to Cambridge via Hitchin was remarkably cheap and apparently genuinely cost -saving. ”
Indeed – the mystery is why the original 1977 GN electrification only went to Royston, with a diesel shuttle from there to Cambridge.
@ Anomnibus re Dawlish electrification – this would suggest not, although there are obviously lots of other factors, but the combination of sea and OHLE looks doable from this
timbeau,
Pure speculation on my part but I suspect that part of the issue was that the diesel trains for Royston-Cambridge were around and there was little to be saved by scrapping them early. I also suspect it is a case of it was (and still is) easier to get a scheme approved if you can break it down into smaller chunks each of which can stand up on its own merit. So, an element of “we’ll let you go as far as Royston and see how you do with that and then maybe later consider going on from there”.
Of course, if I am correct, then once the diesels need replacing the costs change and, as Graham H says, the scheme can be a genuine cost saving one.
Another issue with electrification schemes is that a scheme can become more or less viable depending on the projected long term price of oil. So, without anything else changing, a scheme could be re-evaluated and found to now be worthwhile when previously it wasn’t (or vice versa).
Herned: Your second link seems to be broken…
I can’t see any problems with OHLE along the Dawlish seawall, Saltcoats is one place. Here’s another downunder that regularly gets a pounding.
@Southern Heights
No, wasn’t a second link, just html incompetence…
A suggestion to electrify to Salisbury (with overhead line) is in the Wessex route study draft p. 113. It’s billed as a “electrified freight diversionary route”, but other advantages listed are to increase the Basingstoke to Southampton conversion work and benefit from efficiencies of scale, and to increase the size of the SWT dual-voltage fleet.
Edgepedia: to increase the size of the SWT dual-voltage fleet
Do SWT own, or lease, a pantograph yet?
Re Kit,
Increase from 0
@ Kit I had understood that all the original class 450 and class 444 stock came with pantographs. They were then removed for storage as it was determined they would deteriorate even though they were not being used. So if I am correct SWT have a large stock of them somewhere unless they were passed to the relevant Rosco for storage.
@ngh/kit.
SWT don’t own any rolling stock.
AC or ac/dc versions of all SWT electric units (even classes 455 and 456) exist (Desiro classes 350/360, Juniper class 334) , and all post-privatisation types are designed to be retrofitted with ac gear.
Note the pantograph well on the nearest vehicle in the class 444 – they are there on all SWT units although on some types they are covered by a fairing. http://ukrailwaypics.smugmug.com/UKRailwayPics/Electric-Multiple-Units/Class-444/i-2wbmHjH/0/S/444006_c67156_ClaphamJcn_160407-S.jpg
Whether the kit (pantograph, rectifier, and transformer) is in store by the ROSCOs or would have to be bought off the shelf I don’t know.
Note also the lowered ceiling at the far end of this class 455 MS – what’s the reason for that?
Class 455 linkie escaped – here it is
http://paulbigland.zenfolio.com/img/s9/v88/p1502318290-3.jpg
Re Timbeau,
455 I think that bit is the ventilation unit – there is 1 low ceiling end in every original 455 (i.e. not-508 trailers)
The Siemsn/Alstom stock, the mountings and insulators in the roof wells don’t appear to have ever been fitted so I suspect a pantograph has never been near them…
Save 100k+/unit by not fitting all the AC gear…
455/456 and the 6 new 458/5 (531-536) don’t have wells as the ex Gatex 460s didn’t.
The rest have wells.
@ngh
“there is 1 low ceiling end in every original 455”
only in the motor coaches, unless the trailer I was in tonight was exceptional.
The presence of a pan well, even though it is a sign that the intent to facilitate conversion to AC supply was there at the design stage, does not necessarily mean that it would be easy, affordable and/or worthwile to undertake the conversion on any particular type of train (there are one or two infamous examples). As any progressive DC-to-AC infrastructure conversion would take place over many years, it is in any case plausible that no such rolling stock conversion would be necessary if a suitable programme of withdrawal of life expired stock and cascade of newer DC-only stock accompanied the works on the power supply infrastructure.
@Caspar Lucas
Indeed, although some conversions (of the 365s for example) seem to have gone reasonably smoothly. And even if they were convertible as built, subsequent mods may have interfered with that.
There are several examples of “future proofing” for events that never happened – the Mark 4s on the ECML are designed for 140mph operation, and have narrower body profiles to let them tilt (with a noticeable effect on the internal ambience compared with the older but wider 125s. But the necessary signalling upgrade never happened, so it looks like they will eventually go to scrap having never tilted.
@timbeau 20/03 12.30
In the late 70s the main route from Cambridge to London would have been via the Lea Valley, perhaps with loco hauled trains? If Royston-Cambridge had been electrified at that time then Cambridge passengers would have wanted to immediately transfer to using the faster King’s Cross route which would have required new fast services and the EMUs to run them, perhaps there was not a budget for that. It would also have abstracted traffic and reduced passenger numbers via the Lea Valley, leaving the finances of those services less secure.
Also in the mid/late 70s there was probably not the heavy Cambridge-London daily commuter and international tourist flow that there is now, so demand would have been lighter. If I recall correctly towns like Huntington on the ECML expanded fast in the late 70s and 80s once the fast electric service was introduced. Before that it would not have been a popular commute on slower DMUs.
timbeau: Indeed, although some conversions (of the 365s for example) seem to have gone reasonably smoothly.
It may be that my memory is not correct, but I am sure that Wikipedia is wrong regarding the class 365 dual voltage issue.
I used to commute from Paddock Wood and am fairly sure that the new 365s did indeed have pantographs when they first appeared. They did not need to operate in dual voltage as there were no timetabled duties that required it. The main voltage conversion of the stock was the removal of 3rd rail shoes when they went north of the Thames.
Am I mistaken?
@kit Green
The SEG Group bears out the Wikipedia entry
http://www.semgonline.com/gallery/class365_01.html
Only 365502 was fitted with both ac and dc equipment.
Safeguarding for Crossrail 2 confirmed by the DfT today. The safeguarding is based on the Regional scheme design so we can wave goodbye to all the errors of said scheme being corrected. 🙁 Disappointing.
@WW-more than disappointing – a wasted opportunity…possibly even – think of the “legacy” services – harmful.
WW / GHG
Even so, there is no garuantee that CR2 will actually follow the “safegaurded” route in its entirety, is there?
It seems entirely possible ( Likely even?) that there will be variations & modifications before any shovels or TBm’s are stuck in to the ground ….
@Greg
“there is no garuantee that CR2 will actually follow the “safegaurded” route in its entirety, is there”
Indeed not – after all, it is not the first CR2 route to have been safeguarded, and may not be the last.
I remember in January 2014 I met with Lord Adonis in his office off Whitehall, I asked him whether the Crossrail 2 routing was final. He said it wasn’t, but then I suppose they added the section to New Southgate.
@ Greg / Timbeau – I appreciate that changes can and do happen post safeguarding. However all the political momentum is towards the regional scheme and I really don’t see Michelle Dix in her new role at CR2 doing much to move away from where the political consensus is. We’re due yet another consultation stage in a few months with more detail but I detect no appetite for adding stations where they’re needed or changing routes. We’re more likely to see things scrapped or phased to make the scheme “affordable” or to meet developer requirements. I know I’m a bit of a lone voice in not being convinced by the CR2 proposal and I expect I will be “wailing in the desert” for a long while but I’ll spare the LR audience the pain.
@WW – the best, if somewhat negative, comfort that can be offered is that the whole thing remains unfinanced and when funding becomes available (2020s, 2030s?), the world will have moved on and the preferred route may be radically different. The safeguarding of the Fleet Line route is a good precedent.
Graham H
Actually, I think I’m going to disagree about that.
With current interest rates, the thing is affordable right now – but maybe not so much, later on ???
@Greg T – we might agree that it is less unaffordable now than it will be in twenty years’ time perhaps. (BTW “unaffordable” in Treasury speak means that there is no budgetry provison; things suddenly become affordable when political necessity intrudes – money is then found down the back of the sofa/SOFA).
@WW
Don’t worry you are not alone, Crossrail 2 is such a wasted opportunity. You’d be a lone voice over on Skyscrapercity though, where they appear think the routing is perfect last time I checked on there.
PoP
A few months ago you set out what Crossrail 2 is intended to achieve in excellent detail.
Is there any possibility of you reposting it before the chorus of “your route is ridiculous, mine which goes from X via Y etc etc etc” gets up too loud?
Alternatively should they not be obliged to disclose their methods and calculations?
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32041167
Report by the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee: key points:
-The government’s main arguments in favour of HS2 are not proven.
-There are less-expensive options.
-The Government have not carried out a proper assessment of whether alternative ways of increasing capacity would be more cost-effective,
-Investment in improving rail links in the North of England might deliver much greater economic benefit at a fraction of the cost.
Which puts a big question mark over both XR2’s preferred route, and the proposed developments at Old Oak Common
Re Anonymous 25 March 2015 at 13:42
How about all CR2 comment on the dedicated CR2 article?:
https://www.londonreconnections.com/2013/crossrail-2-doing-nothing-is-not-an-option/
On the subject of Surface Access to Airports. TfL’s response to questions from Zac Goldsmith, chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Heathrow and the Wider Economy was published by the APPG on the 27th of March. (Handily the last working day before the dissolution of Parliament and the beginning of the pre-election period, although it looks like TfL provided their responses sometime in February.)
Zac Goldsmith’s press release is dated the 30th of March, and the local press have only picked up the story today, so it looks like raising the issue at this point has involved some good old fashioned electioneering in a constituency where the Conservatives have a slim majority to defend and expansion of Heathrow is a major issue.
What is interesting is that in some ways it reads like an all out attack by TfL on the work of The Airports Commission. On the other hand it reads like the opening salvo in a quest for greater capital funding for TfL when the inevitable happens and the commission recommends the expansion of Heathrow. There are a few lines that one could almost believe Boris wrote himself, including the final footnote:
It must be remembered that the next Government is under no obligation to accept and act on the findings of the Airports Commission. They may for example, wish to progress an alternative option, which the Commission has previously ruled out.
@ JA – it has been clear for many months that TfL are doing what their “Master” at City Hall commands with respect to aviation issues and London airports. While it’s absolutely obvious why aviation policy will always be intensely political I feel very uncomfortable about the rather obvious “bias” that has been visible in TfL’s statements about the estuary airport and Heathrow. This is the sort of point where political control of London’s transport causes problems for me – I’d much prefer TfL to be completely neutral / objective about the transport implications that result from the options for airport locations. There should be clarity as to where’s TfL advice starts and stops and the politicians’ “bias / views / comments” take over.
WW
I’d much prefer TfL to be completely neutral / objective about the transport implications that result from the options for airport locations.
But – they cannot be, because of the engineering & other issues that directly affect their legitimate “brief” I’m afraid.
The big vested interests are pushing for more Heathrow, whereas (ISTM) that everyone else wants “anywhere BUT Heathrow” – & I tend to agree with the latter.
Problem: Where?
Weerever the expansion / new airport goes will require extensive, effective transport links, won’t it? (Stating the obvious)
@ WW
I had occasion recently to work closely with the Aviation team at TfL and was taken by both their broad range of knowledge and their willingness to assist. Between you, I and the internet, they were the most impressive of the organisations I dealt with on this particular project and tried to answer directly the many questions put to them rather than, as in the case of others I could name, resort to PR puff or information overload to distract or distort my lines of enquiry.
TfL of course is a functional body analogous to a local authority and as such its officers will have to, on occasion, reflect in communication the views of their elected master(s). What you perceive as bias will no doubt be a watered-down and coded version of the political position. Do forgive me for stating the bleedin’ obvious, as I know you have plenty of experience in this arena too, but I have a lot of sympathy for my TfL colleagues here.
THC
Some reactions to various points raised in this fascinating thread [previous attempt seemed to object to pasting tabs!].
1) Passenger behaviour (1): queuing. With buses, non-queuing seems a peculiarly London phenomenon. From my experiences elsewhere in the UK, the norm is to form an orderly queue for buses. In London, the norm is to form a disorderly bunch with buses so frequent that everyone will get on the next one. But there are exceptions, e.g. Waterloo, with orderly queues at most of the various northbound stops along Waterloo Road, and two for the 521 – one for each, and woe betide anyone who queue-jumps. Point is, it becomes a matter of practice by common agreement with particular groups of people of common disposition to suit particular circumstances at particular times (I’m sure there must be a single word to describe all this but I can’t think of it).
2) Passenger behaviour (2): shortest route: Interesting phenomenon at Bond Street on connecting passageway from Jubilee to Central line. Many ignore the signs at the top of the Jubilee escalator and turn right at the first connecting passageway to the Central, knowing it’s shorter. Also, everyone keeps right despite the “Keep Left” signs, because it works better. However, once in the straight bit, there is sometimes a general drift to the left. Either way, conflict with the opposite direction inevitably occurs. People in the know will ignore signage in favour of pragmatism. Kings Cross is a prime example of this – most of the underground signage involves far longer walking than necessary in the pursuit of directional separation, so the cognoscenti do the opposite.
3) Extension of the Aldwych stub: this seems on the face of it a major missed opportunity, and by my understanding it was touch and go in the late 60s between Victoria Line extension to Brixton and Piccadilly extension to Waterloo, and Brixton won. Arguably both should have proceeded. Holborn-Waterloo desperately needs mass transit, although the 521 northbound does pretty well non-stop through the Strand tunnel. But – and this is a big but – exiting Holborn station in the morning is a horrendous experience – nasty from the Central Line, and positively abhorrent from the Piccadilly with its long, narrow tunnels and two very long escalators. To the extent that I shun it despite originating from the north on the Jubilee, continuing to Waterloo and bussing back north to Holborn, rather than the obvious change at Bond Street (present Kingsway closure notwithstanding). This is a classic example of reverse behaviour to avoid specific unpleasant crowd conditions. Homewards I again avoid the crush by using Thameslink from City, slightly longer but vastly more agreeable.
Now all that is a bit of a deviation – my main point was to be that if the Waterloo extension had gone ahead, Holborn would have needed major restructuring deep down, with a whole new exit route from the Piccadilly, to cater for all the extra people who currently use buses. So the extension would in effect have been very expensive and disruptive – or ineffective. Had the cross-river tram proceeded – who knows?
4) Work locations in relation to transport links: There has been much discussion about the fact that the new build provides capacity at specific places (e.g. 10% along the Crossrail corridor) whereas the overall anticipated demand expansion would be widespread. However, I don’t think this will be the case – certainly not in commerce. A lot of the increase will concentrate at specific points such as Stratford, Kings Cross, Paddington, Old Oak Common, TCR, Farringdon, where transport infrastructure is being upgraded. There will of course be some leisure-stimulated general expansion as London becomes a more attractive place for recreation, but the larger commercial/industrial proportion should proactively locate at the new transport hubs, with appropriate local government intervention to supplement natural gravitation as necessary. Likewise, new housing will tend to focus on the new hubs and corridors.
