In early July 2018, South Western Railway (SWR) released a statement on their website. In it, the Operator reiterated their desire to run additional services – something they had included in their franchise submission for December 2018. Unfortunately, the statement said, this was now no longer possible. The long-promised extra services would not be implemented until May 2019 at the earliest. So what went wrong? In a word: Power.
A beleaguered franchise
South Western Railway have, in a roundabout way, been one of the major beneficiaries of the ongoing troubles with the May timetable. Not because it has had a positive impact on their services, but because the issues it caused have drawn attention away from the significant problems (and failings) it is experiencing. Put bluntly: the mainstream media have limited space to cover the railways, and the issues on Thameslink and Northern Rail have been hogging the limelight.
Yet south (west) of the river, significant issues have existed with SWR’s services for some time now. The reasons for this are varied (and we will tackle them all in more detail in a more in-depth upcoming piece), but they can broadly be summed up as a mix of mismanagement, issues with infrastructure work by Network Rail and ongoing industrial strife. These have all been compounded by some things outside SWR’s control – a certain amount of negligence on the part of the outgoing franchisee and the problems upgrading Waterloo.
As a result of all this, SWR’s performance statistics since taking over the Franchise in August 2017 have been poor. By way of example: ORR statistics show that total delays on the network have increased by approximately 25%, and this figure hasn’t shown any signs of getting better.
One of SWR’s consistent promises to its increasingly dissatisfied customers has been that services will both improve and increase. The December 2018 timetable has been marked out since takeover as the point at which those improvements would begin to appear. South Western’s recent announcement, however, made it very clear that this is not, in fact, the case now:
Since before we started the South Western Railway franchise we have been preparing for a major timetable change in December 2018 to provide customers with access to additional services and extra capacity throughout the day.
We are therefore disappointed that we will not be implementing any changes to the December 2018 timetable and instead rolling over the May 2018 timetable. Preparations to deliver the extra services, capacity improvements and reduced journey times started well before we took over the SWR franchise and will continue as we are determined to deliver what our customers and stakeholders expect.
We are mindful of the disruption to customers that happened with other major timetable changes elsewhere in May 2018 and despite SWR’s desire to deliver the increased capacity and extra services as soon as possible to customers, it has been decided at a national level that a period of stability is needed.
Breaking down the statement
On the surface, South Western’s statement seems to place the blame for this delay on the issues caused in May. Yet regular London Reconnections readers may well have spotted more in the wording of the statement than meets the eye. Most notably, the comment that preparations started well before the SWR and that they are determined to deliver what stakeholders expect. Both of these hint at the real, underlying cause of SWR’s current inability to introduce services.
It isn’t about drivers, or timetable clashes. It is down to cold, hard physics: South Western do not have sufficient electrical power available on their network to run the level of service they agreed to run.
What went wrong
The South West Mainline (SWML) has long been known within railway circles for its power problems. Roughly 150 miles long, running between Waterloo and the South Coast via London’s south-western suburbs, it was first electrified in the early 20th Century. Or rather, part electrified (mostly the Surrey section) using DC 3rd rail technology. Electrification of the rest of the line wouldn’t happen until after 1967, with Weymouth itself finally electrified in 1988. Indeed as late as 2007, dual-headed trains (diesel and electric) could be seen in service on the line.
The SWML’s power issues aren’t solely because of this pattern (or type) of electrification. Its proximity and interactions with other lines (including the Underground) also don’t help. The end result, however, is a line that has always struggled to provide the levels of power required to run the service patterns a succession of operators (public and private) would have liked to.
Indeed a visitor to one of our regular pub meetups once recalled that his first job on the railways as a young apprentice had been to stop the power tripping on sections of the SWML every rush hour through the novel application of a piece of wood to the breakers.
In light of the history of power issues on the line, it is perhaps unsurprising that was going to cause issues for South Western. A key part of SWR’s bid was that they would run more services. More trains mean more power. As with the introduction of Siemens 444s and 450s on the line almost 15 years ago, this means new power infrastructure is required.
What is more surprising, however, is how the situation has unfolded so far. This was a solvable problem, requiring some major – but not overly complex – engineering work from Network Rail. Yet it has not been solved.
Given the previous sentence, once could be forgiven for assuming that the majority of the blame for this particular failure should accrue to Network Rail. Certainly – as an Office of Rail and Road (ORR) report highlighted back in March – many of the current issues on the SWML can be traced back to issues with work they have or haven’t completed.
Yet in this instance, the blame largely doesn’t lie with Network Rail and that is why this issue is worth highlighting on its own, before we dive deeper into SWR elsewhere.
The issue arose because of a failure on the part of the Department for Transport (DfT) – and to a lesser extent SWR – to realise that more power would be required at all.
A brave new world
The Thameslink franchise was, to a large extent, a brave (if apparently flawed) attempt by the DfT to follow a franchising model similar to the concession system pioneered successfully by TfL. Yet it wasn’t the only innovation in contractual governance to emerge from Marsham Street in recent years. Almost as soon as he was appointed Secretary of State for Transport in July 2016, Chris Grayling began to push for a more direct relationship between rail operator and infrastructure, and a more ‘hands off’ approach by the DfT. The most extreme example of this so far has been East West Rail, announced in December 2016, as a private sector project to rebuild and connect key areas of the railway in East Anglia. This is to be carried out by the private sector, with little-to-no direct Network Rail involvement. Grayling explained his logic in a speech at the time:
Network Rail is a committed organisation with a fantastic safety record, the safest major railway network in Europe. But it has been too cumbersome, has not always been an unqualified success in delivering the upgrades our railways need; and does need to focus much more on passengers…
But every monopoly needs competition. So I want to go 1 step further, and bring new skills into the challenge of upgrading our railways – to test the ways we are doing things right now, and find ways of doing them better.
Grayling’s desire to “think different” however, had already influenced other projects as well, including the South West Franchise. The franchise handles almost 4 million passengers a week – ranking it second behind GTR in terms of size. In 2016, the DfT asked the incumbent operator, Stagecoach, to continue operating the franchise for two more years, but the operator weren’t keen – or rather they weren’t keen at the price that the DfT were willing to pay. The line had a number of issues and the Waterloo rebuild would bring more, Stagecoach explained. If the DfT wanted them to continue running it, they wanted more money. The DfT declined.
This meant it was necessary to retender. Bids were sought, and bidders were encouraged not just to be aggressive in terms of potential service provision, but to think about ways in which they would work directly with Network Rail without DfT input going forward. SWR’s bid embraced this. The company, a joint venture between First Group and MTR, offered up a plan that, amongst other things, included the staggered addition of new services over successive timetable changes. Their price, and profits were based on this.
It is here that, in hindsight, the first issues seem to have manifested. In a move that will be thematically familiar to anyone who has followed our coverage of the issues on Thameslink, LR sources suggest that the information provided to bidders by the DfT wasn’t entirely reflective of the power situation on the ground. More specifically, that DfT Rail Franchising pushed forward with the franchise specification without confirming with either Network Rail or DfT Rail Infrastructure that the power setup on the SWML would support the service patterns they were encouraging bidders to submit.
Left hand vs right hand
SWR’s successful bid was predicated on the delivery of these services, and the DfT duly signed off their initial proposals for a new timetable and new trains.
Even at this point, the power issue was solvable, if addressed in time. The problem, however, remained largely unnoticed until September 2017 when – beginning the long process of preparations for this December’s timetable change – SWR submitted the track access requests their anticipated timetable would require to the ORR. This represented the first time that their specific plans were exposed to anyone outside of SWR and the DfT. The ORR duly sought Network Rail’s opinion on the feasibility of the timetable and were informed, in no uncertain terms, that the power supply on the SWML simply was not capable of supporting the timetable.
Luckily, Network Rail indicated, there was still time to correct this. The engineering work was perfectly feasible, although Network Rail also warned the ORR that until those improvements were in place they would be unable to properly assess whether SWR’s timetable was definitely deliverable or not.
The ORR duly passed all this information back to SWR.
He said, she said
SWR’s response to the rebuttal of their provisional timetable was a mix of confusion and annoyance. They pointed out, in a response to Network Rail and the ORR, that all of their plans had been signed off by the DfT. A series of fraught interactions followed, leading to a particularly blunt message to SWR from Network Rail in December 2017.
The DfT may have told SWR they could run the trains, Network Rail explained, but they certainly hadn’t told Network Rail to build the required power infrastructure on the SWML. More importantly, the DfT hadn’t given them any money to do so.
Unfortunately for SWR, Network Rail pointed out, this meant the work would not be done. They also pointed out that the franchise agreement specified that, ultimately, it was incumbent on the operator to run a timetable deliverable within the constraints of the infrastructure, not the other way round.
Caught between the two sides, in March the ORR ordered SWR and Network Rail to try and find a resolution to this issue. With no money forthcoming from the DfT, in June Network Rail submitted back to SWR and ORR a less-intensive timetable that would work with the existing infrastructure.
To say that SWR were unhappy with this timetable would be an understatement. Timing-wise it seems that it was this, rather than any of the other issues they are experiencing, that really triggered July’s statement. It was also this that has resulted in SWR returning to the DfT and requesting that the franchise be renegotiated.
It is hard to blame SWR for seeking this. They seem to have been dealt a somewhat unplayable hand. They bid, and expected to deliver services (and profits) based on the understanding that the infrastructure required to deliver those services already existed. Not only was this not true, but there has been no real move to correct this situation by the DfT.