The indisiplined queuing is surely in part a result of multiple bus routes serving the same stop, so that nobody knows who is queuing for which – for some, any bus will do: others going beyond the divergence point (or the short-working destination) may have to let the first bus go, so will let others go past them. If you form separate queues for each route, which one should the short-hoppers join.
And if two buses arrive at once, the entrance to the second bus can be several metres down the queue – who gets on the bus first – the people nearest the door (which is quicker) or the people nearest the flag (fairer)?
Add to that the tendency for the un-umbrella’d to huddle under the shelter whilst the better prepared stay nearer the kerb.
A propos the un-umbrella’d, someone once summarised their distress:
“The rain falls with equal force
Upon the just and unjust fella,
But more upon the just because
The unjust has the just’s umbrella.”
Update, from the Cambridge end, but dealing with a lot of London material as well.
This pdf-article on upgrading “W-Anglia” before CR2 is built, with political pressure form Cambridge & intermediate points.
[ P.S. I assume the original article author, J.R. is well-aware of this?
P.P.S. New franchise award is to be announced very soon, isn’t it? ]
Re Greg,
Some of those Stanstead journey time improvement look a bit optimistic unless they try to run non stop, they also seem to forget more trains running on the fasts with limited stops so they would just catch them up and the need to stop at Tottenham Hale (and probably Broxbourne too after CR2) to maximise passenger numbers. The key as they have noted is sorting the single track tunnel into Stanstead.
@ngh: That single track tunnel always struck me as monumentally stupid, how on earth was that ever signed off?
Not too sure about the layout at the airport itself either, it looks unfinished….
@SH….Perhaps it had something to do with an intention to extend the line further east (to Braintree) and make it a through station? I’ve read about this in several places across the web, but am unsure whether or not this is true.
I was equally as surprised as you are to discover on my very first trip on the line that the line through the tunnel is single. I suspect (as always) that money (or lack thereof) was the reason.
Perhaps Graham H (aka Mr NSE) would be kind enough to share his knowledge about these issues….
@Anonymously – wearing both my DTp and BR hats, I can assure you that no one in any position other than a crayonista had any plans to extend to Braintree* (the business case would have been pretty dire without bothering to get out the fag packet+). As it was, the business case for Stansted was weak – hence the single tunnel. The link was supposed to be at the limit of an acceptable journey time and the possibility of running apparently loss-making RR services into the station didn’t help.
* Closure of the Braintree branch was a constant theme in the ’80s ,and the Stansted line was constructed facing away from any natural route to the east.
+ The traffic from the likes of perhaps at best Ipswich was hardly going to justify it; from anywhere else such as Chelmsford or Southend, it was always going to be as quick to go to LST and out again.
Single tunnel: money, presumably. But also, as present plans and hopes are showing, running a service intensive enough to justify a double tunnel will also require further tracks towards London, so unless these are forthcoming, tunnel-doubling, even now, is pointless.
Re Malcolm,
I disagree, (I suggest you have very good look at the Timetable of everything in the Stanstead area with a spreadsheet and some modelling) the easiest and cheapest way to improve Stanstead Express journey time to London (and journey times and reliability on other services e.g Cmabridge) is building a second tunnel and grade separating some of the junctions from the branch including probably the Cambridge facing junction too (those pesky Regional Railways services) as the single track is a huge constraint on the timetable this is before any potential increase in frequency…
It would then allow better flighting further South and less hold up of Cambridge services etc.
As the airport not NR would be paying, the airport will of course claim the problem isn’t on their turf for as long as they can!
@Graham H…I suspected as much. I’ve taken the opportunity to edit out the statement regarding any further eastward extension from the Wikipedia entry on Stansted Airport Station, with a link to your comment (let’s see how those editors deal with this!).
As the airport branch only serves the airport, it would be extraordinary if anyone other than the airport was persuaded to stump up cash for improvements. But, remember that it isn’t just little ole Stansted, the owners also have Manchester, East Midlands and Bournemouth in their portfolio. It would be quite interesting to know where the money for the extra platform at Manchester Airport came from- another airport sitting on an exclusive branch line.
ngh: that’s interesting. I do believe you, but I find the result surprising. If there is room for more Stansted trains through Broxbourne (by flighting) then that would seem to fit quite nicely with flighting through the current tunnel (so long as it’s two London trains per flight, due to the number of platforms at Stansted). But it’s probably, as you say, the difficult interactions with Cambridge trains and the flat junctions which kibosh this now. And grade-separating any of the junctions without doubling the tunnel would seem quite daft.
@Anonymously 🙂
On the single track tunnel, one needs to remember that at the time of its construction, Stansted was relatively lightly used. Whilst they presumably calculated that the rail link would help increase business, in 1992 Ryanair had just two routes from there, out of a mere 6 in total, and Easyjet didn’t yet exist. When Norman Foster’s terminal was first built, it was a vision of passengers wafting through elegant wide open spaces. It wasn’t known that growth of the low cost airlines would soon be so exponential, and that the place would be bursting at the seems like a cross between a shopping centre and a bus station in eternal rush hour.
I guess it’s a hard call to draw a line between ‘over-egging’ and ‘future proofing’ infrastructure. One only has to think about the M25’s widening, and then using the hard shoulder etc. I find it interesting that, to my knowledge, very little of the deliberations about next runway for the southeast considers the issue of rail capacity, whether through Broxbourne, East Croydon or Ealing Broadway, when one considers that a runway effectively adds another Stansted or Gatwick-s’worth of passengers. Someone – in the right place, and with a Quantity Surveyor or two by their side – needs to get some crayons out!
Malcolm,
We are back to the age old issue of optimising rail capacity. You can often optimise railway infrastructure (sections of double track, single track, junctions) by crafty timetabling. This can be optimised for journey time or capacity. Despite what most people seem to think it is nearly always journey time v capacity – an improvement in one usually leads to a deterioration in the other.
Back to optimising by location, once you have optimised one area, you can’t go an optimise a second area without regard to your first optimisation. If you ever were to read the first (fallacious) proof of the four colour map theorem you will see how even great minds can overlook this simple fact. So you could provide a timetable to maximise use of the Stansted tunnel and you could show it didn’t need to be double track. You could increase capacity along the route to and from London by optimising pathing and flighting trains. You can optimise the junction leading to Stansted Airport. But these are each timetable constraints and you can’t optimise all simultaneously.
Almost worse than the crayonista is the person who wants a particular train service and proposes a solution that involves rewriting the timetable over a massive area – the consequences of which they either do not understand or are not interested in. I could be thinking of Govia here but we will save that for another day.
@PoP -well said -if anything, I’d go further and say that you can optimise the system (track,timetable, stock) for any one state, but change any of the inputs and you will have a new balance point which is not necessarily what you intended. This is what makes business cases, which are usually built around an incremental change to just one of the inputs,so difficult. [It is also yet another argument for not having a disintegrated railway with the cases for new stock, track and services, running along merrily in silos, but let it pass].
@Anonymously: I hadn’t considered making it a through link to Braintree, perhaps carrying on towards Cambridge… Access from the old formation towards Braintree looks much better from the South (note: at least on google maps). This is merley a geographic observation and NOT an invitation for people to reach for their crayons!
@PoP
“Almost worse than the crayonista is the person who wants a particular train service and proposes a solution that involves rewriting the timetable over a massive area ”
Such as Brighton to Bedford, which has resulted in changes throughout south east England in order to fit them through Borough Market Junction.
@SHLR – what would be the point of extending to Cambridge when there’s already a curve in that direction? [Cambridge – another giant untapped market with err just the one link to Stansted].
@timbeau -and this is the problem with all RER-type schemes (and will be the problem with CR2, if built). From an operator’s point of view, the more services are linked, the greater the potential to spread unreliability over a wider area.
timbeau,
I really don’t have a problem with Brighton-Bedford from that point of view. In fact it is one of the better cases. The danger was recognised so there was only 1tph in the peaks through London Bridge and there was masses of recovery time in the Thameslink core. In other words it had to fit in with what was around it which is fair enough.
In the future Brighton-Bedford will have an almost ideal segregated route because the whole thing has been properly planned for and the level of infrastructure necessary to provide the service has been recognised and will be provided. I don’t think in future it will be the Brighton-Bedford services that will cause problems with Thameslink – or cause Thameslink to create problems for other lines. Maybe one should be looking further east to the more congested East Coast Main Line.
I was thinking more in terms of the Orbirail proposal in the 60s/70s where proponents seemed to expect their new route to have priority and the rest of the world (well, South East England) work around that.
I could mention those wanting the Arun Valley line trains to go via Dorking rather than Gatwick or a certain example in the Wimbledon area.
@ PoP – that would be the “ideal” route whose upgraded assets regularly fall over and cause massive delays in the core? And is it not the case that post 2018 the timetable for the BML becomes the constraint that governs pathing and timetables on the ECML and to a lesser extent on the MML?
I follow Thameslink on Twitter and there is barely a weekday when the service does not fall apart (ignoring staffing problems). Hopefully the 700s will be better behaved than what they are replacing but I don’t have the faith you appear to have that Thameslink can run seamlessly and to the second. Surely the lesson for your many excellent articles is that the BML is a constrained railway and not in the best condition? Users of the route also face the prospect, funding permitting, of many more years of major works to unpick the next set of constraints. Even if trains can glide through London Bridge in the future they have to get there first (through all the other building sites)!
@PoP….What are these 60s/70s Orbirail proposals that you speak of? Do they bear any resemblance to what we have now in the London Overground?
@Graham H….So did the creation of the RER have any far reaching effects on the surrounding railways in the Paris region?
It seems as though there is no ideal solution here….you either stick with services terminating on opposite sides of London taking up valuable terminal capacity (and clogging up the Tube as commuters transfer onto it), or you merge them into cross-London routes (TLK/CR etc) and potentially affect every main line that they connect to.
The only solution seems to be completely segregated end-to-end cross London routes (rather like parts of the Tube!……Morden to High Barnet, West Ruislip to Epping and Heathrow to Cockfosters could be regarded as such), which isn’t exactly cheap…..
@WW…..So if the BML becomes the main constraint on the ECML post TLK, then does that remove any pressing need to quadruple the ‘unmentionable’ viaduct and tunnels en route? ?
@Walthamstow Writer,
I am starting to feel that you want to make a point and twist what I wrote to make it.
I said the ideal segregated route and I would have thought it was clear from the context that was what I was talking about. Whether the trains break down or the upgraded assets fall over on that route is completely irrelevant to the point about the route being segregated. Even if they have to glide through other building sites it doesn’t changed the fact it will almost be a segregated route – or at least it will have very few conflicting junctions.
And yes, it is more of an issue if Thameslink trains have to find paths on the East Coast Main Line rather than the Midland Main Line. I was referring to those problems when I stated Maybe one should be looking further east to the more congested East Coast Main Line [for lines that cause problems with other lines].
Anonymously: No. I note your smiley, but the lesson I have learnt (or relearnt) from PoP’s mention earlier of optimising different bottlenecks (he referred to the Stansted route, but it generalises) is simply that the existence of a “main constraint” (aka apparently narrower bottleneck) somewhere on a route does not make dealing with a “lesser constraint” (slightly less-narrow bottleneck) nugatory.
This would apply to Welwyn by the simple observation that if it were quadrupled, the timetable would not have to be optimised around that blockage, and there would be more scope for optimising in respect of some other bottleneck. It could be seen as a kind of action-at-a-distance principle, where an infrastructure improvement in one place can improve throughput at some other place, maybe tens of miles away. Timetable planning is not a branch of domestic plumbing.
Malcolm,
It could be seen as a kind of action-at-a-distance principle, where an infrastructure improvement in one place can improve throughput at some other place, maybe tens of miles away.
No need to be so parochial. The classic example is the problem they had with timekeeping on the lines into Paddington that was substantially alleviated by re-doubling the track between Probus and Burngullow – in Cornwall.
There are similar examples on the Cotswold line that have improved timekeeping at Paddington for all routes.
The black joke in BR days was that the Channel Tunnel combined with TLK would lead to announcements along the lines of “Owing to the derailment of a goods wagon in Skopje last Tuesday, the 08.12 from Caterham has been cancelled”.
PoP, Graham: Thanks for those examples. Though the principle did refer to improving throughput at some other place. Reliability and throughput are obviously linked, but greater reliability elsewhere is rather less surprising/paradoxical than greater throughput.
@ PoP – re your first sentence I can assure you that I am not doing that. I make the comments I make. I don’t sit here trying to find fancy ways of manipulating what others say or write. I merely respond to their comments. I don’t expect people to agree with me – I’ve been used to having the minority opinion for a long time on a whole range of topics. If others disagree with me then that’s fine. Hopefully we are a broad enough “church” here to tolerate different opinions.
@PoP
“I really don’t have a problem with Brighton-Bedford from that point of view. In fact it is one of the better cases. The danger was recognised so there was only 1tph in the peaks through London Bridge
In the future Brighton-Bedford will have an almost ideal segregated route because the whole thing has been properly planned for and the level of infrastructure necessary to provide the service has been recognised and will be provided. ”
It is the cost (not just in money but in aggravation) of providing that infrastructure to which I was referring. Little overall benefit for all the aggro to SE commuters whilst the work is going on – on the contrary if you happen to want to travel from Greenwich to Waterloo or Charing Cross.
Is Brighton – Bedford so much more of a moneyspinner through the Snow Hill link than say Medway-Bedford or Canterbury to Cambridge, which could have been achieved with a lot less engineering.
timbeau: I think your use of the word “moneyspinner” is not helpful in this context. Whatever PoP (or anyone else) said about Brighton to Bedford, it was nothing to do with fares revenue. Challenge the chosen objectives of Thameslink by all means, and discuss the trade-offs between journeys facilitated and journeys hindered. And challenge, if you like, the costs (financial and other) of doing the work. But please address what contributors actually say. PoP said (as you quoted) that Brighton-Bedford will be “almost ideally segregated”. He didn’t make any claims about its profitability, or about its desirability in any other respect.
I accept that ‘moneyspinner” was not the best choice of word, as revenue was not the prime justification for the original Brighton/Bedford service, and may even have been a good idea at a time of lower traffic levels through Borough Market than there are now. But once established, such services are very hard to take away again (as the Wimbledon Loop saga illustrates) . However, had the Medway Towns been favoured instead of the BML, much of the expense and disruption of the Thameslink 2000-&-counting project could have been avoided, and indeed might have been completed by the original target date.
@Anonymously
“What are these 60s/70s Orbirail proposals that you speak of? Do they bear any resemblance to what we have now in the London Overground?”
Not sure about the 60s/70s one, but the “current ORBITRAIL” was described in Hansard in 2009. However this appears to be from Mr M Rawson, “a retired police officer with a life long passion for trains”…
” London’s 11 terminus stations are the hub and the tracks that emanate from the hub are the spokes.
There is no rim.
The missing rim means everyone enters the hub using the spokes and a large number, who have no business the capital, simply leave again on different spokes. Inefficient, time consuming and very 19th century!
The solution is to build the rim or ORBITRAIL to give it a name. An entirely new, four track orbital railway, circling the capital in The Home Counties about 30 miles from the centre of London. At eleven locations (away from town centres—essential if all criteria is to be fulfilled), where the major lines from the eleven terminus stations intersect with ORBITRAIL, interchange PARKWAY stations provide multiple journey choice and cheap, efficient Park and Ride facilities.
The route of ORBITRAIL takes it close to each of London’s four major airports “
timbeau,
You have to consider what state SouthEastern would be in come 2018 if it wasn’t for the Thameslink Programme. London Bridge was creaking at the seams and the situation at platform 6 becoming more and more untenable – partly due to increasing dwell times. I don’t really want to have a dig but is this the viewpoint of someone who experienced the old London Bridge (Southeastern) on a regular basis just prior to the Thameslink work? Basically, the station needed rebuilding anyway. On the Southern side there were too many short platforms that didn’t allow 12-car trains.
A lot of the work (especially resignalling) that is associated with Thameslink is really nothing to do with the project (e.g. resignalling Cannon St and Charing Cross) and would have been necessary anyway.
So let’s look at the two issue specific to the Thameslink Programme and SouthEastern that you raise (again).
I strongly suspect that the Greenwich – Charing Cross service was becoming more and more untenable and would have disappeared anyway. Only four stations lose their direct Charing Cross service.
Whilst it is no compensation to peak period users, off-peak they are compensated for with a train every 10 minutes to Cannon St from the start of September. Presumably from the start of 2018 they will still have an off-peak service every ten minutes and it will call at London Bridge. I suspect many SouthEastern users would willingly sacrifice a direct service to Charing Cross if it meant they had an off-peak train every ten minutes.
Again, whilst it is of no comfort to Greenwich line passengers wanting to use Charing Cross, the freeing of paths into Charing Cross means all the off-peak Hayes trains will go to and from Charing Cross giving the service that most people want on that line. You can’t please all the people all the time.
You repeat (yet again) your suggestion that the Bermondsey Diveunder was unnecessary because they could simply have routed SouthEastern services to Thameslink and Southern Services to Charing Cross. I will repeat (yet again) that the problem with this is that it deprives many SouthEastern passengers of any decent service direct to the West End with only a half-hourly Lewisham-Victoria service as an apology for that – and you moan about no direct service from Greenwich to the West End!
It is difficult to evaluate just how much disruption the Bermondsey Diveunder caused but the main period is January 2015 – December 2016 when the disruption will be at its worst. With all the other things going on is it hard to be certain just how disruptive it was. The initial problems settled down eventually and for a while it all seemed to be working quite well.
I won’t repeat the long answer about the cost of Thameslink but it is approximately £6.5 billion of which £2.5 billion is down to rolling stock and new depots that would have been needed anyway. As the National Audit office acknowledges, a lot of the work would have need to have been done anyway – or was highly desirable. So basically we are down to £100 million for Borough Market Junction Viaduct and another £100 million for the Bermondsey diveunder. For a comparison, £100 million buys you about half a dozen 12-car trains – seven at most.
Thank you Briantist. I suggest that no discussion of Mr Rawson’s ideas is required here, they are best politely noted, and a move on to other business would be appropriate.
timbeau,
However, had the Medway Towns been favoured instead of the BML, much of the expense and disruption of the Thameslink 2000-&-counting project could have been avoided, and indeed might have been completed by the original target date.
Please get real. Thameslink 2000 was delayed because the Conservative government wanted to press on with privatisation and didn’t want anything to derail that. It was then delayed because Railtrack had absolutely no incentive to implement the proposals despite their duty to do so. It wouldn’t have mattered where it went. And Bermondsey diveunder is only a small part of it.
As for Medway towns being favoured instead of BML, you may partially get your wish – after they had designed and built it with the BML being the focus of the traffic. But, we will save that for another day.
Malcolm, Briantist,
I would just point out there were multiple proposals that could be loosely described as Orbirail. I was thinking more of one that would have been further in and utilised a lot of existing track.
Dragging the discussion vaguely back on topic and relevant to the article, there is nothing wrong in principle with these proposals so long as junctions are properly redesigned and rebuilt so that you don’t produce multiple pinchpoints that screw up not only Orbirail but other radial services.
@ Anonymously 23Jul 2234 and others
“@PoP….What are these 60s/70s Orbirail proposals that you speak of? Do they bear any resemblance to what we have now in the London Overground?”
I have now unearthed my copy of “A New RingRail for London, the key to an integrated public transport system” Crowther, Vickers and Pilling, (Just & Company, 1973). Their proposals for Highbury & Islington to Peckham Rye, via Willesden Junction are exactly* as currently operated by London Overground. The ring is completed from Peckham Rye back to Highbury via Lewisham, Westcombe Park, (tunnel) Canning Town, Stratford and Hackney Central.
* The slight exception is Clapham Junction, for which they had a slightly naive solution of moving the whole station half a mile to the east to allow a complete ring. They did, however, put forward an alternative of reversing trains at the current station.
Note to Malcolm, etc., not an invitation for discussion of their proposals but to give some flesh to the answer to Anonymously’s question.
James B: As you say, detailed discussion of this would probably not be a good idea. But it very interesting to get this historical perspective, thank you for this.
(Moving Clapham Junction station has also been raised on LR within the last couple of years, and that repetition of that discussion would be particularly unwelcome).
@Bunting….Thank you for that explanation. It’s quite evident that today’s ‘Orbirail’ only became viable when the ELL was transferred from the Underground to the NR network. Whether it really works as an Orbirail with its paucity of connections to the radial lines (cf the Circle line) is another debate entirely.
‘Thameslink 2000 was delayed because the Conservative government wanted to press on with privatisation….’
*Gnashes teeth uncontrollably*?….
@pop
Valid points all, especially the privatisation hiatus. For clarity, I should point out that my Medway suggestion was via the LCDR route, so would have avoided any changes to Borough Market or London Bridge.
And of course, once the Brighton service was established, it would have been politically difficult to remove it again – see The fuss over Wimbledon, or for that matter every time splitting the Northern Lone is suggested. Which makes it all the more surprising that Greenwich has lost its west end service with barely a whimper, however operationally convenient that is.
I am also out, t, so
@ James B – I did a search on that Ring Rail report title. The results linked to ASLEF’s archive which is held at the Modern Records Centre at University of Warwick. What an amazing trove of information ASLEF have accumulated over the many decades of its existence. It’s all publicly accessible too – subject to complying with the MRC’s rules. It hadn’t dawned on me that TUs would have archives but makes perfect sense when you think about it. (Hopefully my remarks don’t fall foul of the mods’ axe). [No they don’t. Our axes get very little use actually, mainly being deployed, oddly enough, upon would-be axe-grinders. Malcolm]
So did the creation of the RER have any far reaching effects on the surrounding railways in the Paris region?
The handily colour coded Carto Metro map shows that there is quite high but not total of segregation of RER tracks from non-RER services, and perhaps more importantly, and very unlike London, that almost all the junctions on the network have been grade separated.
@Anonymously
“when the ELL was transferred from the Underground to the NR network. ”
Just for the sake of accuracy, this didn’t happen. The permanent way between Whitechapel and New Cross/New Cross Gate is still owned by Transport For London. It even has it’s own vintage 1980s computer control system that doesn’t especially like talking to NRE…
[I think anonymously was referring to the operation of the ELL. Malcolm]
@recent posts
(and apologies in advance for the length of this post)
I came across the RingRail report in 1973, liaised with the authors at the time about some of the less-than-desirable side effects on the established L&SE network, and wrote a report in 1974 called ‘RingRail Reviewed’. This sought to turn the orbital rail concept into a feasible and operable one. It made a case for serving Clapham Junction directly, and eliminated the suggested long distance platforms at radial/orbital interchanges.
WW might be able to advise if my report is in the Modern Records Archive! I remember cycling up the Arkwright Road hill and handing over a copy to ASLEF!
1974 was also when the Barran Report (London Rail Study) was published. This started the process of incremental improvements to the inner orbital railways, by favouring reopening of the West London Line, and the linking of the North Woolwich Line with the North London Line via Hackney. This was achieved in basic form by 1985 (NLL/NWL) and 1994 (WLL), though it took until TfL and London Overground to liberate many of its capabilities.
RR supported use of a new Angerstein Tunnel as the East to South London link, but clearly the radial rail pressures at Lewisham and elsewhere in south London made the southern leg of an orbital line that way round harder to achieve.
The solution there turned out to be the ELL as the most practical way of crossing the river (as it already existed), and of avoiding the worst of the south London bottlenecks.
So Anonymously (24/7, 16:56) is right in saying that getting to a full orbital rail network – still in 2016 minus some desirable stations and interchanges – required participation of the ELL on a national rail basis.
Peter Kay at London Railway Record is currently drafting an article on RingRail and its legacy. My background note to him makes the following points.
There was a paucity of pro-public transport propositions during this period. Understanding this context is vital to appreciating the RingRail motivation.
The GLDP* was in full swing with radial and orbital motorways seen as a way forward for Greater London. Car was foreseen as the main mode in what we’d now call Zone 2 and outwards. That was the perceived (and assumed- so vicious circle of thinking) requirement for suburban London in the GLDP with Ringways etc.
The FIRST modelling done with improved public transport for the GLDP was the Movement for London Part 3 report in 1969 (my archives advise that this is a much slimmer volume than Parts 1 and 2 on roads!).
MfL started to move public transport away from being seen just as satisfying Central London peak-time travel demands.
Therefore RingRail also has to be seen in that context, as a counter-RingWay proposition for general London planning – and not just transport.
For the Barran Report to argue in 1974 for better rail – and even semi-orbital rail – was a fundamental change only several years later. For RR to have succeeded in the form it did then – an official proposition of an improved and expanded North London semi-orbital system – was a vital change in thinking and in policy. It was helped of course by the change in GLC attitudes from 1973 when Labour won control of the GLC partly on the background of anti-Ringway voting.
By definition an improved and expanded NLL brought the scheme within the ambit of the North London Line Committee and other rail campaign groups (eg Hackney Public Transport Action Committee).
RingRail also contained important elements about stimulating inner suburban development at major interchange locations (eg the Hackney Downs/Central interchange, only instituted as a transport interchange in 2015!). So this was a land use as well as transport proposition.
The land use element has largely been forgotten, but the proposition remains fundamental – that an improved inner London orbital service can and should stimulate major developments in its catchment = densification.
I wrote extensive papers in ca. 2008/09 on behalf of the East London Line Group, for the Outer London Study and relevant GLA audiences, including land use capabilities if further orbital improvements were taken forwards.
Overall, the case for any serious orbital rail has always been about:
(1) stopping the inwards ingress of the car as the main mode in high density inner London – with Zone 2 as the battleground – now largely won, I think.
(2) then move the trenches out to Zone 3 and beyond, as much for environmental reasons as anything else – much harder with lower densities and PiR2* applying – to further expand the area served primarily by public transport and green modes rather than car.
(3) a higher density inner London with greatest densities focused on the main p.t. interchanges
(4) relieving Central London of unnecessary travel via the Centre, and in turn making London more polycentric (also less vulnerable to paralysis if a catastrophe occurred) while still making p.t. the main ingredient in mobility for a vast population nexus.
The arguments continue to require re-statement in the context of a growing Outer London population and continuing clustering of jobs, as in the London 2050 Infrastructure Plan.
Hence the propositions for Outer Orbital options in the London 2050 material (drafted at TfL’s request), and the most recent Turning South London Orange proposals for new and improved interchanges at key locations across the South London area, and for a potential ‘R25’ via Croydon.
Finally, here is the ‘Beeching and London’ presentation given to an audience at the LT Museum in 2013, which summarises a lot of the wider context as well as the railway specifics. Link here: http://www.jrc.org.uk/PDFs/Beeching-And-London-JRC-Detailed-Presentation.pdf
[* GDLP is the Greater London Development Plan. PiR2 is pi times radius squared. LBM]
JR
Which makes apparent official opposition to extending Barking Riverside S, whether in tunnel or Bridge via Thamesmead & onwards to ( Where would be overly crayonistic) suitable locations & links hard to understand.
Couple that with the apparent revival of E London road-based river crossings (see other article) odd.
Silo mentality? Left-hand not comprehending Right hand?
[This squeezed past. I recently mentioned axes… Malcolm]
Briantist (IGIH)……. for the sake of pedantry…… When the ELL was modified for use on the Overground network, the track was replaced largely with slab track with extensive alterations to earth arrangements to permit 3rd rail. The whole lot was re-signalled more or less to main line principles and a new control system was provided.
@Greg
Perhaps TfL are learning from the Heathrow Airport manual of getting expansion:
“No, no, if you give us this one bit of expansion we won’t ask for anything more ever. Promise…
“Thank you for agreeing to our expanison, work is now under way. But we will need just one more piece of expansion and then never anything more. Promise…”
Continue indefinitely.
But while Heathrow has sought to overcome local opposition, TfL’s opposition is from elsewhere in the country, competing for a limited pool of funds.
Pedantic of Purley – Greenwich etc already has trains every 10 minutes off-peak to Cannon Street and has for many years now – that’s not a benefit beginning in September.
What they do have is whopping big cuts in peak time services from September. Will they be reinstated as they are now, let alone to 2014 levels, before the first round of cuts happened in 2015? With Cannon Street peak time capacity cut from 25 tph to 22 tph who knows?
Ed,
I did wonder if the 10 minute service was nothing new. I very much doubt if the service in the peak will get reinstated to former levels. There is ongoing pressure to provide more services from beyond the London suburbs. I suspect the best that can be hoped for if you live on this line is 12-car trains for the ones that do run.
You can start suspecting a rail network has problems in coping with demand when the off peak services ar better than the peak ones.
It will also be interesting to see what the final capacity into Cannon Street will be – or at least into London Bridge if the latest Thameslink proposal sees light of day.
Re PoP,
Remember the limit on 12car isn’t just Woolwich Dockyard but also for the Cannon Street to Cannon Street Loop services via Sidcup, the length of the Crayford Spur so it will be interesting to see if this is proposed for treatment in the forthcoming Kent study?