The knowledge gap
We will explore all of the ongoing issues with SWR shortly in a more thorough piece, but the power issue is worth highlighting in its own right. Not only is it the cause of another major loss of services (albeit potential, but very much required ones) for passengers, but it speaks again to many of the issues facing both the railways in general and the DfT in particular.
As with Thameslink and Northern, it reveals the critical importance of understanding the sum of the operational railway, not just its parts. It also highlights, just how important it is – under the current railway governance model – for those commissioning services to have that level of knowledge.
In a way, SWR’s power issues prove Grayling’s point – it is vitally important that someone understands the impact of every strategic decision on the working railway. Unfortunately for the Secretary of State, as with Thameslink and Northern, the SWR experience suggests that under the current model that ‘someone’ needs to be the DfT.
Next week we will explore SWR’s wider issues in more detail.
“A series of fraught interactions followed, leading to a particularly blunt message to SWR from Network Rail in December 2018:”
Presumably you mean December 2017 – otherwise I’d like to borrow your crystal ball!
Presumably you mean December 2017 – otherwise I’d like to borrow your crystal ball!
If I did, I’d be a richer man! Well spotted. Fixed!
It seems to me that all this is history repeating itself. Remember the fiasco back in the early 2000s on the Southern and SE networks when Network Rail had to upgrade the power supply to allow 12-car trains to run, but they only did it after the trains were delivered.
Since the DfT took over the mirco-management of the railways (from the SRA), there have been a whole series of disasters, IEP, GW and Northern Electrification, GTR, franchise management to name but a few. Surely the role of civil servants is to advise politicians on what is possible and, more importantly, what is not? But they need experienced experts in the subject to do this effectively. Since there are, apparently, no railway experts in the DfT, now all they can do is say “Yes Minister” and chaos ensues.
We need a new SRA type organisation staffed by experienced railway experts from all disciplines including, most importantly, railway system integration, to guide policy and to confirm engineering and operational viability of all schemes.
A small note: DfT is on Horseferry Road, round the corner from Marsham which has the Home Office, MCHLG and Defra.
*MHCLG, my apologies
If the power for the third rail is provided at intervals along the track , using transformers and rectifiers to convert ac from the grid to lower voltage dc, where are the places that cannot supply enough power?
Surely it can’t be a problem on all the lines that carry SWR trains, so where are the pinchpoints? And is it the ac feeds that do not have the capacity, or is it the conversion gear? Or is it that more transformer/rectifier sites are needed so the load can be spread?
Re JB and ThameslinkTerry,
DfT inhabits Great Minster House (GMH) which occupies the corner of Horseferry and Marsham Streets.
In an efficiency measure in circa 2008 they decided to sell off the Marsham Street wing of the building as they needed less space* (allegedly) and it was turned in to flats (by Berkley?).
*Ending up with virtually zero meeting rooms** and then having to lease expensive office space in other private sector buildings near by, even more so after the bonfire of the quangos. Oops.
**DfT love nearby organisations that can provide meeting rooms – for example the SMMT even conveniently moved to just round the corner greatly helping DfT.
DfT also doesn’t do long meetings as then they would have to provide Tea, Coffee, Water and Biscuits (via PPP contract) for which they have virtually no budget as an early coalition government era cost saving was axing the meeting coffee budget. Hence no long meetings were nasty bits of detail might emerge…
Hence DfT are now in Horseferry Rd.
And now I’ve got to finishe the article for next week…
Re Ray L,
The last sentence of the article gives a big hint:
“Next week we will explore SWR’s wider issues in more detail.”
They’ll always be ‘Marsham Street’ to me!
And yes, one of the things I love about the DfT is that their ‘biscuit meetings’ (slang for any meeting that seems to achieve nothing other than the eating of biscuits) still happen a lot.
They just don’t even have biscuits any more.
Re JB,
And then there are the other biscuit meetings that are very productive – the consumption of tea coffee and biscuits or even sandwiches (yes some of those meetings do still happen) is timetabled to achieve a productive session of 120 minutes between breaks.
It’s all very well DfT and NR saying that SWR should have put in a bid that worked with the existing infrastructure, but DfT had a responsibilty to both taxpayers and passengers to check that the bid was deliverable. They can’t sign away their client responsibility with a wave of the hand, especially as its deliverability directly involved potential action by them, ie funding the upgrades.
The fragmented railway delivers chaos again. I despair.
I well remember dual-powered trains on the South Western in the late 1980s (class 33 +TC+8VEP, dividing at Basingstoke for Salisbury and Southampton), but not since the arrival of the class 159s on the Salisbury route in the 1990s, (they cannot operate in multiple with electric units, as far as I am aware) and surely not as late as 2007?
If power is an issue, I am surprised this hasn’t caused problems already as most inner suburban services were increased from eight to ten cars since the December 2017 timetable, making use of the twenty-four 2-car class 456s to augment the class 455 fleet, sixty ex-class 460 “Juniper” cars to augment the class 458 fleet, and thirty new 5-car class 707s – all hired in by SWT in anticipation of keeping the franchise. That’s 258 extra vehicles on the network. Even though converting the 455 fleet to ac traction motors (still fed from a dc power supply of course) may have mitigated this a bit, increasing the length, and therefore weight, of most trains on the busiest part of the network must have been a drain on the power supply.
But it seems that the return of the power-hungry class 442s is going ahead anyway. There was a proposal at one time to convert them to loco-haulage (for Transpennine?). Maybe a few Class 67s or 68s could be found to keep that as an option?
JB… excellent piece. Interesting that power is the issue and not the timetable moratorium. One wonders what might have happened if SWT had continued; was there enough power. After all the only extra trains that can be expected by December 2018 are the class 442s and the number.ber of vehicles is a drop in the ocean, given the size of the rest of the fleet. One wonders whether there was ever enough power to properly accommodate the class 707s and the extended class 458. One also wonders what the former alliance did re power supply in planning the capacity increases.
I guess you will cover the likely impact of the new Bombardier trains in the follow up.
Once again we see the impact of the de facto programme managers – the DfT – failing to exercise proper (or any?) programme management.
Re Timbeau,
Some power supply upgrades and regenerative braking have enabled 10car 455/456 and 707 operation along with not working the units too hard acceleration wise.
442s (re-)introduction is **ON HOLD **
a) not enough power for the extra trains Guildford – Portsmouth
b) 67 or 68 is no an option as the acceleration isn’t good enough and they don’t fit in enough platforms at Waterloo at 10 car.
c) increasing diesel haulage into London LEZ isn’t a starter politically at the moment.
d) even post retractioning the 442s performance is a timetable limitation.
Agreed on JB’s 2007 date being out by 15+ years.
RAYL asked “…Or is it that more transformer/rectifier sites are needed so the load can be spread?”
Generally “Yes”. Under the old (pre 1967 Electrification scheme) it wasn’t unusual, on flat section of track, to have 2 TP (track paralleling) huts between each set of Sub-Stations; all working at 630vDC. Their role simply to balance out the power demands between the Up and Down lines. The key things, is that TP huts are not connected to the Hi-Voltage network.
Since 1967 (when the power went up to 750vDC, its generally been only one TP hut between each pair of sub-stations.
Since the arrival of power upgrades to operate the Electrostar fleet across Kent and Sussex, to meet the power demands, most TP huts have been replaced by Sub-Stations. Again long sections which are relatively flat can get away with just a single TP hut.
Providing new sub-stations does not come cheap as you have to also play about with the High-Voltage AC supply; sometimes there is an existing lineside supply but in many places a new feed is required from the National Grid and/or UK Power Networks. The thing is these are profit making enterprises and their services do not come cheap and their timescales are not the same as the rail industry!
I wonder how many more ticking time bombs there are like this? I wonder how many more are currently being created in plans for the new South Eastern franchise? Can’t wait to see the plans for upgrading the Trans Pennine core route which does 35 years worth of asset replacment / renewal plus electrification without blockades or even many weekend closures due to Grayling’s “magic” (I jest, of course).
The interesting thing here, though, is that not even TfL can be too smug given problems with Crossrail and other issues on the Overground. They’ve done better in the past to be fair but it’s not exactly wonderful now.
@NGH
“442s (re-)introduction is **ON HOLD **”
Really?, the official announcement doesn’t say that, and I’ve seen nothing to contradict it.
“Even without timetable changes in December 2018, we are preparing to deliver additional capacity for the benefit of customers and, over the coming weeks, will be seeking to confirm plans as to how the 90 additional Class 442 vehicles which are presently being refurbished can be progressively introduced into service in the existing timetable to allow other trains to be cascaded elsewhere on our network. ”
https://www.southwesternrailway.com/plan-my-journey/timetables/update-on-timetable-changes-for-december-2018
Re Gordon,
DNO wise for 3rd rail Network:
UKPN east of the western most extreme of M25
SSE west of the western most extreme of M25
Both UKPN and SSE have contracting arms (outside regulator envelope on pricing etc.) that have 3rd rail network power specialists that will usually do all the work for NR (everything from connecting the 33KV cables to the DNO’s substation to the NR substations/rectifiers). Both firms contracting arms work in the other DNO turf without issue resulting in a stable duopoly.