@ Graham H (23 July 2016 at 10:57): The only reason I can think of is to be able to have trains continuing on to somewhere else to terminate by rejoining the mainline further North. Far from ideal, I will admit, but it would allow reversing the trains somewhere quieter…
The only other reason for the station layout as it currently stands is if there was a plan for a rolling stock depot just beyond?
Been discussed before, but IIRC no definite conclusion was reached …
Would it be possible to have 3 track throughout between LBG & CST, or if not that, then to reduce the length of 2 tracks by a significant amount?
And, would this then:
a) Improve capacity
b) Not cost too much?
Re Greg,
Oh it definitely was…
It is only about 110m of 2 tracks between the point ends which is less than the alternative distance to (safely) achieve the same flexibility of getting to all platforms at CST from LBG with 3 tracks and vice-versa (unless you rebuild everything with lower speed point work which is self defeating for capacity). CST is just too close to LBG. (Then you have the difficult of actually building the extra track!)
Currently the CST tracks west of LBG are mostly but not entirely bi-directional but they will be after the CST resignalling work in the near future. TMS and ARS etc. are likely to help from later next year. The question is what that leaves you with as baseline which is what there is no commitment on how much that could add capacity wise.
However resignal with ATO overlay identical to that which the adjacent TL tracks will get in the near future would be enable a few more tph. The question is then whether would be worth retrofitting 465s/466s for ATO or do at life expiry and replacement in the early 2030s or just banish the 465s/466s to Charing Cross +Victoria services and replace with new 12 car stock with SDO and sort Crayford Spur.
Pedantic of Purley – “There is ongoing pressure to provide more services from beyond the London suburbs”
Very true though when looking at station and line usage figures, stations past the M25 have generally been stagnant the past 5-10 years, while those within have seen huge growth. Deptford, for example, has seen double digit growth each year over the past decade. Many of the new housing developments (and there are a huge number) will see people wanting to use the station as 1) it’s just 6 minutes to London Bridge and 10 to Cannon Street 2) it’s closer than the DLR. Convoys Wharf for example, or those all along Evelyn Street.
There’s a lot more developments underway in the hinterland between Deptford and Rotherhithe. DLR isn’t much use for many so it’s go to Surrey Quays LO (packed out), Jubilee Line (packed out with many more flats coming at Stratford, North Greenwich, Canning Town etc) or Deptford station. Buses still take a very long time to reach the centre. That whole stretch between Deptford and London Bridge could probably do with a tram.
ATO must be the answer in 5-10 years time. For now getting every train to 12-cars would be a big help, and that means more sidings, Crayford spur being altered (possible?) and Woolwich Dockyard rebuilt or moved.
I wonder, could 376s and 465/466 Networkers go to Southern Metro routes where 10 car is the limit, or SWT land, and SE get some stock with SDO to utilise the 12-car infrastructure more widely?
ngh, Ed,
Both now and after the end of August there are no direct trains between Woolwich Dockyard and Charing Cross. Read into that what you want as regards future intentions and 12-car trains.
And funnily enough I haven’t heard a squeak about Woolwich Dockyard losing its Charing Cross trains – presumably there used to be some?
Ed,
when looking at station and line usage figures, stations past the M25 have generally been stagnant the past 5-10 years, while those within have seen huge growth
I am not surprised at that and suspect that the pendulum will swing back to there being pressure to serve the inner London suburbs better. I suspect capacity within the trains will be increased but not necessarily the number of trains!
Re Ed,
“I wonder, could 376s and 465/466 Networkers go to Southern Metro routes where 10 car is the limit, or SWT land, and SE get some stock with SDO to utilise the 12-car infrastructure more widely?”
(Again covered on LR for the Nth time) Almost certainly not:
Southern metro has far more problems with short platforms e.g. (8/9car) that can’t easily /cheaply be lengthened than SE.
SN will need more 10 car with SDO, CSDE bodyside cameras and in cab monitors so for 376s that would need a big refurb, rewire and major software work. For 465/466 that is non a starter (and the 465/466s aren’t physically cleared on the Southern Network).
The 455s will get replaced in the early-mid 2020s even if 8 car (2x 4car but probable view to 3×4 car on the potential 12 car metro routes) but will need something more appropriate for high loading and short dwell times than networkers with almost equally narrow door and they will also want to get rid of the platform monitors as these cause issues in several places. NR is also looking at 8 & 10 car SN metro routes going to 10/12car respectively long term but both would need SDO etc. stock to make it viable. The solution would probably be to get more new stock that could be lengthened like LO have done a few years later to give maximum flexibility.
Expect the next SN+GX franchise tender to be similar to to the current SW one in terms of stock requirements. Coastway is likely to have similar SDO and DOO requirements to metro given similar platform length variability
If you read the SWT Franchise tender documents carefully it should be obvious that no one could submit a viable bid using ex-SE stock as the loadings are even higher in SWT land (No one is going to rebuild anything with wider door openings! Suitable door widths are suggested;-) ). The aim in SWT land appears to be heading for CR2 stock performance spec very soon so even a large number (~50% of SWTs) of recently/ about to be retractioned 455s could end up on the scrap heap early.
The best SE short term solution is to get the Kent route power supply upgrades finished (scheduled for 2018/9 completion) so that more than a hand full of 12 car can run (inc semi fast outer suburbans) then just run more 12car with 4+4+2+2 combinations (not into some CHX platforms) and get some new stock with SDO.
@ Ngh – are we not now at the point where it is positively stupid to be buying lots of new 4 car EMUs for commuter routes south of the Thames? Surely a move to at least 8 car fixed formation (but extendable) trains for the inner area makes much more sense given it allows more opportunity to maximise internal space and lose intermediate cabs. I accept that further out, with train splitting and lower flows on some routes, may require shorter units that can work in multiple. I know there are some risks with long fixed formation trains but many systems seem to cope OK with them.
Pedantic – the Charing Cross trains were mainly the semi-fast which skipped Woolwich Dockyard so they havn’t really seen any change.
A decent short term fix would be making Networkers 2×2 throughout to increase standing space. The middle seat in a bay of 3 is pretty awful.
NGH – Thanks for the comprehensive answer. So Networkers are not much good anywhere else, but the 376s with SWT even if not Southern? Crossrail 2 isn’t coming for 10-15 years. SWT do have 10 car lines – will they be solely served by 707s? 376s can deal with large loadings what with some traverse seating, wide doors, and large amounts of standing space but being 10 car are still a bit of a waste on 12-car capable railway after 2018, or whenever it is that all the obstacles are overcome.
2018/19 for power supply upgrades is not great. I thought I read a couple of years back it would be complete by 2015/16. And nothing planned for the Crayford spur?
Re Ed,
Networkers – Agree on the quick 2+2 fix, the vestibules also need enlarging.
376s even less likely with SWT as they won’t pass the door width test to allow the higher passenger densities to be used in the passenger carrying calculations* for the bids so more 707s or equivalents (e.g doors 3 people wide not just 2). [And being Bombardier not Siemens]. Three door options are also permitted for consideration…
Stock with that kind of performance (inc acceleration, DOO, ATO capability etc.) is need very soon they just want to make sure it is compatible with CR2 does doesn’t get binned (Learning lessons what ever next?)
*All existing SWT stock gets an “F” in this category
SWT Windsor line metros will be 707s with via Wimbledon all 455×2 + 456 but that only allows 50% of metro services on the Wimbledon side to be 10 car hence about 45-50 extra 5 car units would be ideal to go 100% 10 car. (A large number of fast Windsor line train will also end up as 10 car with cascaded 458s and power supply upgrade completion)
“Kent” Power supplies – Blame ORR for not agreeing with NR’s cost estimates (which happened to be quotes in this case) hence re-profiling (aka “delay”) of some of the work especially the outer ‘Burban area stuff getting pushed back e.g. all semifasts via Gravesend or Sevenoaks as 100% 12 car will come very late.
The Kent route study is coming up soon.
@Ed/Pedantic. The semi fast trains via Woolwich and Lewisham to Charing Cross did not call at Dockyard, but the Greenwich line ones did. Dockyard (and all stations skipped by the semi fasts) lost its Charing Cross service when Greenwich and Deptford did.
@ngh….I was also going to make similar suggestions as to where else the 465/466s could be used, but your replies have kaiboshed that…..d’oh! Completely agree that 2×2 seating would be a big improvement….it’s a tight squeeze even for normally sized people to use the middle seat when they’re wearing coats etc (especially during the winter).
I have never before now heard anyone mention the Crayford spur as an impediment (along with Woolwich Dockyard/power supply/lack of rolling stock etc) to 12-car running….were there any firm plans for addressing this during the Networker program in the early 90s (Graham H)?
@ngh: ” 4+4+2+2 combinations”, these are currently not allowed, all three current 12 car services, must be made up of 3×4 car…. This was mentioned somewhere here earlier in one of the London Bridge articles…
Re Southern Heights,
Which Is why I said “then just run more 12car with 4+4+2+2 combinations (not into some CHX platforms)”
The ban could easily be relaxed down to just that. The other issue at the moment is that12 car with 4+4+2+2 would leave a 10 car on certain routes as an 8 car due to the lack of stock.
@ngh
Having trains not able to fit certain platforms at the terminus is just one more operational headache. This is why SWT run so few 10-car trains on the main line suburban side as, of the suburban side platforms, only platform 5 can take them. (Most of the 456s are currently used in pairs, forming a 2+2+4 formation with a 455).
Should a 10car turn up at Waterloo when platform 5 is already occupied by a train that is not ready to leave, it has to wait in the approaches until the problem is fixed (waiting for crew/fitter/ambulance/whatever) : and everything on the up main slow has to queue up behind it.
The approaches to Charing Cross are much more constrained, and ensuring a 2+2+4+4 isn’t routed into the wrong platform that much harder to arrange.
Re Southern Heights
I think the ban relates to having four separate units on one train, as opposed to it being specific to Charing Cross. It relate to the staffing agreement with ASLEF, and was discussed in the “Two of our Carriages are missing” piece re the Hayes line.
I don’t see this as another way to discuss staffing…
@AoC: I cannot recall the ban being for CHX only either, I seem to recall that this was a general ban due to the added length of the two additional cabs….
I think it is clear that there are two seperate issues here, both involving 4+4+2+2 trains. One is that they are definintely not allowed in certain platforms at Charing Cross. Perhaps the word “ban” does not really apply here, it is a operating restriction with a physical reason (they would not
safely clear the pointsbe wholly in the widthwise-useable part of the platform [corrected at 15:28 based on subsequent comments]). Such a restriction may also apply at some other places, but if so none of our contributors has mentioned it. And incidentally, the extra length is, arguably, not caused by the extra cabs (which only replace what would otherwise be seating space) – it is just a feature of the design (or of the original specification): a 2-car unit (along with allowance for couplers) is slightly longer than half the length of a 4-car unit.The “ban” on 4-unit trains is part of an agreement with unions, and applies wherever that agreement says (possibly across the whole network). Having no physical basis, it could, in theory at least, be removed at any time by a further agreement.
As I understand it, the prohibition on 4+4+2+2 Networker trains into Charing Cross is purely determined by length. Space is very tight at Charing Cross. Other issues may arise if that one was solved but for the moment it is the only significant issue.
As far as I am aware, technically they could be run into Cannon Street but that would create an operational nightmare on SouthEastern with diagrams covering multiple routes in the course of a day.
I have a feeling that all Networkers, regardless of length, are banned from platforms 4-6 but may be wrong.
Networkers do use 4-6 at CHX. The Tunbridge Wells trains are normally formed of Networkers. Evening Sevenoaks services normally use platform 5 as well…
Not sure about how the length is at CST, I’m normally in coach 2, not 12! 🙂
Ban may have been the wrong word.
The CHX issue is due to to extra driving cars which means 2+2 cars is 1.66m longer than 4car which then means the doors further from the buffers would be beyond the use-able length (i.e the point at which they become to narrow) on some platforms. [See note from the NR Sectional Appendix below, particularly note**] The Networker driving cars are 83cm longer then the centre cars.
Platform lengths at Cannon Street are all almost 13 car so no issues there (apart from services calling at Woolwich Dockyard and /or via Crayford Spur (especially “clockwise”).
Plenty of opportunity post 2018 for re-diagramming and re-timetabling so there is more segregation between service groups so that some longer services could be run with Networkers without SDO.
Everyone typing at the same time!
Re PoP,
“I have a feeling that all Networkers, regardless of length, are banned from platforms 4-6 but may be wrong.”
See post above as 12 car 375 can’t use P1-2 then they need to make sure there is space in P3-6 for them! Hence virtually guaranteed Networkers in the lower numbered platforms at CHX which also aligns well with the traditional fast / slow platform split at Waterloo East.
Re SHLR
I answered you CST length question telepathically!
Until LBG works are completed (including resignalling and TMS which will complete after all platforms available in Jan ’18) the diagramming will be too much of nightmare to contemplate.
Whatever happened to phase 2 of the proposals to sort CHX, was that put on ice till after LBG sorted?
Crayford Spur – I’d expect a possible link with sorting it for 12 car with potential Crossrail 1 extension to Dartford / Ebbsfleet area / Gravesend as it could be done together or separately with the CR1 extension altering the BCR of doing it.
@Anonymously – Looking at the NSE publication “20/20 Vision” of 1992 (suppressed by DTp), which listed the intended new works programmes with and without additional funding, I find that neither programme mentioned any new works or power upgrade for the SE division, only (in the unfunded version) the possible new North Kent Main Line (aka HS1 as it eventually became). I certainly don’t recall any discussion about the need to spend on stations and power at the time. This is not perhaps surprising because (a) in 1991 we would have had no idea of the growth that we now face, and (b) the spec for the Networkers was built round the mantra “1/3 cheaper to build, 1/3 cheaper to maintain, and 1/3 less power consumption”. In the event, these operator “demands” weren’t met but that hadn’t been proved yet at the time in practice. [They also offered more capacity per metre than the slam door stock they replaced thanks to the 135% PIXC rule).
@ngh: Whatever happened to phase 2 of the proposals to sort CHX, was that put on ice till after LBG sorted?
Like to fix up the country end of platforms 5 & 6? Last time I looked (some time ago, I admit), those platforms seemed to be being held up by temporary scaffolding and the odd spare bit of wood….
@GH
So that’s a fourth mantra – 1/3 more passengers!
@JR – 🙂
@Malcolm
“The “ban” on 4-unit trains is part of an agreement with unions, ”
Four- or even five-unit trains certainly used to be a common sight on the South Eastern Division.
The 2HAPs used to go around in gangs of five, and a typical boat train was 13 or even 14 cars, formed – CEP-BEP-CEP-(TLV)-MLV
http://www.bloodandcustard.com/MLV001_files/image002.jpg
MLVs did occasionally work to Charing Cross, but not, I think, in 13-car formations!
http://flickrhivemind.net/blackmagic.cgi?id=6776715711&url=http%3A%2F%2Fflickrhivemind.net%2FTags%2F419%252Cmlv%3Fsearch_type%3DTags%26textinput%3D419%252Cmlv%26photo_type%3D250%26method%3DGET%26noform%3Dt%26sort%3DInterestingness%23pic6776715711&user=&flickrurl=http://www.flickr.com/photos/66162475@N06/6776715711
Elsewhere on the Southern, the original Gatwick Express formations were also four or five units: 73+3×488+489 (Only 2×488 in the winter)
NGH – “Crayford Spur – I’d expect a possible link with sorting it for 12 car with potential Crossrail 1 extension to Dartford / Ebbsfleet area / Gravesend as it could be done together or separately with the CR1 extension altering the BCR of doing it.”
Blimey lets hope its not too long a wait! Another 10+ years with such an obstacle isn’t really feasible, and I can’t see CR1 extended much before that.
When Kidbrooke alone is built up (another 5000 homes isn’t it?) the Bexleyheath line will be in trouble. And anyone passing the station can see the cranes now. I think the tower broke ground last month…
Similar story all over really. Dartford has 1000+ homes within 5 minutes walk of the station coming along. Mill Pond 1 starts very soon, just north of the station. I wonder if a northern station entrance is planned there?
@timbeau – not to mention the Directors’ driving saloon which was certainly attached to 12s on various outings.
Something Toby suggested way back on this thread about capacity on the Liverpool Street to Norwich route. Broadly to leave the existing route and proceed ‘North of Braintree’ then via the airport and a newly four tracked West Anglia line. Two points about this, that four-tracking was at least once almost started, and space is available for much of it, eg the Northumberland Park Victoria line depot can spare a yard or two without problems, and also to remark that much of the route Braintree to Stortford still exists as a footpath, and goes very near the airport tho’ the M11 will need a long bridge. Except for the bridge this idea should be (relatively) cheap to achieve.
@Ed – and how long has it taken CR1 to get this far? And will any extension of the Elizabeth Line take precendence over CR2 extensions. Or over BLE? Feasible or not, given the pace with which London’s population is growing and the time taken to raise the funding for any major infrastructure, it’s difficult to see anything other than a worsening passenger environment for the foreseeable future.
@Graham H….? So I take it from your earlier answer that there was nothing in the 1992 plans to address Crayford spur?
I would have thought that the problem with 4+4+2+2 at Charing Cross is not so much the total length – after all, 12 car trains in platform 4 already use SDO to open the doors only in the 10 carriages closest to the buffers – but that you can’t walk through if the back two carriages are in a 2 car unit.
@Anonymously – no,nothing specific; the assumption was that the hike in capacity and the NNKML would see us through the following couple of decades in the SE. NSE management was reluctant to reorganise the SE inners radically for the early ’90s, investment in more /better/ more capacious rolling stock was seen as the preferred solution for many problems.
GH: “given the pace with which London’s population is growing”
IF it continues to grow. Most of the net growth is coming from immigration, which the electorate seem to have decided they want to end. I would have thought London’s continued rapid population growth is now rather less certain.
Of course, the other thing driving passenger growth is that employment (and retail and leisure activities) is being concentrated in fewer, larger centres. And central London is the largest employment centre. This driver of passenger growth will, no doubt, continue.
If quinlet is correct about SDO at Charing Cross, then the restriction would only be necessary if a 2-car unit happened to be at the rear of the train. The NR sectional rules quoted by ngh, however, make no such stipulation. So the puzzle continues…
John Bull’s dog – Much of London’s migration is non-EU. Most of the UK’s is too, but it’s a bigger % in London.
And the birthrate to non-EU migrants is higher too. According to the ONS, many African and Asian migrant birthrates are up into the 3-4 per woman. EU migrants tend to be lower around 2-3, though there are some exceptions that are higher. This is what is causing the school issues in London at the moment, and will feed through into transport.
Even if all EU migration stopped, which it wont, transport demand will continue to rise quickly.
Re Quinlet,
But the networkers (the only 2 car stock on SE) don’t have SDO*…
And if they did there would be several hundred less comments on LR!
* That works or can be used
Re Anonymously,
The Crayford Spur may have been less on an issue in the past, the track is “technically” long enough but the issue is probably with modern requirements for signal overlap and any attempt to reduce the required overlap by lower permitted line speed is self defeating as it then increase time over the junction at the entry to the spur. Anticlockwise has trap points which will help but that isn’t possible clockwise round the spur. This became a hotter topic after Purley (’89) and Cannon Street (’91).
The spur and any potential elongation at the Crayford end is entirely within Kent but all the benefits with the GLA area!
With 4x4x2x2 such an issue do the 466s even have a long life left in them? I recall reading somewhere that work to make Networkers 2020 compatible did not include 466s in the contract. Anyone know more?
Though once again, getting rid would mean only 8 or 12 car running, so that’d be 8 car on services via the Crayford loop and those calling at Woolwich Dockyard. Not really feasible.
I get the impression no one knows, or wants to know, what to do about SE’s rolling stock plans. If, or until, TfL takeover that is.
* No one with authority that is.
Another thought; originally the Networkers were apparently to stop with 12 cars at Woolwich Dockyard in the early ’90s, as 11 carriages fit. A rudimentary type of SDO woul’d’ve been used. Same at CX. Is it completely impossible that this early type of SDO could be used now? No chance to alter rules to save many millions and much inconvenience? Would it take a law change, or the DfT altering regulations slightly?
Re Malcolm,
There is no puzzle as the 2 car 466s (& 4 car 465s) don’t have SDO (in the modern sense, they had (when new) first and last door deselect with no in platform verification which doesn’t tick the safety box these days). Quinlet is talking about 375s and everyone else is talking about 465/466s used on Metro services!
375s have the same GPS based SDO system that the Southern 377s had before they received 2 major upgrades.
On 12-car Networker operations, the sectional appendix has been updated (07/05/16) since the version @ngh quoted. It is now that all Charing Cross platforms can hold 12 car electrostars (though doors on rear coach will not open). Networkers if 12-cars must be 3 class 465 trains and routed into platforms 1-3.
The issue is about usable passenger length of platforms rather than the length of the platform with the slightly longer 4 unit formation making a difference. I believe platform 3 is the most marginal, but it is probably worth it to have more platforms available and a much better chance of dealing with misrouting as it can be picked up at Waterloo East.
There are additional rules for places other than Charing Cross for example not allowing to call at one fast platform at Grove Park, Woolwich Dockyard and a few banned shunt moves. The Hayes branch is still not permitted, but there is no mention of the Crayford spur which suggests it is an inconvenience on the nice to fix list.
I’d be surprised if 4+4+2+2 Networker formations are a pressing issue. If needing to ‘hide’ the 43 2-car class 466 trains, the easier option would surely be 2+2+2+2 for trains out of Victoria. Victoria-Orpington and Victoria-Dartford would require the entire class if all 8-car. The much bigger problem is that Southeastern doesn’t have enough trains for the 12-car limitations to be the main concern.
Platform lengths for SDO enabled units ARRIVING at CHX:
P1-3 10 car
P4-6 11 car
Re Se Passenger,
Oops shouldn’t have looked at my old copy, have now got new one which makes everything far clearer:
Re Ed 0018
“Another thought; originally the Networkers were apparently to stop with 12 cars at Woolwich Dockyard in the early ’90s, as 11 carriages fit. A rudimentary type of SDO woul’d’ve been used. Same at CX. Is it completely impossible that this early type of SDO could be used now? No chance to alter rules to save many millions and much inconvenience? Would it take a law change, or the DfT altering regulations slightly?”
See my comment also at 0018.
” they had (when new) first and last door deselect with no in platform verification which doesn’t tick the safety box these days). ”
The system was not ideal for CHX and Woolwich Dockyard.
1. How long before the passengers at CHX in the first car near the front doors use the “green” door release when they find out the front doors don’t open! (and how long to reset!)
2. How much abuse would the driver get from passengers???
3. The risk of an incident at Dockyard is too high so the TOC and unions wouldn’t agree to it (Yes TOC and unions agreeing on something!)
4. SDO on SE is along way behind Southern, Gatex (or soon all Thameslink and most of Great Northern) quality and risk wise already so the push will be in 1 direction only.
SE should be getting more than the minimum of 25units from Southern but that just allows more 465s back on the metro routes. The metro problems is definitely for the next franchise or TfL to worry about after the LBG works are over.
@ngh…Thank you for clarifying that, but could you please explain signal overlap for the non railwaymen amongst us?
This might have been asked before, but why can’t the 465s/466s be retrofitted with SDO that meets modern safety standards?
@Graham H, ngh: re: Network SouthEast’s intentions for power supply and infrastructure upgrades for 12-car operation:
If anyone has a copy of the June 1992 issue of Modern Railways this article on the introduction of the Networkers may shed some light: from the abstract:
25% of the cost is for upgrading track, signalling, maintenance and berthing facilities. This is a very high ratio of infrastructure works to rolling stock, even allowing for the total route modernisation…Priority has been given to the immediate introduction of eight-car Networker operation, with the four[-car?] Class-465 trains. Even this requires infrastructure work, including extensions of platforms at many stations. For the project in general, infrastructure work also includes…new signal systems for some areas… replacement of reed-track circuitry… upgrading of power supplies
No mention of the Crayford chord or Woolwich Dockyard in the abstract, but there might be in the article.
will any extension of the Elizabeth Line take precendence over CR1 extensions
I’m not quite sure what you mean here – aren’t the Elizabeth Line and CR1 the same thing? Do you mean that different extensions might take precedence over CR1 to Dartford?
On the question of future population growth etc, what did for the Kent Link upgrades and delayed Crossrail for 20+ years was not so much a fall in immigration, as the early 90s recession causing a fall in the number of people working in Central London and something like a 20% fall in passengers on the Southeastern and similar routes, causing the Treasury to (stupidly) say ‘aha! we don’t need these expensive schemes any more’. Passenger numbers on the lines into the City and Docklands have historically been tied to employment in the financial services industry, so a lot depends on the future of that industry.
@Anon
Signal overlap is, as I understand it, the distance beyond one signal that has to be clear before the preceding signal can show a “proceed” aspect. This is therefore the minimum separation between the rear of one train (protected by the signal) and the front of the following train (standing at the signal). Called the overlap because it is protected by both signals. If there were no overlap at all, the safety margin would effectively be the width of the signal post!
The rear of a long train standing at a signal may extend into the overlap beyond the previous signal, preventing a second train entering the previous section. Reducing the size of the overlap would avoid this, but is effectively reducing the safety margin.
@Ed
” getting rid would mean only 8 or 12 car running, so that’d be 8 car on services via the Crayford loop and those calling at Woolwich Dockyard.”
No, they could have to be operated by class 376s (2x5car)
If a two car unit hanging off the end of the platform at Charing Cross is the problem, marshalling it at the London end won’t work if it’s working a loop service. But is there any reason the 466s can’t be in the middle of the train (4+2+2+4)?
@Ed
” getting rid would mean only 8 or 12 car running, so that’d be 8 car on services via the Crayford loop and those calling at Woolwich Dockyard.
@Ian J – A propos the 1992 article, as it says,even going to 8-car Networkers required substantial infrastructure spend; I recall seeing a “to do” list for that. I don’t recall seeing a parallel list for going to 12s. I meant CR2 not CR1 – sorry, sloppy checking of draft.
You are right that the Treasury took a short term view of the downturn in CLE. With privatisation on the near horizon,it suited them to play down any problems for bidders. Salmon was all in favour of selling the franchises as seen. Indeed, when yours truly was paraded in front of him as a potential planner for OPRAF, he was very clear – he saw no reason to be concerned about the future; his only objective was to sell off the franchises, after which OPRAF could be reduced to a contract monitoring body.
Re Anonymously,
Overlap is a distance allowed for the train to stop in should it pass a signal showing a stop aspect. It is provided by positioning the signal some way before the entrance to the section it is protecting, in this case the points at the exit of the spur in each direction. [Up trains from Dartford also not blocking Dartford Jn would be useful! Via Crayford looks OK but not via Slade Green.]
On NR, because of all the various braking distances of different types of trains and because it is impossible to predict when a driver might react to a stop signal, a fixed minimum value of (200 yards now) 180 metres is normally used in 4 aspect areas.
So the spur length for 12 car without junction following junction blocking would have to be:
[Start point just clear of TC area adjacent to exit points]
180m for overlap
240m train length
+ margin for stopping short of signal etc
= 420+m
[Finish point sufficiently clear of TC area adjacent to entry points]
You could theoretically run 12car but you run the risk of junction blocking (track circuit detection rather than actual) which destroys capacity.
Re Timbeau,
Width is also part of the issue – think of minimal distances between yellow lines with issues if passengers try to get off the last carriages quicker than they can clear on to the concourse.
@ SE Passenger: There are additional rules for places other than Charing Cross for example not allowing to call at one fast platform at Grove Park,
That must be the down fast platform, my 12 coach train on Monday called at the up fast platform… Though I don’t see why as they appear to be equally long…
@ngh
Indeed, but platform width is the same whether it is a 2 car or a 4 car unit at the country end. I was responding to quinlet’s suggestion that
“after all, 12 car trains in platform 4 already use SDO to open the doors only in the 10 carriages closest to the buffers – but that you can’t walk through if the back two carriages are in a 2 car unit.” If you can ensure the 2 cars at the country end are part of a 4 car, (by putting the 2 car in the middle of the formation) that problem, at least, goes away.
@Ed etc
It is not surprising that the birth rate is higher among the migrant population. Most migrants come here to look for work, and are therefore likely to be in the most job-mobile age range of 20-40. They are also more likely to be single, or at least not to have yet started a family, when they come here.
It works both ways too. Remember that a foreign posting often requires the postee’s spouse to take a career break. I know of several people who have come back from foreign postings with a larger family than they had at the beginning of the posting. This is why Boris Johnson could be a future president of the USA.
Re SHLR,
No DOO monitor at the 12car stopping point.
Re Timbeau,
But if you don’t have SDO then it doesn’t as you need someone to lock out the doors…
@ngh
“Overlap is……… is provided by positioning the signal some way before the entrance to the section it is protecting,”
In some locations this is very obvious because the signal does not go to red behind a train until the train has travelled some distance beyond it. (It is of course still protected by the previous signal still being at red)
In more intensively signalled areas the overlap stretch has a separate track circuit, so a train occupying that track circuit holds both signals at red. This arrangement is described in detail in the report to the Clapham Junction disaster of 1989.