ORR have a slightly misplaced belief that supply related costs can be reduced with X% efficiency savings (because that is what regulatory economics says and shows they area good regulator if they can insert efficiency / cost savings*) and have been known to allocate NR less money for 3rd rail power supply works than NR estimates. ORR not realising that NR estimates were actually the the lower of 2 quotes from UKPN Contracting or SSE Contracting thus the only saving to be made is deferring the work to the next CP.
Re Timbeau,
See next weeks article for more detail but:
“Progressive introduction” =
a) Limited introduction to cover for 444 and 450 refurbishment programme which is way behind schedule so they want to be able to take more 444/450 units out of service for refurb at the same time to catch up using 442s to fill in.
b) limited use of extra trains subject to last dregs of available power
The 442 refurb programme has ground to a halt in the last month:
a) repsrays have stopped
b) retractioning is on hold (same traction electronics as the 455s with 3x BBQs so far). Expect the 2 initial retractioned units to get extensive testing and tweaks before any others get done
c) driver training has started on unrefurbed units so they can be used to fill in for 444/450 refurb programme
d) All 18 units won’t be needed for December so a more relaxed schedule can be followed.
The core issue is that 2x 442 has much fewer seats than 3x 450 (and less standing room and worse dwell times) so without running more trains (a key feature of the 442 plan) substitution is effectively 2x 442 replacing 2x 450 thus allowing 2 more 2x 450 to become 3×450 which can only be done for a limited number of services.
The original plan was akin to taking 3tph 3×450 and replacing with 2tph 2×442 and 2tph 3×450 (more seats and standing room per hour) and also releasing 3x 450 for other areas.
The 444/450 refurb programme won’t complete by December even once accelerated.
“The South West Mainline (SWML) ……..part electrified (mostly the Surrey section) ……..Electrification of the rest of the line wouldn’t happen until after 1967, ”
Only the Surrey section: Pirbright Junction, which is in Surrey, was the limit on the main line until 1967
However, other electrified lines on the Southern’s network extended far into Surrey’s neighbours by the end of the 1930s.
If we sit back and look at it again, DfT have created a system for innovation and investment that relies on competition of ideas between suppliers in a very stressful winner takes all bid arrangement. All happening at intervals dictated not by need, but by the timetable fairly randomly set out in the bid docs several years before. They pretend it brings in private industry innovative skills, and so it does to some extent, mainly in how to best recover bid costs and wangle the premiums! It’s a setup for change and investment that bears just about zero resemblance to how any large private company works. They tend to do it the way you would expect – look forward and see what is needed, evaluate various options and go ahead on a timetable that suits the need rather than complying with an arbitrary time interval.
SWR has reached that bust point where sweating the assets will give diminishing returns. That means it’s time for a bit of central planning!
@NGH re class 442
Thank you for that clarification – interesting times!
So the refurbishment is on hold, but a limited reintroduction (of unrefurbished units) is still planned.
Re: timbeau 11.27 – I don’t think it is safe to assume that the 455/456/458/707 suburban fleet would have been retained had Stagecoach won the franchise.
The world moved on between ordering that particular combination under the previous HLOS and the production of the invitation to tender for the present franchise.
It has been widely reported that 455, 456 and maybe 458 could not meet the ITT requirements, while Roger Ford stated that Stagecoach’s did not include 455/456.
Could it be that a factor in Stagecoach losing the franchise was that they knew and allowed for the limitations on the power supply?
Re: NGH – You have referred to “3 x BBQ” on 455s before in relation to the 442 re-traction.
Not necessarily doubting you, but what is your source for the 442 re-traction being in jeopardy? (As opposed to being delayed.)
I would have thought that if the 455 incidents were deemed so serious as to lead to 442 being cancelled, then re-work would be urgently underway on 455s. Is this happening?
The report into the 455 explosion identified that one of the “hard” causes was that the OEM (sub-supplier to Kiepe) had confused end of day with end of night shift, which – if I recall correctly – was the only reason that the defective item was put onto circulation. (Not denying other issues, but that was a pretty crucial one because it was known at the time that items manufactured in that batch should not be used.)
Am I the first to draw a parallel with Stagecoach/Virgin on East Coast, who also built their franchise plans on assumptions of infrastructure upgrades which it turns out Network Rail were under no requirement to deliver?
@ Fandroid – I think we are seeing what happens when you get several DfT “policies” interracting and not coming up with the right answer. DfT have not properly integrated the tender preparation, bid assessment and award processes. By not having had NR actively involved in assessing the implications and investment needs arising from the train service requirement and then bids you end up in the mess we are now seeing. Secondly we have the much vaunted “quality” element much loved by Mr Wilkinson. All this is doing is adding a false urgency in bids to bring in “shiny new trains” which potentially compounds the infrastructure investment / upgrade issue. Finally we have “Grayling’s brave new world” which is ill defined, not understood and introduces new complexity and new relationships and potentially removes the infrastructure operator from essential decisions. It’s an abject lesson, as you say, on how not to plan railway upgrades.
The other fundamental issue is the link between “upgrades” and projected franchise revenues, costs and premium payments. As soon as you get delays in upgrade programmes you bring in risk around francise finances and introduce the possibility of renegotiation. To add to this we now have the new “we are scared to introduce new timetables” factor which is likely to damage multiple franchises unless the rail industry can very quickly restore order and confidence. We can’t end up in a situation where large scale timetable changes are forever postponed.
@Balthazar
“I don’t think it is safe to assume that the 455/456/458/707 suburban fleet would have been retained had Stagecoach won the franchise.”
Stagecoach may have had to change their plans in response to the ITTs , but at the time the re-tractioning of the 455s, rebuilding of the 458s, and leasing of the 456s and – particularly – the 707s were commissioned, it was surely their intention to get a reasonable service life out of that investment?
“Due diligence” (caveat emptor). Did the franchisee fail to ask the question about power supply, or did they ask the question and not get an accurate answer? (And if the latter, was that because the DfT in turn failed to ask NR, or because NR’s answer was wrong?)
Re: timbeau – your question misunderstands the nature of franchising.
The franchisee’s, and its shareholders’, time horizon extends no further than the end of the contract. The next franchisee, even if owned by the same company, owes no allegiance to the decisions of its predecessor and is only tied to its contractual agreements.
Crucially, there are no sunk costs as far as a franchisee is concerned that carry over from one frandhise to the next because basically everything is rentalised.
Your question about reasonable service life does of course apply to other parties, but you didn’t mention them!
Re Timbeau @1252
442s – The reality will be that resprayed and interior refreshed but not retractioned units will be used when they enter service but they will then need to go back for the rest of the refurb and retraction work. Hence pause and replanning.
Re Balthazar @1318,
No everyone is thinking the same thing!
Re Balthazar @1316
My “On Hold” = your “Paused”
There is no point in fitting more new traction equipment till the revised design is finalised and the deadline (18 units
for December) has also been removed. There have been a further 2 incidents after the RAIB report one (including one in the last 2 months). There are still outstanding issues including EMC problems hence roll out is reliant on everything getting fixed.
Kiepe (the remnants of Hunslet of 323 fame after several owners) is now owned by Knorr-Bremse after 5 years of Vossloh ownership so expect some changes and design revision to better integrate with K-B products as well as better QC.
Re Balthazar @1305
As I understand it the Stagecoach would have retained the 707 and ordered slightly fewer 701s (600 cars vs 750cars)
Re Captain Deltic,
I suspect both bids were unworkable but that First’s was more unworkable.
Re Balthazar & Timbeau,
All the rolling stock upgrades and additions were franchise variations with DfT picking up the cost so SWT and the ROSCO may not have been as cost efficient as they could as they were just passing on the cost (less competitive than franchise tender pricing). The 707s turned out to be very expensive and Angel got their fingers burnt as it was cheaper for First to order more 701s overall (707s needing mods to comply).
The proverbial issue of squeezing a 21st Century litre into a 19th Century pint – but try building new infrastructure in this day and age. Other constraints on the new timetable include level crossing down time – which saw off the Windsor line increases and indeed Airtrack some years ago.
The only hole in SWR’s case will be if they failed to ask the question as to power supply capacity – it was certainly widely known that the Weymouth electrification was done on a shoestring to just accommodate 5 car trains.
@TIMBEAU 12:47
QUOTE Only the Surrey section: Pirbright Junction, which is in Surrey, was the limit on the main line until 1967 UNQUOTE
At risk of being pedantic, the local lines were electrified further west to Sturt Lane Junction which allowed direct rush-hour trains to run between Brookwood and Frimley. There is still `noise` about this spur being re-instated, but I am not sure I will live long enough to see this.
Re Kevin,
” it was certainly widely known that the Weymouth electrification was done on a shoestring to just accommodate 5 car trains.”
but with upgrades for the 444s 15 years ago and another for limited 10 car upgrades for the Olympic sailing in 2012 paid for from the London 2012 budget…
@NGH DfT quotes the selection of First MTR as an example of its not going for the lowest premium payments NPV.
It may also be worth noting that the CP5 HLOS Waterloo Capacity project was very much initiated and led by SWT with the Franchise’s Project Director, responsible for bringing together the various element s, well aware of power supply issues. CP6 became a separate programme.
@Balthazar
yes, I was aware that the risk was borne by the leasing company rather than the franchisee, so perhaps I should have said “the intention” rather than “their intention”.
But certainly the retractioning was publicised as a joint enterprise between SWT and Porterbrook, and I would guess the work was paid for in increased leasing charges. (If those leasing charges were calculated to cover part of the risk of a new incumbent having other ideas, that might explain why 701s have turned out cheaper – but I suspect the flurry of new orders for trains to replace rolling stock barely half way through its service life is making the ROSCOs review their ready reckoners for setting leasing charges).