Re Anonymously 0205,
Why can’t they be retrofitted:
They could but it would probably be cheaper to scrap and get new stock. The train needs a sophisticated computer system with everything interlocked to it, the first were the Electrostars, the equivalent Siemens and Alstom stock of the time couldn’t/didn’t. The Alstom 458s recently got ASDO when the 5 car works happened (the computer system could be upgraded with additional functionality) and the first Siemens product with ASDO are the 700s (and soon 707s 717s).
Networkers would need a suitable train management system (computer) fitting and a complete rewire.
Re Timbeau,
Also remember with Networkers 2+2 = 4.08 not 4!
Have any studies been conducted into the costs of fitting SDO to networkers?
It sounds pretty simple on the 458s, so maybe not a good comparison, but are there any comparables in the rest of the world?
Given Networkers are are 20-25 years old it may seem tempting to ride out the issues for another 5-10 years, but if they have a 40 year life planned like many EMUs then that’s possibly another 20 years which makes the SDO case much stronger, assuming any study reveals a cost that isn’t extortionate. I could see the recently re-tractioned networkers lasting that long.
On the subject of work on Networkers, only the 465/9s have had the 2020 work done so far havn’t they? When does it begin on the rest of the Metro fleet? I thought it was a franchise requirement, and there’s less than 2 years left of it now.
Re Ed,
The leases on the networkers expire before 2020… So not the current franchisee’s problem and the issues are all relatively minor compared to some stock. Any sensible planning got canned when DfT went for the direct award rather than retender (long story).
One potential bidder for SE has been investigating new stock options to replace them.
The 375 are getting overhauled at the moment so I’d expect any work would only start after they are all done, the transferred 377/1 come over from Southern before the end of 2017 will want a refurb and revinyl/repaint 375 style too. So networkers after that?
458 project was a disaster taking a lot longer and and costing everyone involved lots more than intended. (Alstom / Wabtec / ROSCO / SWT). One comment I heard was that no one would want to repeat it.
Comparators. Bombardier recently rebuild some 1980s Norwegian Loco hauled stock (that was build by a firm they later bought) with all the bell and whistles (inc installing sophisticated computer system -MITRAC?) recently but the cost and delays were worse than to the 458 project… (NSB sued to recover extra costs due to the delays and won). The upgrade included new bogies* (including disc + track brakes and wheel slip prevention), modern info systems (GPS linked), wifi and some kind of SDO.
*The BR Suburban design as seen on the voyagers, 172s and soon the crossrail stock.
Without wanting to go into crayonism, I presume the option of extending the platforms at Woolwich Arsenal by digging out the tunnels has been considered and rejected? As they appear to be very shallow indeed at either end, and the east end in particular has nothing above it at all for ~40 metres
Re Herned,
Dockyard – Yes all perfectly do-able especially as the council is wanting to redevelop some parts of the area around the station. platforms are 11 car so just needs ~20m.
The question as always would be who pays if station works instead how does NR recoup from TOC etc. When the same result could be achieved by the TOC pay for different solution.
@ Ngh – it will be interesting to see if the upcoming “joint TfL / NR” TfL Board Paper for South London rail improvements has a nice shopping list of Crayford curve adjustments, Dockyard platform extensions and terminal platform changes or if it is all flyovers, flyunders and station rebuilds. Might give us a flavour of what is being studied and whether a full spread of costed options has been considered.
WW – When is that due to be made publicly available?
Re WW,
Indeed one gets the feeling the TfL don’t fully know what they are getting themselves into! They have bought Vol 1 of the text book but not Vol2.
Grade separation could be an expensive solution in this case. Moving the points at the Crayford End 20m west would probably do it and there is space. The max freight train length on the spur in the rules of the road is equivalent to 11.5 car which suggests it is relatively close to being easily sortable.
Interestingly, Google Earth currently shows the Crayford Loop with a 10 car train on it and quite a substantial additional length at either end. I’m no track/signalling expert but I would have thought that this could be solved without substantial engineering works.
@ Ed – all that has been said is “Autumn this year”. There are Board meetings on 22 September and 2 November. If I was a betting man I’d say November was more likely as there is a Finance and Policy Cttee in advance of this which affords an extra level of scrutiny. It also means the new Board will be in place by then. There is a Board meeting in December but I count that as Winter. 😉 What we don’t know is what the Board is being asked to do – take a decision, nod wisely and say “jolly good” or something else. I’m doubtful there will be any monetary commitment at that stage as TfL will no doubt still be faffing around with its budgets and business plan in the aftermath of the Autumn Statement.
@ Ngh – well you might be right. I was more musing about the balance of “small, affordable but effective” against “mega scale, expensive and very effective” interventions. *If*, as seems likely, TfL are going to be asked to contract the operation of South Eastern inners it will need some level of infrastructure intervention planned so that bidders have something to bid against in terms of delivering improvements sooner rather than later. Obviously there are lots and lots of issues but I can see TfL wanting to optimise capacity and path usage as quickly as it can to demonstrate it can do more and not “screw over” longer distance commuter services. If it can do this with a package of smaller scale and readily deliverable interventions then so much the better. Larger scale works are no doubt needed too but they take time to plan, fund and deliver and bring their own woes.
Re WW,
Volume 2: “The long tail of the imperceptible that all add up”
The small affordable but effective things that are virtually impossible to calculate a sensible BCR on because the effects could be very indirect and it needs a large number done to make noticable sustained impact on performance to the user. Often one off and possibly not seen on the LO (so far) or LU networks in more than 1 place requiring work in the less than half a career, so will probably be missed in the first few rounds of analysis.
The ultimate example might be extending canopies at certain stations to spread out passengers more to help reduce dwell times on wet days.
@ngh – I very much agree with your “little things that make a difference” philosophy. (Another example is the trade off between customer information and reliability, or even frequency and station loos) The problem is, as you imply, that these things are not measured and are quite difficult to measure, all being swept up in a vague volume/quality elasticity. LT and TfL have done a lot more than the progenitors of the PDFH ever did (but then BR was concerned only with cost saving – IC apart, and they had their own philosophy when it came to quality).In part, the problem is too much top down managament and management by indicators. In a geographically “random” layout like the railways, local knowledge and management by walking about win every time…
ngh, Graham H,
Famously, the British Olympic cycling team made lots of small differences. Redesigned the helmet for better airflow is an obvious example. Bringing in (and transporting where necessary) mattresses that cyclists are familiar with so they sleep that bit better is a less well known example. Most of these differences weren’t measurable and the ones that were were generally copied by others. Yet a lot people believe it is this obsession to detail that led to better results.
Re Graham H
“local knowledge and management by walking about win every time…”
Which is difficult if you don’t currently run it and don’t have a heavily staffed shadow operator preparing to operate in the future…
Re PoP,
Agreed but with a TfL take over of SE there is also the opportunity to make big differences with a few big expensive items e.g. grade separation which Brailsford realised the equivalent wasn’t always possible in cycling (e.g. a significant innovation could get thrown out by UCI rule changes) but there were opportunities with small tweaks to produce small guaranteed results.
It will be interesting to see which direction NR/TfL goes in initially Big / Small / or mix.
UCI = Union Cycliste Internationale
What TfL has which no other major body seems to possess is vision, leadership and, general, the funds to harness the many players who contribute to excellent performance. Each of its line upgrades has had such features whether on the Underground, DLR, Overground or trams. This is in stark contrast to DfT who seem not to be able to join up all the participants – although – I do hear about “programme boards” chaired by DfT officials for major schemes (GW electrification, Thameslink etc.) But where is the Programme Director or other Visionary who can lead the whole thing with accountability for delivering the outcomes that the customers would recognise.
ETCS is a case in point. Network Rail has a role and responsibilities, Rolling Stock owners have roles and responsibilities; so do the TOCs and FOCs. But who leads and presides over the many trade offs and who encourages the “little things” mentioned above?
100andthirty: So basically: TfL does better because it’s an integrated organisation?
Southern Heights (LR). Yes….that and the recognition, like Transport Scotland (who I failed to credit earlier), that good transport positively contributes to better economic activity and this is an overall benefit to the region (country for Transport Scotland).
We’ve argued on here before that central government departments are too big to be properly joined up so they just end up fighting; themselves, their colleagues and/or the Treasury!
@130 – actually, DfT staff dealing with public transport in its many forms have always been fewer than the central apparatus of LRT and TfL Indeed, before the fall, railways directorate comprised fewer than 60 people, passenger transport 30 in two divisions, London Transport a dozen, plus about 10 finance people. BR HQ – a couple of hundred, BR business HQs, less than that. Even the bloated DfT Rail organisation is no bigger than all those put together. Those numbers include clerks, secretaries and executive staff. Policy makers in both “old” DTp and now, DfT, probably total no more than a dozen or so senior staff – not a big organisational coordination problem at all. Nor is the Treasury a large organisation – merely pervasive – public expenditure is controlled by about three divisions each of 20 people.
Having worked in both, I can tell you from first hand experience that organisational control was never at any level a problem. The reason for the lack of joined up thinking had everything to do with a prevailing culture of anti-integration. How often did I sit in meetings in which my colleagues solemnly parrotted the mantra that the best way of coordinating transport was to allow free competition and uncontrolled pricing. And if possible no subsidy.
100andthirty at 13:15 “where is the Programme Director or other Visionary ”
At TfL?
Philip Rutnam’s total remuneration was £220-225k. TfL had 22 Group employees paid more than the Perm Sec. As an example, Terry Morgan’s total remuneration was nearly 4x Philip Rutnam’s…
Figures taken from 2014/15 Annual Reports.
Anonymous: Those salary figures are interesting, at least to those who understand such things. But it may be just me, but I do not really see why the ability to Direct, or indeed to have Visions (in the sense that 130 was using these terms) is intimately linked to pay levels.
I accept that paying peanuts tends to attract monkeys, but to me no salary above £100K per annum, even in London, can possibly be described as peanuts, in that sense. I also accept that many people have difficulty with the situation where a person paid X directing a person paid Y, where X is less than Y. But the whole salary business still strikes me as too-daft-to-laugh-at.
Malcolm: I wasn’t arguing that senior DfT officials are on their uppers just that one possible reason for the “stark contrast” identified by 130 could be pay (if the market for attracting visionary people capable of directing programmes works then surely the best will be at TfL).
Interested in the various comments. I wasn’t talking about financial reward, but about leadership and integrated programmes. Others mentioned Terry Morgan. He’s been a first class leader in Crossrail and in all probability Crossrail will come in more or less on time and budget AND work! My question is who does that leadership job in Thameslink or GW electrification, and whether having someone in charge might have eased some of the “interesting challenges” these programmes have faced?
By the way, integrated programmes aren’t a panacea. They can and do go wrong. Perhaps that’s another benefit of having leaders – there’s someone to sack!
ngh
A N other classic example was the salami-slicing approach to incremental improvements on the ex-GNR & NER main lines to Leeds & Newcastle.
Plus their old BR(ER) approach to electrification, of course.
Both worked very well, but are, I suspect impossible in today’s fragmented contracted railway
@100andthirty…..Don’t forget the Olympics, which also came in on time and budget (albeit one that was substantially increased before construction started). Whoever was responsible for the logistics of that probably should be drafted in to sort out NR projects ASAP!
@Graham H…..’How often did I sit in meetings in which my colleagues solemnly parrotted the mantra that the best way of coordinating transport was to allow free competition and uncontrolled pricing.’
Well, that explains a lot…..how did such ‘groupthink’ end up permeating the civil service at the DfT? And how- if I may ask- did you avoid succumbing to this? ?
The boss of the Olympic Delivery Authority during its construction and delivery phase was John Armitt. Prior to that he chief executive of Railtrack, then Network Rail. He clearly did have the skills required to deliver an integrated programme, but wasn’t called upon to use them in the railway because he was only in charge of part of it.
@ Ngh – I assume there is someone other than you who is aware of all of the wrinkles and issues that you regale us with here. There is clearly a shopping list and you have told us what issues would be resolved and you can derive benefits from that. I accept that with a potential takeover of South Eastern train services TfL do not have a team “on the ground” but I assume Network Rail are more than aware of the issues. If they aren’t then something is seriously amiss. They are jointly authoring the paper to the TfL Board so I’d hope there is detailed work already done. The advantage TfL have is that they have far more data and understanding of customer preferences and the values attached to them. They will also understand, to a level, the operational improvements that are achieveable on South Eastern and I assume they do have a “vision” as to the sort of train service they want to provide on that network. I’d argue the building blocks of a business case covering “hard” and “soft” issues are there. I’d also expect a far more nuanced and rounded view to be taken of something like “fixing” Woolwich Dockyard than Network Rail and South Eastern acting independently (or even together) could ever do. If the same station leasing concept is applied on South Eastern as on West Anglia / TfL Rail then I’d expect a much better approach to station development to emerge in due course. Govia with a relatively short term franchise would never be interested in forking out money to fix those sort of issues nor to participate in development and it will be way down NR’s priority list (although that might be changing given Mr Hendy’s different view on things). I know I’m taking a relatively optimistic line here but something sensible has to come forward soon or else the opportunity will be lost.
@Anonymously – your two questions:
– the civil service normally works by consensus after extensive – some would say, too extensive – consultation amongst interested parties. However, at a policy making level, it is a small community – those who would be involved in public transport policy development would amount to no more than a dozen or so senior voices, although much of the ground work would have been done in advance by their staff (ie the Grade 7s). In those circumstances, it doesn’t require many determined senior staff to “capture” the process. If, as was the case with railways policy in the ’80s, the most senior official was a thug who was prepared to use every means – including physical threats – to enforce his views, opposing voices didn’t standmuch of a chance against his claque.
– this takes us into personal territory which is not perhaps appropriate here. Suffice to say that whilst the Perm Sec and Ministers were well aware of the problem, they did nothing about it (and possibly felt that they couldn’t remove the people involved, despite some very public complaints in front of officials about “how right wing the civil service had become – this from Paul Channon). They (both Ministers and the Perm Sec) did,however, exercise extreme care as to whom they asked for advice, often waiting until the unfavoured official was away. The price for this was yet another round of aggressive rebuke when he returned(and an eventual nervous breakdown, but that’s too much info, I think).
I should perhaps add that the civil service bureaucracy is much like a musical instrument – many tunes can be played on the same equipment. It is also a highly pluralist and generally pretty broad church organisation. This means that a good “operator” can usually find alternative routes to get their opinions heard and good Ministers know this and seek advice accordingly. On several occasions in the ’80s, Railways Directorate effectively split into two, with the economists working to the deputy Secretary’s requirements, and the adminstrative side to Ministers’ and the Perm Sec’s requests. This didn’t lead to happy internal relationships.
100andthirty at 17:10
There are many differences between Great Western electrification and Crossrail perhaps the biggest being – in the words of Bowe – “in the case of the Great Western Mainline, conducting delivery in tandem with design has brought about increases in cost”.