Stagecoach did at one time own much of its fleet, as between 1996 and 2000 it owned Porterbrook, who own all of SWT’s fleet except the Desiros, 442s and 707s.
Re Timbeau,
Several new(ish) leasing companies (Rock, SMBC and others) are making the market fairly competitive for the three incumbents at Privatisation. It has taken 20 years but the market is finally competitive.
The Vampire Kangaroo (Ex Lloyds and HBoS) has never been that competitive just a ROSCO of last resort with prices to match.
Re: timbeau – And indeed the only reason for the existence of Class 458 was as a quid pro quo for letting Stagecoach acquire Porterbrook.
There was no plan for new trains in that first 7-year SWT franchise (which might explain their relative indifference to the fleet as operator, potentially as significant a factor as Alstom’s lack of technical support in ultimately seeing the Washwood Heath factory close through lack of follow-on orders).
Re Captain Deltic,
“Not the lowest premium payment NPV”
Of the several options – Presumably bigger promises then?
“It may also be worth noting that the CP5 HLOS Waterloo Capacity project was very much initiated and led by SWT with the Franchise’s Project Director, responsible for bringing together the various elements, well aware of power supply issues. CP6 became a separate programme.”
Which should have rung alarm bells all round that they had just maxed everything out post some small upgrades and more regenerative braking (455s )
I should point out that there has been some limited refurbishing of the 450 fleet with some units receiving new seat covers and carpeting. However, these units will still have to go back for a full refit. Also, it is interesting to hear about the plan for unretractioned (I think I just made up a word!) 442s to be used as a stopgap.
Let it be said that I cannot wait for the in-depth article next week!
@NGH – I suspect the change in the power of the ROSCOs (and the associated collapse of the Rothschilds indifference pricing model) has occurred because the rolling stock market has suddenly become fairly liquid – which it never used to be – and that has been the consequence of DfT becoming willing to finance new stock regardless of the existence of suitable existing stock (Cl 707 is the extreme example). Presumably, this reflects a very high premium for new stock in the franchise appraisal. [Cf LBL tendering until recently].
Re Graham H,
Indeed but I think DfT has only been part of the story, large financial organisations wanting to enter the market who have been willing to hire the necessary experienced staff (unlike the previous wave of entrants) and also TfL’s willingness to work with new players (e.g SMBC who could think outside the traditional big 3’s box e.g. acceptance of longitudinal seating and wide corridor connections on the 378s not being a problem).
The liquidity doesn’t necessarily to be permanent an occasional purge of the system is probably sufficient to get rid of what is unfit for purpose.
I also suspect that most previously refurbished stock hadn’t been refurbed as heavily as it probably need to be for the future (e.g. 458s extension to 5car but interiors pretty much as before and not really fit for Windsor Line loadings so another refurb to sort) has left everyone outside the ROSCOs a little exasperated.
Building the new sub-station is to some extent the easy part if you have the land – the DNO needs to find sufficient electrical capacity on their network as well. This may involve laying miles of new 33KV feeder cable resulting in dug up roads etc. They then need to connect it to the HV network – at best a new breaker in an existing building – at worst a new building and a new Grid connection.
Particularly in more rural areas that may only have an 11KV overhead supply of very limited capacity. These restrictions are part of the reason new supplies take a long time and can be very expensive.
Re: GH – It doesn’t have to be the quality scoring that results in new trains replacing existing ones (their age is immaterial as we shall see). The DfT only sees the franchisee’s premium/subsidy over the franchise duration, and the franchisee only sees its own costs and revenues over the same period.
If ROSCO A has offered its existing stock at what seems a good historic price, but ROSCO B offers new trains with lower energy costs, lower maintenance costs, lower track access costs (due to lower weight) and economies of scale (the 701-replaces-455/456/458/707 scenario), then the cost of taking A’s trains out of service and introducing B’s may well look lower than running A’s stock throughout the franchise period when calculated by the bid teams.
Furthermore, the revenue forecasting calculations may well show that introducing new trains also brings in more cash.
The sunk costs are not seen by either franchise bidder or DfT, so are not taken into account.
Obviously after a few franchising rounds, two things happen:
1. ROSCO A and others in its place lower their prices, but only if they can without offering their services at a loss.
2. ROSCO B and peers realise that their new-ish trains are now falling into the same bin as ROSCO A’s and the lease price of brand new stock goes up to reflect the very real risk that they find themselves staring down the barrel of the 379/707 scenario.
As of now, I think 1 has started to happen but 2 hasn’t. It has to, though…
Note that decisions on whether or not new trains are made by franchise bidding teams who only consider monthly costs (including rentalised capital costs) over a period which is much shorter than the asset’s design life. The residual value of the partly depreciated asset is not a factor in the decision.
Exogenous factors (is that the right term?) of course include the price of money and its availability for capital investment.
But I’m sure you know all this so not quite sure why I’m saying it!
Re Balthazar,
I would add that DfT (and TfL & Scotrail) have all been pushing the performance requirements higher and this has been eliminating some existing stock (e.g 455s as the door opening aren’t wide enough) or requiring mods (e.g. 707s more grab rails in the vestibules which is actually a big design issue as the ceiling panels there are designed to be easily removable to access all the cabling etc behind so the panels aren’t rigid enough to mount anything on).
Hence it is scrap, modify or find a lower performance franchise to cascade it to. The sequence of franchise renewals has not been helpful on the last point lately.
It isn’t all about cost.
The newer ROSCOs tend to have been much more careful about making sure their stock is future proofed* as much as is sensible and adaptable in the future and Bombardier and Hitachi have tended to be fairly in tune with these requirements and won most of the business from the newer ROSCOs, Siemens somewhat less so (hence no recent heavy rail orders) and CAF & Stadler pretty inflexible but designed to be cheaper so targeting a different market and I’d suggest that some of the ROSCOs will get burnt next time round e.g. the Stadler Stanstead Express Stock.
* The need to be future proof has some what been enforce by the elimination of section 54 agreement so ROSCOs can’t keep forcing unfit for purpose stock on franchises for the first 20 years of it life. Now if it isn’t fit for purpose it goes.
DfT also now apparently understand the poor economics of TOC zoos full of micro fleets of different species rolling stock so supplying popular platforms is now also part of the model.
Wasn’t the whole point of creating the ROSCO’s in the first place to provide the sort of liquidity and flexibility we are now seeing? I remember at the time that there were questions regarding what would happen if a new TOC didn’t take on the old TOC’s stock, and the answer was that it was part of the risk the ROSCO’s took on and that risk would be reflected as part of the rental costs. What I find surprising is that it has taken over 20 years to get a competitive leasing market and be in a situation where they may end up scrapping stock that isn’t life expired.
I remember that there was a competition enquiry into the ROSCOs around 10 years ago. DfT were aiming to reduce prices.
I believe the outcome was that because DfT determined the franchise requirements it was not a free market. The proposed solution was to change DfT policy.
[link]
Given that the market has become more competitive, this suggests that DfT revised policy has improved the market.
In regards to the 442s…
“retractioning is on hold (same traction electronics as the 455s with 3x BBQs so far)”
Wait. Is that the same 455s they’re now desperate to replace because they replaced a solidly reliable (if inefficient) powertrain with something that likes to blow up? And they’re using the same package? I mean, I’m sure they’ve worked some of the kinks out by now, but it still doesn’t sound like a *good* idea. Not that the 455 retractioning ever did either. I don’t see GTR complaining too loudly about theirs. I’m sure they’re old and in need of some TLC, but they don’t explode either.
Re CHZ,
The 442s existing traction package is pretty unreliable (all being at least 51years old and recycled) and gave GTR /Southern and NR no end of issues including blowing up impedance bonds (adjacent to Three Bridges depot /sidings while passing was a favourite as was power cabling in the throat at London Bridge during the rebuild) so something needs to be done or there will be issues on SW. The WSP system is also not fit for purpose so Portsmouth route could be “interesting”.
The 442 BBQ rate is also far higher than the modified 455s.
455 replacement is nothing to do with new traction package – the main issue is that the doors are too narrow to deal with passenger loads at Vauxhall P7+8 and get dwell times down to acceptable levels. The” Via Wimbledon” Metro services urgently need a TT recast to introduce realistic dwell times and allow a reliable service but that won’t happen in December now.
The pause is allowing a few more kinks to be ironed out.
One issue appears to be that replacing the good old fashioned main fuse with an MCB (remotely resettable) isn’t proving as reliable and predictable was it does on brand new stock (e.g. Desiro City and Aventra)
Re Jimbo,
Not quite. There were “section 54” agreements in place to tie future franchisees into using stock to protect ROSCOs typically for the first 20 years so they couldn’t lose money. The 444s and 450s are covered by one till the end of 2025 for example. Section 54s haven’t been given for more that 5 years on retendered franchises so the ROSCOS now have to be more sensible. If you forget to order the extras on some new stock to future proof it, it will now come back to haunt you e.g. Lloyds (now sold the on) and the 379s (combined with charging rip off prices).
@NGH Bombardier has indeed dominated the recent EMU market with the Aventra. Hitachi has been limited to a few orders for more IEP clone bi-modes and that market segment is now under-threat from an Aventra bi-mode.
Re Captain Deltic,
Worth noting Hitachi’s EMUs in Scotland (in service roll out started Tuesday this week with SMBC as the ROSCO) and also worth noting (not in your recent e-newsletter) that 2 of the 3 bidders for the SE Franchise (Govia and Abellio) have teamed up with Hitachi for EMU supply (you had noted that Stagecoach had teamed up with Alstom.) Hence no new Bombardier or Siemens EMUs there. Hence probability of the order going to Hitachi.
Agree that the Bi-mode Aventra should be the substantially better for the upcoming re-franchising requirements than existing products.
@Jimbo/NGH – The Rothschild indifference pricing formula had a far more baleful influence than many believed. As recently as the last round of bidding for the TLK fleet, the pricing was set by reference to what had been achieved hitherto and not by reference to the market, even by “captive” ROSCOs set up as SPVs for the bid – there was no contested leasing market. And those “historic ” prices can be traced all the way back to Rothschilds. In that respect, the rigged market was very similar to the approach adopted by many property developers to rentals.
The whole purpose of the price formula was deliberately to rig the market so that the sale value of the ROSCOs was maximised by giving them a guaranteed market for the ex-BR stock they took on. Competition was far from the Treasury mind. So long as there was no liquidity, the prices could be made to stick and the ROSCOs’ future revenues could be securitised, In that sense, as one banker put it to me at the time, we are not selling a leasing company but a gilt backed by a state guarantee to carry on running the railway system as it was. [As with freight, it was an interesting case study into the conflicts within the Treasury between the cash max faction and the competition junkies; as with freight the cash max faction won].
Only some rolling stock has been the subject of s54 agreements
I take the point that the spread of liquidity wasn’t the only factor in the more competitive market – the advent of manufacturers with their own sources of finance has been another key factor. BTW, I don’t buy the argument that nearly new stock has been binned because even newer stock is so much cheaper to maintain/operate. Si monumentum requires, look at the sidings full of 707s. Outdated on costs before turning a wheel? I very much doubt it.
It was thoroughly disingenuous (or naïve) of DfTto turn round and ask the CMA to look at ROSCOs as the source of high rolling stock prices
Re Graham H,
” BTW, I don’t buy the argument that nearly new stock has been binned because even newer stock is so much cheaper to maintain/operate. Si monumentum requires, look at the sidings full of 707s. Outdated on costs before turning a wheel? I very much doubt it.”
I disagree slightly.
707s the cost was rigged as DfT would end up paying so the ROSCO and Siemens in particular though they would do ok
The 707s will struggle to meet technical requirement that have changed in the mean time and hence the cost of new 701 vs modifying 707s is the real comparison.
DfT effectively specified toilets to be fitted on the new SW metro stock The additional weight on the 707s is an issue because they have been fitted with fewer and smaller traction motors than the 700s and 717s (75% of the power output and 80% of the powered axles save a bit on construction costs but limit future proofing) so they immediately fail other performance criteria (acceleration, energy efficiency) because of the extra weight (they are that close to the limit). Hence fitting toilets and new / more traction motors (and retesting new suspension set up).
Bombardier have an ace up their sleeve as they developed a radial new retention toilet system that is very low maintenance. The tank emptying infrastructure required for a complete fleet of 750x Aventra 701 cars is only 60% of the infrastructure required for 150x 707 cars. Bingo less investment in maintenance and lower maintenance including staff and diagramming units with dead mileage (driver cost) to the correct tank emptying locations. (The 701 should be able to last upto 45 days between tank emptying. As it turns out virtually no investment in emptying infrastructure give than already available for 458s etc.
The contractual wording surrounding the computer systems /software on the 707s was bit lax so the TOC had to pick up most of the cost of getting it working unlike Thameslink and SWR don’t want to spend more so the PIS will never work properly.
@NGH – thank you for the detail. I’m still astonished that the superior value of the 701s makes it worth what will presumably be a complete hit when the 707s are written off. I suppose DfT can assume that that will be borne by the manufacturers and will not, in any way, work its way through to enhanced costs downstream.
A small related issue to all this is the power supply to the Waterloo & City line which, for historical reasons, is supplied by Network Rail. To me it seems long overdue for this 630V supply to be the responsibility of London Underground rather than saddling Network Rail with providing a 630V supply in a 750V third rail area that is at capacity and needs upgrading.
Re Graham H ,
You probably know any way but
SWR ROSCOs
Incoming:
701 – Rock one of the 2 big newbies
442 – Angel
Outgoing:
707 – Angel
455 – Porterbrook
456 – Porterbrook
458 – Porterbrook
Retaining:
444 – Angel – no change possible during franchise as S.54
450 – Angel – no change possible during franchise as S.54
The presence of the 2 new ROSCOs has enabled bidders to not be almost forced to retain some of the the big 3’s stock that they might otherwise want to be shot of but have to becasue of limited choice with only 3 and often doing business with at least 2 already.
My feeling is that the 707s will find a home in a less demanding location e.g. Coastway when TSGN is refranchised/split to replace the 313s (have ASDO and DOO cameras)
@NGH
“The tank emptying infrastructure required for a complete fleet of 750x Aventra 701 cars is only 60% of the infrastructure required for 150x 707 cars.”
Class 707s need no tank-emptying infrastructure as they have no toilets. One of the factors which make them difficult to re-lease. (The 313s on Coastway duties are unpopular for the same reason).
“My feeling is that the 707s will find a home in a less demanding location e.g. Coastway when TSGN is refranchised/split to replace the 313s ”
You may be right – after all TSGN is the only other operator of the Desiro City type. But thirty 5-car 707s to replace nineteen 3-car 313s? But where else could they go – most suburban electrified systems (Glasgow, West Midlands, Manchester, South Wales, Merseyside, Anglia) already have new trains on order, and I can’t imagine South Eastern would have much use for a small fleet of non-standard trains of non-standard length – they aspire to run all services as twelve-car trains. (Could the units be re-formed as fifteen six-car sets and fifteen four-car sets, making twelve 12-car trains with one spare unit? – I suspect not as only the end cars are powered (according to Siemens website) so the six car units would be underpowered.
I wonder if some limited on-board traction energy storage for the new inner suburban fleet could help with the supply issue, as proposed for new tube stock. Comparatively small arrays of very fast-charging supercaps, together with some form of lithium battery, might be able to efficiently absorb braking energy for reuse in acceleration, while the batteries could be slowly topped up as expedient en route, where and when the supply can deliver. The solution could provide a low speed depot shunt capability as well as sufficient emergency power to get passengers to the next station in the event of supply isolation.
Re Timbeau,
“Class 707s need no tank-emptying infrastructure as they have no toilets. ”
Read what I said more carefully it is a discussion of the issues involved with fitting toilets which is what you do when they aren’t any!
The 707 were designed to be retrofitted with a conventional retention toilet system.
The 707s would have needed retrofitting to be retained and low maintenance toilets wouldn’t have been available so the infrastructure required is a comparison of:
a) modify 707 with existing toilet designs and retain
or
b) replace
No toilets was not an option that would win a bid hence no analysis of your 3rd alternative!
As a reminder the new SE metro stock will be Alstom or Hitachi and the 707s ain’t much use for Corby in their current state either.
NGH….What is a “low maintenance retention toilet”? Does it imply carrying around a large tank of poo and wee for up to 45 days?
@Class 707s
Much of the discussion here and elsewhere about replacing the near-new 707s seems to fail to grasp the fact that the ROSCOs are probably the only truly privatised free market in the railway ecosystem.
Private capitalists invest in assets at their own risk, and quite often they get burned if those assets turn out to not have the value the investors thought they did. This is how capitalism is supposed to work.
Now you can argue that the ROSCO will only inflate future leasing costs to recoup their losses, and this is an appealing argument, but it disregards the reality that (a) investors are looking to profit as much as possible in the first place, so the leasing price will in any case be as high as they can get away with, and (b) there’s real competition here pushing and keeping prices down. Angel can’t artificially inflate prices for new stock because other ROSCOs and new entrants can come along and win the business instead.
So the decision to replace the 707s is of no consequence to the taxpayer or the travelling public. Yes it is wasteful on a purely technical basis, but that’s how capitalism works. When the same sort of money is wasted on underused cars, ships, planes or wacky hyperloop ideas we don’t think anything of it. We shouldn’t when it’s ROSCO-funded trains either. That’s the risk they took.
As a further complication to ‘The Beleaguered Franchise’ it now appears that they are asking the Government for compensation for lost revenues due the the ‘No Guards’ strikes – see ww.dorsetecho.co.uk/news/16382432.anger-as-rail-company-asks-government-to-reimburse-losses-caused-by-strikes/ for more details
@Timbeau
“But thirty 5-car 707s to replace nineteen 3-car 313s?”
The 313s currently share Coastway duties with 377s. Having a larger “Coastway-only” fleet (30 modern trains vs 19 old trains*) would allow the displacement of some 377s to strengthen other services. Also, having 5-car trains in place of the existing 3&4-car trains would be seen as a nice capacity boost on a line that can get quite overcrowded at times.
(*You would expect the newer trains to have a higher availability as well.)