This simply has not happened with Crossrail. Whether that is because of the lack of “a Programme Director or other Visionary” for GWEP or the differences in the decision-making, design and development processes between the two or a combination of both could be argued long into the night…
@Anonymous – the lesson of the cost implications of designing on the hoof ought to be an old one. Certainly, I recall from my first civil service job – managing the Post Office’s construction programme (those were the days) – that we couldn’t din hard enough into the client’s brain that changing the design of the building once it had reached first floor level would cost them an arm and a leg. GWML the same.
GH @ 11:22 Perhaps the electrification of the GWML was announced too early? IIRC it was some time in the second half of 2009. There was a new Secretary of State in post and less than a year until the General Election…
@Anonymous – there certainly were political pressures for an early announcement, but I suspect that the very significant changes to OHLE design following the factory train debacle, the associated reduction in available working time, problems with cable runs and changes to scope will all have had serious cost implications.
Re Anon and Graham,
One of the consultancies also pushed a move to civil and electrification works at the same time on the same sections of line on both on GW and North Western Electrification (behold the saviour BIM). And this was the plan for MML and EWR too. As soon as you hit trouble with the civils (Bridge deck replacement and raising, track lowering, drainage etc the whole optimised schedule is shredded and the costs go through the roof. (Also destroy any logistic plans v quickly)
Now note a return to sorting civils then start electrifying (which can then happen very quickly). This is now the approach that has been reverted to for MML, EWR, NorthWest, EGIP (Edinburgh Glasgow…). Note the amount of prepwork done for Goblin where this isn’t being done!
Being optimistic on civils and assuming you could close almost all the bridges across the GWML in half a county at same time might have been unwise too!
The classic doing stuff in parallel what could possibly go wrong example was designed the automated train and new catenary system at the same time then discovering the piling rigs weren’t big enough and the self propelled trains were under powered when full loaded with piles or masts.
A classic civils /electrification disaster example from WCML-Blackpool:
Several years ago consultancy: lowering track cheapest option rather than raising bridge. (no time to do fll survey or ground surveys due to required haste.
Along time later survey done on bridge for work to increase parapet height (to 1.8m required for OHLE) reveals the county council owned bridge is not far off falling down leading to 6 months of discussions as to what to do with the CC. [NR contributes cost of lowering and new parapets to new bridge deck and rebuild and CC picks up the rest of the cost but this take time to sort an agreement]
@ngh
Well, that seems to explain why costs ballooned to the extent that they did. If only NR and its predecessor had retained some engineers with skills and experience in OHLE, they wouldn’t have had to rely on consultancies for questionable advice!
I realise that this was the biggest electrification project for over 20 years (since the ECML), and that NR were (re-)learning how to do this after such a long gap, but that doesn’t excuse the basic failures in project management that you highlight. I’m particularly surprised by the factory train problems, as I thought this was an ‘off-the-shelf’ design that would match up with the OHLE equipment to be installed?
@Graham H
Oh dear, that really wasn’t the answer I was expecting ?. As someone who has encountered workplace bullying, I’m so sorry that you and your colleagues had to endure this. One hopes that this type of behaviour would not be tolerated in today’s workplace, but alas….
Re Anonymously,
NR oversaw the development of the HOPS train based on previous design expectations but their consultants / PM team (Now sold on by the former parent company) decided the best way to avoid doing ground surveys (save time…) was to oversize most the piles (one size fits all) so that the piling rigs on the new HOPS train weren’t big enough if the ground conditions were good! (generally good ground = more resistance). Some bigger piles are still required in areas with good ground so some RRV based piling would have been required anyway. The solution appears to be shorter piles in many cases based on ground surveys.
The piling rigs on the HOPS train can also only pile relatively close to the track which is unfortunate if you discover you have to avoid signalling cables and pile beyond that distance etc.!
The revised NR solution includes a Kirow crane based piling rig that will deal with almost anything!
RRV = Road-rail vehicle
Yet again reinforcing the saying that you pay for a good ground survey whether you plan for one or not!
What appears to be the case from the above comments, and talking to people involved, is that GWEP was considered a project with the objective “put up the wires” for the first few years. Whereas it is actually a programme of projects with the overarching objective of “deliver a railway capable of operating various new and old electric trains”.
Lesson not learnt from the West Coast Route Modernisation.
SFD: I think I understand your comment, but feel the need to ask for clarification anyway. You seem to be saying that there was insufficient emphasis, in planning and directing the project, on all the other things needed apart from the wires.
I am wondering if the “other things” not considered carefully enough were those things which are obviously essential to “putting up the wires”, like erecting posts, lowering track under bridges, building substations, signalling changes and so forth. Or are you referring to things not strictly part of electrification, but required at the same time, such as platform lengthening, new footbridges etc. and also routine renewals and fettling which might have had to be done at about the same time, whether or not electrification was happening?
And what is the relevance of “new and old” electric trains: wouldn’t much the same things have to be done for either age-group?
Malcolm re your last para (relevance of age groups): as I understand it the requirements for the new Hitachi Class 800s are different because they have two pantographs in use at the same time.
The catenary therefore needs to be resistant to the setting up of wave effects and bouncing pantographs.
@Old Buccaneer
Any overhead electric train of more than one unit will have more than one pantograph raised. A 12 car class 377 formation on Thameslink has three.
@timbeau – then there is also the question of the power draw over a given distance between pans.
@ Malcolm – SFD will no doubt provide his wise words in reply to you in due course. My reading of his comments is that no one took a holistic overview of all of the interventions that were likely on the GWML routes over the next 10-20 years. There can be merits in redesigning and restructuring interventions and amending the designs of what you do in terms of electrification to make maximum use of possession time during the main works (opportunity works) but also in making later work easier to achieve and with less impact on the railway. I’ve not followed the GWML works in great detail but there seem to be several large risks which have now materialised but which could have been mitigated or avoided. We also have a number of consequential impacts like have running to run the new trains in diesel mode over longer distances than envisaged. I imagine that will be affecting depot designs and servicing issues as well as the scheduling of the trains and how the drivers are trained. We’ll leave the financial consequences to one side. 😉
It’s the age old issue that the railway is a system and everything interacts with everything else. It’s all too easy to make a couple of apparently simple changes and hey presto lots of knock on consequences. I’m not saying any of this is easy but if nothing else it shows the benefit of proper “lessons learnt” and “corporate knowledge” being retained and made easily available to those who follow in later projects.
Re Malcolm, OB, WW,
“over the next 10-20 years.” Try 5 years! The GWML resignalling was cancelled after Railtrack went bust and issues with WCML upgrade including cost escalation and is now happening in parallel with electrification.
In reference to Malcolm’s point I suspect SFD meant both to a certain extent for example the need to rebuild Oxford Station (also Bristol TM and Cardiff for passenger train issues) to cope with more passenger trains, longer passenger trains and more + longer freight trains (containers to / from Southampton) as well more general infrastructure improvements for example the current (next fortnight) closure at Hinkley just south of Oxford for flood prevention work so that the line doesn’t close due to flooding most years (8 out of 10 years). The possession time is also being used to do as much piling for electrification as possible between Didcot and Hinksey (South Oxford). Also see new and more depot space.
“deliver a railway capable of operating various new and old electric trains”.
The original scheme would have allowed existing rolling stock or clones to run rather than future (now current rolling stock).
The existing OHLE designs only allow multi-pantograph use up to 100mph with 110mph in recent (e.g. since original GWML electrification announcement) special cases on certain routes when the 110mph 350 and 387 variants came along (caveats and design tweaks galore). Above 110mph everything was single pantograph (Cl 91 has everything contained with the power car and the Pendolino uses 1 pantograph (usually the rear) with a 25kv cable along the train roof to distribute it to the 1 / 2 other transformer cars (9/11car variants respectively)*. The pendolino solution doesn’t work when you have multiple units e.g. 2x 5car IEP with a design speed of 140mph hence the development of new (forward looking) OHLE spec (UK series 1) with the following main criteria:
140mph+
3+ pantographs /train in use at design speed
Increased current draw
Substantially lower failure rate
Substantially easier to repair
Substantially less disruptive in the event of failure (e.g. adjacent tracks OHLE is independent and quicker to repair)
Substantially lower maintenance (requirement and cost)
Performance effectively not degraded by weather (high temps or wind see GEML as reference case for issues)
Substantially safer for railway workers.
Improved corrosion performance
Small parts count for simplified logistics
UK series 2 has been developed for line speeds upto 100mph providing the same benefits but at reduced cost (many common parts with series 1).
*Any full length high speed EMU with distributed traction (e.g. Pendolino / new Eurostars / IEP will have multiple transformer cars due to the size /weight of the transformers (e.g fitting them under the floor) which then means multiple pantograph and then 1 pantograph / transformer starts to make sense. (Also for lower current/pantograph & pantograph & contact wire wear reduction).
What ever happened to the phase Total Route Modernisation? (Answers on a post card to Mr C Green…).
ngh
The words: “fragmentation” & “privatisation” loom behind your most recent comment, don’t they?
Also “integration” between different suppliers & customers, rather than having a single “controlling mind”.
That will teach me to drop in a throwaway comment and go away for 2 days.
What I meant was, roughly, the second half of Malcolm’s response. In that electrification is one project, but it runs concurrently alongside several other projects such as new train introduction (Class 800s, Class 387s, Class 345), ‘new’ (old) train introduction (Class 319, and anything else an operator wants to throw that way), Crossrail, platform extensions, new depots, Reading, various resignallings (including Cardiff, Bristol, Oxford, Swindon) plus the usual track and structures renewals. Oh and maintenance of a 125mph railway that also accommodates heavy freight trains.
I am really puzzled as to how the GWML electrification mistakes (and the NW examples mentioned by ngh) have come about in the modern projects industry. Risk as a methodology, rather than as the combined experience of ‘hard knocks’ graduates, was beginning to take off in the early noughties, and Crossrail shows how it should be done. Gleaning what facts are available from insiders like ngh and specialist journos like Roger Ford indicates two issues: (1) no appreciation of or control over the complex interrelationships that linear multidiscipline projects inevitably involve, specially when dealing with a work site that is more archaeological dig than greenfield (2) the lack of any real risk management with serious grip. I can imagine that everyone duly filled in the risk register and then thought that just doing that would magic the risks away. My feeling is that the engineering institutions have failed their own members and the industry. When big time gaps occur as happened with electrification, the knowledge in the wise old heads has retired along with the owners of those heads. The engineering institutions are supposed to be the repositories of such knowledge and should be telling clients like Network Rail that they need to learn from the accumulated experience and not assume that enthusiasm and new technology will overcome all.
Sorry rant over.
Fandroid…….. re “The engineering institutions are supposed to be the repositories of such knowledge and should be telling clients like Network Rail that they need to learn from the accumulated experience and not assume that enthusiasm and new technology will overcome all.”
To mangle an old fable: “there’s none so deaf as those that won’t listen”!
@ Fandroid – I would say that Crossrail has also learnt one other key lesson – engagement and good media relations. Obviously a great deal is happening so they can usually say good things are happening somewhere in the project but criticism of the project has been close to zero. If there has been any we’ve not heard about it! Even potentially very damaging stories like the death of a worker and cyclists ending up underneath lorries serving Crossrail sites have not proved fatal for the project.
I’m pretty convinced that various things have gone wrong on Crossrail but you’ll be struggling to find them – I think they’ve hit a lot of problems in the City of London and also at Whitechapel (how many week long ELL closures?!!) but have we ever had the real facts? Nope. All cleverly managed and rescheduled “within the scope of the whole programme” but no doubt “off the rails” in terms of the specific local programme for that project. Note I’m not being critical – things always go wrong and need managing on something as huge as Crossrail. However the entire public face of Crossrail has remained unblemished and instead we get good news stories about how Liverpool Street’s platforms were made off site and then lowered down and assembled. I wonder if that was always the plan or whether “events” caused a significant rethink? We may never know but Crossrail still got a “good news” story off the back of whatever has happened. It’s all very clever and done well.
I think Network Rail are beginning to slowly learn some of these relationship and media tricks but it is undoubtedly too late for the GWML project. Hopefully something like MML electrification will be an examplar of 21st century railway projects.
@WW – a good degree of truth there re PR strategy. TfL are much more in control of their own destiny (compared to NR) both in terms of budget and their ability to say what they want.
I was once told that there were ten times as many people in the TfL comms team than in the whole of NRs. Although you have to treat that with a large pinch of salt, (and note the respective industry structures), it does help to explain the different approach.
WW: good points comparing the media presentation of Crossrail with GWML. But the fact remains that GWML electrification is already certain not to meet its originally planned completion dates, whereas that is not the case for Crossrail. This is not a difference of presentation, it is a difference between a “target” definitely-missed, and one which will probably be hit.
@Fandroid – well yes, the industry lacked the proper engineering knowledge of its patch – literally, in the case of GWML, where the corpses were buried – but that is partly to be blamed on the process of privatisation. The engineers who did know their patch rushed, for the most part, to take the redundancy money rather than work for the likes of Balfours – and who would blame them. I subsequently discussed the problem with one of Balfour’s senior managers who admitted that they were effectively starting from ground zero and had resorted to handing out tablets to their field managers to record what they found as they went round. [Of course, BR should have kept full records – with the benefit of hindsight – but the railway industry had managed well enough for the previous two centuries without them and in the run up to privatisation, no one was going to do anything about it then… Literally, sold as seen]
@Graham H: literally, in the case of GWML, where the corpses were buried
That sounds very Tony Soprano… (although Crossrail encountered at least one previously unknown medieval graveyard).
On record keeping, there is an interesting comparison with Crossrail’s enormous database of every structure and drill hole, which is intended to be handed over to the infrastructure managers – the challenge will be keeping it up to date after opening.
@Graham H…..So, whenever the success or failure of rail privatisation is discussed in the mainstream media, why is this point never raised??? *Goes to nearest wall to bang head*.
@Anonymously – and you expect the press to bother to do the research?
@IanJ – the shallow “graves” containing the signalling cable runs were (ngh passim) seem to have been what did for the HOPS train.
Re Graham H,
Probably number 1 of 3 bigger reasons which meant they then weren’t allowed near large section of the eastern area to be electrified for months / quarters / years (or yet!). Note the extensive use in Wales in areas where there were better records e.g. Newport area very successfully (obviously designed by some one with LNW (South) or Kent / Sussex /Wessex experience of record keeping not Western region).
2. The piling rigs not being big enough so 10′ of pile could be left above ground to be finished off by something bigger later (or alternatively the piles being too big if the ground conditions were good!)
3. The HOPS train being underpowered and proceeding at a snails pace from loading area to worksite so having a shorter working window overnight than anticipated.
@ngh – yes, I’d heard anecdotal evidence that Western Region were more reliant on “invested knowledge” rather than documentation – possibly either because they’d not done anything radical to the infrastructure since 1892, or possibly a lingering “we do it this way in GWland”.