@NGH – yes, and some manufacturers and their backers have proposed setting up a captive ROSCO just for a particular bid. Maquaries were particularly keen on that; the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund less so. I agree that these things tend to help introduce more flexibility in the market, but it leaves open the mystery of what answer the financiers of those captives were given when they asked the inevitable question: “What resale value do these assets have?” The answer (and the giver of the answer…) in the 707 case would have been especially illuminating…
@130 – in my parish council incarnation, I found a zero maintenance loo of Swedish manufacture for our allotment holders – a close relative of the earth closet, it seemed a bit bulky to cart round on a train…
@anonananon –
Whilst you are technically accurate, and there may not be any impact on the public purse, but the reputational damage could be significant. You fail to take into account the fact that many people do not know, or for political reasons, do not care about how leasing really works . I can imagine the sound bites from various people, along the lines of “The government fails to invest in railways in the north, but can afford to throw away new trains in the south”
@ANONANANON 27 July 2018 at 16:05
Actually I do worry about the resource wastage inherent in capitalism, especially in the luxury sector, but mainly from a ecological perspective rather than the impact on my bank account, or the treasury’s. Your argument doesn’t mean they’ll end up as razor blades however. The ROSCO is now highly incentivised to find a new market for these potentially very useful assets. As NGH suggested, they could end up on less arduous duties with a different TOC away from the London inner suburban area. They have been designed to be easily convertible to 25kV so could realistically end up pretty much anywhere electrified in the UK.
“anywhere electrified in the UK”
But where? What are the oldest electric trains on the network for which replacements are not already on order?
Re Timbeau and Anon E Mouse
Old EMU stock where replacements not on order – Southern’s Coastway…
Anon is correct about limited 377 usage so the number is ideal
Re Mark T,
The first few 707’s had pantograph and transformer fitted for testing purposes (they used the canal tunnels for testing – yes they were open to traffic 18 months ago! and Farringdon for changeover testing) , all are wired for 25kV
Re Graham H,
I’d trust the Canadian pension funds far more than the Vampire Kangaroo…
Re 130 & Graham H,
Biodigester – one wonders whether Grayling is minded for the methane – carbon monoxide gas mix given off to be used as an alternative power source in the Windermere trial?
Re Anonananon
agree on virtually everything but note the market is currently a free market but it hasn’t always been…
Re John M,
Standard practice – others have got the compensation on the issue.
Timbeau
Among the oldest fleets for which there are no published replacement plans are the fifty class 318 and 320 units working in the Glasgow area. ScotRail’s new EMUs are for newly-electrified lines and replacing class 314. If units made redundant in England were to come to Scotland, some reconfiguration would probably be needed, particularly as many Glasgow suburban routes are designed for three- and six-coach trains.
It is also worth remembering that the Scottish HLOS requires Network Rail to develop “an efficient electrification technical specification…that…can deliver an efficient and affordable rolling programme of electrification”. There are no specific schemes in CP6, pending NR doing their homework, but continued demand for electric trains is likely.
I don’t think those who turn their noses up at less frequent toilet emptying are reacting very logically.
There is an initial yukk-factor involved in the very idea of retaining human excrement for a while albeit with suitable added chemicals to prevent undesired biological activity. But once you have decided to retain it, there is really no logical reason why retention for 45 days is any yukkier than for 24 hours.
There may be a weight issue, but presumably the designers have allowed for that and built it into the calculations.
Re L in S,
The franchise should run till 2025 and the only extra stock on the table are Hitachi options for a little more electrification.
Plenty of other good stock available too that may be more suited depending on the quantities:
379s
350/2s
321s (30 being refurbished for GA) replace some 318s and some spare for more electrification. Plenty of commonality with the 320s)
Re M.,
But the aim desired IS biological activity…
The existing retention periods are much longer than a day.
ngh: in that case, my comment still makes sense by deleting the clause about chemicals. I may have been misled by earlier technology of this kind used (inter alia) in motorhomes and such.
We seem to have wandered away from power to poo
It seems that major factor in the unemployment of the 707s is Grayling’s purely political insistence on having toilets even on inner suburban trains, which in turn happened as a way of demonstrating that passengers would be better off than if he had devolved those services to TfL.
So come 2019 people on SWT’s London routes will be able to reflect that, unlike their neighbours in West London, they will not have received the promised improvements in service or capacity, but a big section of each train will be taken up by a toilet…
Ian J
Your reference to Mr G is interesting, given the remarks in various places in the August issue of “Modern Railways” – funny how no-one seems to like him!
… and I’m rather surprised that a toilet compartment is significantly heavier on the traction than not having one. On an empty train, yes, but at peak loading time when the power under most demand? Perhaps it’s all about the longer-interval emptying times.
NickBxn: It probably depends how you measure it. Per train (of a given length) one would reckon that if the train has a toilet (and therefore fewer passengers) slightly less peak power will be required. But this will translate as slightly more peak power per passenger carried.
Malcolm, NickBXN…I would estimate that the mass of the toilet would be approximately the same as the mass of the passengers displaced by the toilet. To that one must add the mass of the water that must be carried, and, I suppose the mass of the solids and liquids added to the water. However, if its just one disabled toilet per 5-car train, then the impact will be tiny…..in the order of 1% to 2% increase……all “within the limits of experimental error”!
@Ian J. Toilets on suburban SWT services will be hugely welcomed by many. Some of the routes are up to an hour long – the lack of toilets is indefensible.
Re: the Class 455s, don’t forget their lack of air con provides an experience well below what passengers on other suburban lines now receive. On hot summer days (plenty of those recently) they turn into hellish ovens, especially due to the design flaw that causes open windows to slam shut when a fast train passes by.
Re: – IanJ “Grayling’s purely political insistence on having toilets even on inner suburban trains”
What is your basis for this? I do not believe that the South Western ITT required toilets on inner suburban trains, while the South Eastern ITT certainly does not (much as I was half-expecting that it would as a demonstration that DfT oversight gave better passenger experience than TfL).
My interpretation was that First MTR’s bid team had determined that their new trains needed to operate on both inners and outers, and since the outers needed toilets it followed that the inners got them.
Re: many – Bio-reactor effluent treatment technology (other suppliers may be available):
https://www.akwauv-protec.com/Bioreactor.htm
Can I remind all commentators that discussion of whether toilets are necessary for journeys of up to an hour is strongly discouraged on this site, and liable to immediate deletion. Some trains on such journeys do have toilets, for a variety of reasons, and some do not. Some people strongly believe that they should, and some do not – and these beliefs do not seem amenable to change based on anything said here.
Other entirely novel discussion relating to train toilets will be allowed – still with some reluctance, because we feel that there are many other things to talk about.
Could I add that the ‘toilet ban’ is simply because it has been discussed so many times before ad nauseum and we never get any new insights – just the same old rants (on both sides) time and time again.
Re: Exploding 455’s and Mark Townend 27 July 2018 @ 15:20 – well, the 455’s do have
(very) limited on-board traction energy storage already. Some weeks ago, I read the RAIB report into the exploding 455 at Guildford and, frankly, it horrified me. ngh has already alluded to the manufacturing fault in one of the 11mF caps, but what leapt out at me was the design.
Who in their right mind would slap a pair of 11mF caps across the conductor rail with nowt but a switchable 11 ohm resistor whose sole purpose, it seems, is to reduce arcing on the main contactor ?? Caps are notoriously unreliable – whatever dielectric you use – I’ve seen the devastation caused by traditional electrolytics going up, and narrowly avoided some very hot ejectile material when a tantalum bead went up.
Where the ***** is the overcurrent protection in the design (assuming the RAIB report describes the setup correctly) ?? I know it’s hard in high-current DC apps, but really. It’s a disaster waiting to happen.
Seems to me that Mark T’s design suggestion – multiple low-value caps – has the potential for being a much more resilient, if more expensive, design.
@Balthazar and others, at the risk of getting too toilet oriented: I fail to see much advantage from the Bio-reactor / retention technology.
What this does is separates the liquids from the solids in the effluent, and discharges the liquid to the track. Only the, much smaller, volume of sludge is then retained for the much less frequent emptying.
However, the service water tanks (for flushing and hand washing) still have to be filled once every day or two so why not empty the comparable quantity of effluent at the same time and save all the complexity of treating it on board?
Most TOCs struggle to keep their air conditioning units in good working order, the Bio-reactor plant would be far more difficult. Whereas it’s probably OK run a train with non-working air conditioning it may not be with a non-working toilet.
There is also the question of how reliably disinfected the discharged liquid is….
I gather the system is in use in Switzerland and possibly Germany – but I really fail to see what advantage it offers over conventional retention tanks.
RogerB: One phrase in your comment may be misleading – doubtless unintentionally so. You say “separates the liquids from the solids in the effluent, and discharges the liquid to the track“. What is discharged to the track is certainly not the unaltered liquid component of the effluent. It is claimed to be made harmless by the reactor, presumably a similar claim to the harmlessness of the end product of any conventional land-based sewage treatment plant.
Of course you are right that if it does not work properly it will be dangerous. But so are many other things. The best response is not to reject such things out of hand, but to ensure that they do work properly.
Re: Roger B – Fresh water ” tanking” is done in many places, e.g. station platforms. CET* tank emptying requires specialised infrastructure which is found at depots and some stabling points, and is a constrained resource. The logistics** of getting every single toilet-fitted vehicle through the latter every two days or so is where the advantage of bioreactor technology lies, if it can be successfully harnessed (but you point out that it has been).
*Controlled emission toilet.