One lesson from HOPS experience with buried cables should be to plan to replace cables as part of electrification schemes where HOPS will be used . Thus allowing new cables to be installed and documented bringing the benefits new cables could bring .
No doubt HOPS or indeed other systems will still come across Unknown cables, pipes etc but this will hopefully still allow HOPS to work more to what it was designed to do and thus overtime reduce the costs and times for electrification .
I also read recently that a new system has been developed which feed cables for overhead at tension it will operate at that speeding up wiring of overhead .
Re Graham H,
I had chat with an ex western civils friend who ran for the hills the moment the electrification word was mentioned for both reasons you mention. He set up a specialist software company for surveying and asset tracking / management (Including the software for tablets!)
WR’s filing in the Waterloo dungeon wasn’t that great…
Re Melvyn,
🙂 Or just put the cables in concrete line side ducts like other bits of NR!
The wiring part of the HOPS is fantastic and can easily do mile a night – it isn’t all bad.
Melvyn: Whilst installing new cables makes a lot of sense you can’t just push a pile through the existing ones unless the new cables are all already connected up and tested, thus requiring multiple passes. Thus back to the initial issue.
Ian Visits has noted building & preparatory work around Angel Road / Meridian Water + some pictures, & makes a brief reference to the STAR project.
HERE
@ Greg – there is also activity to the south of Tottenham Hale. Say it today when I went past on a train. Loads going on with the GOBLIN in preparation for bridge replacement near Ferry Lane.
WW
Yes – the trees to the S have been cleared, it’s obvious that the boundary wall is going to be moved back between T Hale & the reservoirs.
As for the GOBLIN, there are now two lines of track re-laid throguh Walthamstow “midland”, but platform lowering work is still in progress. Masts are up, but nothing hanging from them & probably won’t be until the “low-level” work is completed.
Lots of progress (!)
The strategic outline business case for the West London Orbital scheme has just been published by TfL.
https://tfl.gov.uk/cdn/static/cms/documents/west-london-orbital-strategic-outline-business-case.pdf
The plan is to use the Dudding Hill freight line to link Hendon with Hounslow via Harlesden.
Whilst the benefits ratio is around 1.5 to 2 (medium) it would appear that the fare revenue only covers a small proportion of the operating costs, let alone provide a profit to recover part of the capital costs.
The initial plan is go with class 172 4 car diesels, and look at electrification later.
4-car class 172 diesels don’t exist, but I suspect they mean some diesel configuration circa 95 m to 100 m in length. However to specify diesels for London lines seems very much behind the curve in terms of zero carbon at point of emission.
I suspect if this proposal goes forward the TfL train order woukd be for hybrid stock using third rail where possible and diesel elsewhere. There is sense in this idea of diesel or hybrid stock as additional electrification let alone a modest extension of third rail is likely to be highly problematic partially because of cost but mainly due to ORR’s attitude to it.
It’s a shame that this idea could not be pushed further to include Twickenham as a terminus but that would add additional costs of a greater magnitude.
RichardB…..Hmmmmmmm………ORR’s attitude is interesting. Less than 10 years ago 3rd rail was extended for the ELL extension. As far as I’m aware, the law on electricity hasn’t changed. But if they are obdurate, this line is short enough and speeds low enough that very simple catenary could be used, or battery hybrid, charging on the 3rd rail and at 3rd rail charging at termini which would be energised only when the train is over it. This is similar to Alstom’s “third rail in the street” system and VivaRail’s patented “charging station”.
I still think it incredible that a June 2019 TfL report proposes diesel trains!
130
They are certainly all too aware of the (IMHO) irrational objection by ORR to 3rd rail, & the current minister’s objection ot ANY electrification & have “cut their coat” accordingly.
3rd rails (*) kill. That is enough of a rational ground for anyone to object to them.
However, I do agree that the opposition to any electrification is not so logical, and also agree that advancing a scheme, even with diesel trains, is better than doing nothing. And if the scheme does go ahead, there may still be time for it to be tweaked into something more compatible with expert thinking.
(*) as used throughout the ex-Southern Railway. Intermittently live ones (as 130 mentions) are probably safe.
It’s ludicrous to not allow any small 3rd rail extensions if there are no plans to remove all the existing 1000s of miles of 3rd rail across the south of England.
If live rails are so dangerous, then surely the London Underground should be shut as live rails serving (over)crowded and narrow underground platforms are far more of a safety risk than relatively lightly used overground platforms. Even the “4th” rail nearest the platform would give you a nasty shock.
@Verulamius
Thank you for the TfL link.
I note that capital costs in the TfL strategic outline business case are inflated by 80% for Optimism Bias, a practice discouraged in the now preferred RMM (Rail Management Method) pricing which focuses on earlier assessment of real costs and risks.
However the revenue shortfall is also significant, after deducting abstraction largely from existing TfL services. The bulk of direct local travel will be within Zones 3 and 4, so with low fares yield per orbital journey.
It is principally the time savings gained by users which make the BCR equations fair to high in merit, and with wider benefits if additional housing can be accommodated because of the better rail network scope.
TfL is satisfied that the scheme should be investigated further, with more optioneering to define the best value scheme(s).
@Mikey C
The 4th rail is always on the side away from the platform (except when a track has platforms on both sides of course)
@Malcolm
All 3rd rail routes in the UK are securely fenced away from casual (accidental) trespassers, and you are much more likely to survive contact with a 750V rail than a 25kV cable.
The Croxley Rail link would have used live rails. There seems to have been no objection to it there.
But wouldn’t the proposed route be ideal for a battery unit, given that more than half the route, and both ends, are electrified? (the spur between Kew Bridge and South Acton was electrified until at least 1940, when passenger services were withdrawn)
I was only mentioning the generally accepted fact that the overall risk to life from 750V at ground level is greater than that from 25 kV overhead, which justifies a presumption against third rail for new work. Many other factors come into play, as people have mentioned, and it is accepted that in some circumstances, use of conductor rail can still be justified.
I can find several places close to where I am sitting, where an unsupervised child could walk the wrong way at a level crossing or at the end of a platform, which are difficult to “securely fence” (though efforts are made with wooden stumbling blocks). However, this apparent risk is not, so far as I know, borne out with statistics, whereas the risks to cleaning and other operational staff are, unfortunately, supported by known deaths.
@TIMBEAU
I’m pretty sure (I read it somewhere) that while the middle rail is less fatal than the outside one, it still wouldn’t do you any good…
@ Mikey C
The centre rail is (nominally) at -220V, with the outside one at +440V, so it should be quite a lot less fatal. Although still not recommended!
Herned,
Only on Underground lines still at around 630V. The move is towards a nominal 750V. Most of the SSR is at 750V and I think the Victoria line is too – amongst other things it helps with regenerative braking for reasons I don’t really understand.
Feels like a proposal that is 20 years too late
I find it hard to believe any Mayor of London is going to put weight behind adding diesel powered routes, the political optics are bad
Any consultation is surely going to get a lot of “diesel – think of the children” responses
Further, as part of the line in question is a freight route something will have to be done within the next 20 years (at most) to allow removal of diesel traction “by 2040”.
If it can’t be 3rd rail then it’s 25KV, bionic duckweed or simply no freight. What other realistic options are there?
PoP….. On LU, 630 V, 660 V or 750 V are all flavours of the same thing with resistors biasing the floating earth to +2/3rds of the voltage and -1/3rd of the voltage. The only exceptions are on the lines shared with TOC trains where the negative rail is bonded to earth.
Increasing the voltage from a nominal 600 V to 750 V allows an increase in power for a given current of 25%. This can be and is used to increase acceleration.
For regenerative braking the voltage generated by the train has to be higher than the line voltage to enable current to flow the “wrong way” back into the line. International standards allow the regeneration voltage to rise by 25 % above nominal which is often rounded up to a nominal 950 V. Sometimes the current regenerated is allowed to be higher than the maximum allowed in motoring. All this allows high braking rates at high-ish speed (eg 46 miles/h) using solely regenerative braking. On some older LU train with no regenerative braking but with rheostatic braking, the internal-to-the-train dynamic braking voltage could sometimes rise to circa 1200 V.
Regenerative braking is a dynamic situation in more ways than just providing a retardation force, as the line receptivity can change in the blink of an eye and trains need to be able to switch from regenerative to rheostatic and to friction braking equally quickly.
Is the inclusion of diesel traction merely a bargaining chip to get another party to put in the funding for electrification/battery hybrid/hydrogen should the plans get to that stage?
I guess the reference to Class 172 is simply because there is some ecperience of them on the TfL network – they’re all in the Midlands now after all (barring the paltry 4 × 2-car units to be seen at Marylebone)!
@ PoP
Fair point. I assume that the ratio is still 2-1 ish between the rails (ignoring bits shared with NR etc.) though, so the point stands as to why a shock from the central rail is preferable, for want of a better term.
Am I missing something, but won’t the 4 trains an hour Kew Bridge – Hounslow get in the way of the already agreed increased SWR service via Brentford? I believe when the 15 minute interval Windsor and Reading trains start they are split 50/50 between the north and south sides of the Hounslow loop. So that’s at least 4 semi-fasts. On top of them there will be the 4 Hounslow loop stoppers. Or is there still space for an extra platform at Hounslow?
“3rd rails (*) kill. That is enough of a rational ground for anyone to object to them.”
Malcolm’s view.
But 25kv kills….& so do roads.
I haven’t trawled the statistics but it is a long time since I have read of someone being killed by a third rail, but I can remember two recent & different incidents in which youngsters have been killed by the overhead wires.
Third rail is a cheap ( v cheap in relation to 25kv) way of eliminating some diesel passenger trains in London & the south east.
I have read ORR’s objections & they are not categoric. They just require someone of stature to say third rail risks can be made low.
Just point to the tens ofmillions of third & fourth rail train miles run safely every year in London & the open countryside.
It is absurd that London Bridge still houses dated DMU’s because no one in authority can be bothered to make the case.
“It is absurd that London Bridge still houses dated DMU’s ”
……….and Waterloo ; electrification at least to Salisbury (with a Bournemouth-type push-pull arrangement beyond?) is long overdue.
Timbeau: the 4th rail is in the middle of the track, so it can’t be on the side away from the platform (that’s the 3rd rail).
At the grave risk of crayoning things in, wouldn’t improved connectivity between the Hounslow loop and OOC / WLL be achieved at far lower overall cost by a new interchange station at Strand-on-the-Green, similar to the proposals for a new Brockley interchange?
This could also provide District Line interchange and remove the need for a new Lionel Road station (which I guess would replace Kew Bridge?).
I would have thought that this “option” would at least be mentioned in the study given the level of emphasis on the benefits to Hounslow Loop passengers.
No idea of practicality beyond a quick look at the Google satellite map showing some viable-looking allotments as a potential site…
Sorry – I mean “… between the Hounslow loop and OOC / NLL …”
@Timbeau: Waterloo has steam too…..
@B@T
Not possible to put an interchange station where the Hounslow loop and North London/District lines cross as this is next door to the large flats complex known as “Chiswick Village”.I lived there between 1979 and 1981 and my kitchen overlooked this crossing.Most evenings at around 7.30 pm a very long coal train would pass by very slowly having come off the line from South Acton to the Westbound Hounslow loop and turned left at Kew East Junction and onto the Eastbound Hounslow loop at New Kew Junction.
@Hugh.S – I lived up near Chiswick Park station in the late 80’s and had friends in Chiswick Village.. I would have thought the residents would be ecstatic about a new station right on their doorstep, especially if the main entrance was in the south-west corner with a pedestrian tunnel through to the flats complex (and providing them with better access to the river as a by-product)? Surely it would add a fair chunk to the value of a flat there?
I’m not seriously pitching the idea, just a bit surprised that it wasn’t shown as an alternative option in the TfL paper given the frequent references to improvements to Hounslow Loop connectivity and their promotion of similar solutions at Brockley and Streatham.
@Hugh S
Why not? The flats are well away from both lines – there are only garages next to the tracks. But where would the trains terminate? There is no room at Richmond, and you are not going to get very far trying to truncate an existing service (NLL or District Line) at, say Gunnersbury (or diverting the NLL from Acton Wells junction to Ealing Broadway, for example)
It is also not clear where trains could terminate on the officially proposed route. There is no siding anywhere between the Kew Triangle and the Whitton Triangle (which can’t take much more traffic). Rather than running via the west side of the triangle, with a station inconveniently situated on Lionel Road (which has little going for it except being useful cut-through between the South Circular Road and the M4), why not terminate on the east curve, reinstating one of the original platforms and providing same level interchange with the eastbound SWR line. (The other track can be made bi-directional so that trains laying over do not get in the way of freight traffic). Unlike the Lionel Road site, Kew Bridge station, as its name implies, is convenient for both sides of the river. Hounslow, Brentford, etc would require a change, but a practical connecting service is better than an impractical direct one!
@Timbeau
I was brought up not far from Hounslow Station and I recall two sidings to the immediate west. I’ve checked on the National Library of Scotland site (v useful) and the Up siding was about 400 metres long, the Down 500. They were disconnected and removed (I think) in the mid to late 1970s probably in connection with the Feltham Area resignalling. A check on Google Maps shows the area still clear, so if they really wanted, a siding could be reinstated. Or if you’re being really ambitious, spacing out the running lines to install a central reversing road. Either might be preferable to the proposed bay, which might impinge to far into the little industrial estate. I’m rather more concerned about the situation at Acton Wells Junction, to be honest, and this could be a major sticking point.
@ Timbeau
I think you meant North Circular.
@nameless – No, I think that Timbeau did mean the South Circular. The North Circular (A406) meets the South Circular (A205) at the Chiswick roundabout, M4 J1.
@Johnmf
I guess it depends if you are talking about Lionel Road North or Lionel Road South.
The TfL Strategic Outline Business Case makes little reference to the capacity of the network to handle the proposed train service. NR concerns about station capacity on the Hounslow loop are noted and reference is made to the need to accommodate freight. Acton Wells Junction looks like a serious pinch point. Aggregate trains from Acton Yard to locations including Allington, Crawley New Yard, Purley, Tolworth and Battersea all cross the junction at slow speed, having approached on the gradient up from the Great Western Main Line, where there is a 15 mph speed restriction. They already have to fit between the LO service to Richmond. Are paths really available for up to 8 trains per hour between South Acton and Neasden?
@Nameless
I did indeed mean Lionel Road South, which crosses both Kew Bridge spur tracks on its connection between the A205 and the A4. (Although currently closed during the building of Brentford FC’s new stadium – Capital Interchange Way is a suitable alternative)
Although Lionel Road North could be used as a cut through to the NCR from the A4, Larch Drive is the usual one.