**Especially after service disruption.
PS: I probably don’t need to add, but anyway… The consequence of *not* mastering the logistics of CET tank emptying is, of course, non-functioning toilets. This *will* happen if emptying does not occur within about three days (during which time the unit *will* have been at several tanking locations, at stations and stabling sidings, which are a less constrained resource than CET roads).
@Balthazar – fixed CET emptying points are not absolutely essential. Some operators have contemplated using mobile bowsers to avoid that selfsame diagramming rigidity you mention.
Re: GH – The operative word being “contemplated”…?
It does of course need to be practicable, e.g. you’re unlikely to achieve CET emptying in a typical terminal station turnaround on a south-east commuter operation.
Thanks for that Balthazar. After a career in sewage I’m surprised it’s more economical to fit a mini treatment plant to every train toilet than to provide a CET emptying facility at fresh water tanking points. (I’m assuming fresh water points are at depots or stations where there is a foul sewer connection. However, I can see that in the day of the fragmented railway this may be too hard.)
Re: RogerB – The presence of a foul sewer is a necessary but not always sufficient condition for its use in this way. If for example there isn’t the time available between arrival and departure to empty (bearing in mind also that CET tank pipe connections are on the underframe and the aim in recent years has been to avoid people on the track outside depots) then it can’t happen.
ISTR that it is possible to generate electricity from effluent (‘bio-digester’?) in which case toilets could replace battery storage.
I’ll get my coat…
@RogerB 15:15
“Whereas it’s probably OK run a train with non-working air conditioning it may not be with a non-working toilet”.
At the moment Southeastern are – for reasons I think that have been discussed on another thread – occasionally having to run trains in service without toilets, and are making selected extended stops to allow access to station facilities as an alternative.
@Balthazar: What is your basis for this?
You are right. I had assumed that the amount of prominence given to the “every train will have a toilet” in SWR’s publicity, together with the way that removing toilets from trains to save space (as proposed in some pre-Grayling franchise consultations) had stopped being suggested, meant that there had been a change in policy with the change in minister.
Nevertheless for right or for wrong (and without discussing the rights or wrongs!), if the SWT inner suburbans had been devolved to TfL, as was likely under the previous minister, then they would have a dedicated fleet and it almost certainly wouldn’t have toilets.
The question then becomes, would TfL have thought to ask the question about power supplies that DfT and SWR didn’t?
@Balthazar – the “contemplation” was directed at the various minor stabling points rather than terminals. As with the current TLK fleet, “depots” in the traditional sense have become quite small affairs as their functionalities have been dispersed and each delivered on different time cycles.
Re Allison W @ 2257,
“ISTR that it is possible to generate electricity from effluent (‘bio-digester’?) in which case toilets could replace battery storage.”
Yes – Hence my previous comments in jest about alternative power sources trials, the only problem is that you wouldn’t get very far. Energy from waste is very popular on big (livestock) farms and large food waste producers (e.g. returns to Supermarket distribution centres) with the Methane – CO mix that the biodigesters provide being used to power modified gas engine CHPs (electricity exported to the distribution network and barn etc heating on the farm or powering the refrigeration and the supermarket DCs). One of the most popular gas engine families for this purpose are made by Jenbacher which was later bought by GE who put a modified version of the same the engine in some of their locomotives (Class 70s) to meet stricter emission regs as the engine uses a Miller Cycle (rather than Diesel cycle) in similar way to the petrol Prius (and other hybrid) engines using Atkinson cycle instead Otto cycle.
As an aside the new VW group TSI petrol engines 2017-> are actually Miller cycle engines with stupidly low NOx emissions given their thermodynamic efficiency. The secret to efficient petrol is to effectively use a diesel engine with spark plugs!
Re Graham H, Balthazar, Roger B
Toilets were a quality point winner rather than compulsory but you can’t win with out some quality points these days. The Aventra fleet will also serve Windsor and Eton + Reading so a common fleet all with Toilets fitted makes sense.
Fresh water refilling: The fresh water tanks are far smaller than the waste tanks so need far more frequent refilling but they are also far easier to refill than emptying CET tanks (see the Reading depot additional CET tank emptying facilities that First have gone through (arguments over whether planning permission was needed or not) First and NR’s point was that as the SoS has mandated CET from 1/1/2020 at the latest then it is a railway operational issue and within the rail boundaries (see Railways Regulation Act 1844) so no planning permission required.)
Southern / GatEx use mobile platform bowsers at Victoria* London Bridge and Brighton
(*and SE at Vic). As do Cross Country in various locations.
LNER /VTEC/EC/GNER use hose pipe from under the metal covers on the platform edges.
CET tank emptying is a nightmare in some locations at the moment until all the operators have got the 3rd rail protection properly in place / 3rd rails moved to other side of the track as it should have been.
See SE cleaning staff electrocution http://orr.gov.uk/news-and-media/press-releases/2017/southeastern-trains-and-cleaning-company-fined-after-worker-electrocuted-on-live-rail
ngh,
The Miller cycle is so last year.
For details on the Budack (new), Miller, Atkinson and Otto cycles see this video.
There is also loads of stuff on the internet about opposed-pistons diesel engines and integrated exhaust manifolds. It seems that these technologies take a long time to reach the railways.
Sorry to all for the petrol-head type posting.
Couldn’t the 707s be re-deployed on Southern’s Metro services, instead of the 455s?
JohnKellett,
First issue is that the class 707s are five car units. This may be an advantage on some routes but could cause problems.
I think the other concern would be that they are underpowered. Even if they matched the class 455, I suspect that Southern (or their successors) would want something better. They really need to at least match the speed characteristics of London Overground (LO) stock between New Cross Gate and Norwood Junction due to the interworking there.
There are currently 8tph LO stock between New Cross Gate and Norwood Junction but in the early 2020s this is planned to rise to 10tph as far south as Sydenham. Even off-peak there will be at least 4tph Southern trains interworking with these as far south as Sydenham so 14tph and you don’t want any stragglers amongst them.
I suspect there are similar issues elsewhere.
Re Mike P,
I think our views on HV electrical engineering are fairly similar. single capacitors like that are a very very bad idea.
As regards depot batteries the new Stadler 777 for Merseyrail will have them (After one particular incident about a decade ago where the traction controller was left in notch but the train was isolated with paddles (aka cricket bats) between the 3rd rail and shoes at which point someone removed a paddle and the train shot off till the DSD kicked in.
The problems with Vossloh Kiepe as was it was a firm assembled from several smaller firms with different areas of expertise:
a) 25kV AC OHLE (comparatively low current)
b) DC trams (lower current)
Who then entered the market for a 3rd area – highest current DC which is a very different market by trying to scale up everything they already did.
Over current protection – the main contactor and charging contactors in the RAIB report are actually remotely operable MCBs located in the same location as the original traction fuse was. As you know MCBs don’t like DC hence the protection arrangement to reduce arcing damage on the MCBs. The arrangement is similar to the VCBs on OHLE with the capacitors added
Traction DC is of course not real DC but approximately DC with a 300Hz saw tooth ripple of 100+V so lots of energy getting pumped into / out off those capacitors. A sensible option would be very large inductors to help smooth things which tend to have safer lifespan (somewhat alien to AC power engineers.) Up until the latest Desiro City and Aventra all the rolling stock manufactures stuck with the traditional massive traction fuse used since the dawn of time.
Luckily Kiepe’s new parent company* has all the expertise required (85years?) in 3rd rail to address the issues off the shelf from their own parts bin. (*They also supplied the original 455 equipment.)
Re: JohnKellet – as there are 30 x 707s and 46 x Southern 455s, the simple numerical answer is “No”. Not that it is that simple, of course.
@PoP, Balthazar – So a programme to beef up the traction on the 707s (and add toilets…?), and build some additional units to make up the numbers (perhaps including some 4-car units) would be viable, no?
@PoP
A prototype locomotive powered by two opposed-pistons diesel engines was tested on the West Coast Main Line in 1955. The production locomotives were introduced into passenger service on the East Coast Main Line from 1961.
The locomotives and engines were commonly known by the arrangement of cylinders – Deltic.
Not all “new” technologies on YouTube are particularly new.
@poP
“First issue is that the class 707s are five car units. This may be an advantage on some routes but could cause problems.
I think the other concern would be that they are underpowered”
I don’t have the power and weight figures to compare a 707 with a 378, but would reducing them to four car units (by removing a trailer) solve both problems?
@Balthazar
“there are 30 x 707s and 46 x Southern 455s, ”
And if you then have thirty spare trailers, you could match them with thirty new powered cars to get another fifteen units.
@Timbeau – the metro routes between New Cross Gate and Norwood Junction can take 10 cars, but often see 8-car 455s at present (even in the peak), so there is scope for at least some additional 10-car stock in the fleet.
…and indeed that lengthening would be one of the main reasons for making the swap from 455 to 707 in the first place!
JohnKellett,
Indeed, the extensions made to the platforms from Anerley to New Cross Gate seems monstrously wasted as used by 8tph London Overground (5-cars), 2tph Coulsdon Town – London Bridge (8-cars) and 2tph London Bridge – Victoria (not sure). So a maximum of 2 trains out of 12 that take advantage of them.
Mind you, I think a bit of SDO is still involved even north of Norwood Junction. One of the problems is that the stations involved are now served by Coulsdon Town terminators. South Croydon, Purley Oaks, Reedham and Coulsdon Town itself all have platforms restricted to 8 carriages.
SDO is certainly in use at New Cross Gate, not sure about elsewhere. Could it not be used at South Croydon, Purley Oaks, Reedham and Coulsdon Town as well (especially if the 707s were deployed, with their walk-through carriages).
SDO can and is used at South Croydon and Purley Oaks for 10-car trains that split at Purley but it is most unsatisfactory and leads to increased dwell times in the morning peaks as most of the space available is in the last two carriages. It is particularly frustrating at Purley Oaks where the up platform is almost 9-cars long and could easily be extended by a very short amount to enable 9 carriages to be useable. You can’t easily go to a 10-car platform because of the relatively recently located substation placed there.
It is difficult to see how SDO could be approved for use at Coulsdon Town because of the points at the north end of the platform which, I suspect would necessitate a terminating train pulling up beyond the end of the platform. You can’t easily extend the platform at the country end because of the relatively new overbridge (complete with lifts).
Besides, there comes a point where the amount of SDO involved makes the idea of lengthening the trains questionable.
@ Ngh 1204 30/7 – for those of us clueless numpties who didn’t understand physics at school and who find electricity bewildering is there any chance of a “goo goo ga ga” style explanation of your reply to Mike P? Doesn’t have to be hugely detailed or done quickly (you’ve got better things to do) but all the abbreviations and underlying assumptions are meaningless to those of us at the bottom of the knowledge curve. I would actually like to understand why SWR trains have been going bang and why there is residual risk due to the power system constraints.
WW
25kV OHLE – High-voltage ( & therefore relatively low current) overhead supply
DC trams usually at 600 or 750 V – so fairly high currents ( up to a kiloamp? )
…. But nothing like the loading used on the SR lines.
MCB’s – Minature Contact Breakers – devices that act as “fuses” without actually melting anything – they pop open ( Hence breaking the contact ) when the conditions are “wrong” – typically too high a current. (!)
VCB’s are Vacuum Circuit Breakers – vacuum to prevent arcing & “sparking” & wear & tear, given the much higher voltages used. ( 25kV as opposed to 750V )
Remember that, because of good old Ohm’s law, it’s a lot easier to transmit Power at high-voltage & low current & then transform it to lower voltage & higher current for power-use.
High currents tend to heat things up, because of said law & internal resistances, but high voltages tend to “jump” across gaps.
Electrically, power is Voltage times current ( V*i) but Resistance is V/i ( Ohm’s law reformulated), so power becomes (V^2)*i – which is why we go for large “V” for power transmission , as – for the same current- 25kV carries over 1100 times the power
Horses for courses
HTH
PoP & Balthazar
Even that “Budack” cycle is a reversion to STEAM practice, ridiculously enough …
It’s remarkably like changing your valve-gear to increase the “Lead” & reduce the “Lap” in long-travel valves for a steam-cycle.
If you will pardon the pun: “What goes around comes around”
Ah yes, couldn’t resist it:
Napier Deltic visualisation
Enjoy!
CORRECTION – (because of brain-fade on my part )
I should, of course have said … similar to changing the cut-off in steam practice, assuming that you have the Lap/Lead parameters correctly adjusted to start with.
Oops
One of the clever features of the Deltic engine design was the use of “exhaust lead” to make the phasing work. As each bank of the engine has its three cylinders arranged in a triangle, neighbouring pistons had to be phased at 60 degrees to each other to drive the same crankshaft. And of course the two pistons in one cylinder have to be synchronised. But three lots of 60 degrees is 180 degrees – only half a complete circle, meaning each crankshaft would have to be 180 degrees out of phase with itself – a geometric impossibility.
The opposed piston layout in each cylinder means that one piston could double as the inlet valve and the other as the exhaust valve. In a 2-stroke engine, power and inlet strokes are one and the same, as are compression and exhaust, and careful design is needed to minimise the amount of unburnt fuel that escapes, and maximises the amount of burnt fuel that is ejected, during the compression/exhaust stroke. Having the two pistons in each cylinder out of phase, with the exhaust opening and closing before the inlet, improves the “scavenging” effect. Some unsung genius at Napiers realised that an exhaust lead of 20 degrees (in each cylinder) would cancel out 60 degrees of the unwanted 180 degree phase difference, and having one of the crankshafts running in the opposite sense to the other two would cancel out the rest – and make the engine vibrate less.
It did mean, however, that in every revolution the engine fired at 40, 80 and 120 degrees rather than a smooth 120, 240, 360. This was solved by having several banks, phased 120 degrees apart – which is why Deltic engines always have a multiple of three banks (nine cylinders).
This animation https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=4dd23K5E&id=FED86602AC5A09FEBAC4B47E3B52CAD3B3DB34A4&thid=OIP.jbhJIJs1XIuiNrwMXVnFoQAAAA&mediaurl=http%3a%2f%2fatomictoasters.com%2fwp-content%2fuploads%2f2011%2f01%2fdeltic_animation.gif&exph=347&expw=311&q=deltic++animated+engine&simid=608022021327752188&selectedIndex=0&ajaxhist=0 shows the exhaust lead more clearly – note how the outlet (purple end) opens and closes slightly before the inlet (green), and how briefly on each cycle both pistons in one cylinder are moving in the same direction
Re: JohnKellett 12.41 – Viability is entirely dependent on the relative costs (capital as amortised into monthly lease costs, upgrade ditto, plus energy, maintenance, track access, etc.) and play-off against quality scoring estimates of that option compared to the other options – including new build – considered by the bid teams at the time of bid compilation (circa summer 2020?).
And you’re asking us to give you a yes/no answer now…?!
@WW
As someone who makes a living explaining technical stuff to lawyers (and legal stuff to engineers) I find visualising electricity as a fluid is often useful, until you get into the more complex electronic devices.
Electrical charge, measured in Coulombs, is basically a quantity of electrons. You don’t need to know how many electrons in a coulomb, any more than you need to know how many molecules there are in a litre of water.
Current (amps or Coulombs/second) is the rate at which electrons are passing through a wire, appliance, motor etc. like. Direct current flows in one direction, like a river. Alternating current sloshes back and forth, like the tides (but changing direction millions of times faster!) Just as a steady water flow and a tidal flow can both be used to drive water wheels, both ac and dc can be used to drive things like motors.
Voltage is the one that confuses people, but is analogous to the pressure or “head” of water which makes it flow.
A capacitor is essentially a way of storing electricity, and can be thought of like a dam or weir. Like a weir, it can be used to smooth the flow (like the “sawtooth profile” dc discussed earlier, in which the input current is not smooth but comes in surges or pulses). Or it can be released all at once in a single damburst, for example deliberately in a photographic flashgun, or accidentally if the capacitor is overloaded, which is the problem discussed above. Like a water damburst, a breakdown of a capacitor can do a lot of damage.
Circuit breakers are designed to break the circuit (close the tap) if the current becomes excessive. It is difficult to think of a liquid analogy (one reason I prefer doing electrical DIY than plumbing is that its much easier to shut the electrics down than to fix a water leak)
A fuse is simply a single-use circuit breaker.
Confusingly, if you want to make electric current flow you “close” a switch (make contact) so current will flow, whereas if you want water to flow you “open” a tap (or valve).
The “paddles” referred to above are simply blocks of wood (or another insulator). They are named for their paddle shape, which has a long handle to distance the user away from the business end, and a narrow blade to be inserted between the live rail and the current collecting “shoes” on the train, to isolate the train from the power supply (in just the same way that the paddles in a lock gate stop water flowing through the sluices – the handle in that case being so it can be operated without being in the water!) In either case, if the paddle falls out, a current will flow.
Given the short formations of some coast services on Southern resulting from the use of more 377s on metro services and the longer peak level of service, I think 707s would be better used replacing 377s back to coast work than trying to use them to replace 455s on Southern.
Greg @1843
“Electrically, power is Voltage times current ( V*i) but Resistance is V/i ( Ohm’s law reformulated), so power becomes (V^2)*i – which is why we go for large “V” for power transmission , as – for the same current- 25kV carries over 1100 times the power”
I think what you have written here is quite confused. We have P=VI and R=V/I, as you state (P=power, V=voltage, I=current, R=resistance), but your subsequent statement is at least partly wrong.
Suppose we want to supply a certain amount of power (P) to a train (or other load). Then we can determine that, for a given voltage V (measured at the train), the current required is I=P/V. Then we look at the losses in the distribution system. Let R be the resistance of the supply cables. Then the voltage drop over the supply cables is V’=IR=RP/V, and the power lost in transmission is P’=V’I=R(P^2)/(V^2).
So doubling the voltage reduces the power loss in transmission by a quarter, whereas doubling the power consumption quadruples the power lost. We can counter that by making the cables larger (reducing the resistance of the cable). A related concern (particularly with overhead transmission) is the heating caused by the resistance in the cables, particularly at the contact point of the pantograph with the overhead cable. I believe there was an incident at St Pancras where overheating led to an OHLE contact cable breaking and landing on the platform.
Re Jonathan H,
The 707s are relatively under powered as performance wise they were designed to keep to 455 timings as the 455s were assumed to be on the SW Metro services for a long time to come in when they were ordered in 2013. Oops.
As PoP has stated the desire for the metro fleet on Southern is uniformly better performance hence the 707s would need to be modified to improve performance hence the easier solution is to send them to the Coastway after fitting with toilets as that is cheaper than traction system modifications. The new timetable relies on many metro services /routes being guaranteed to be 377s so the number of 377s can’t really be reduced in the metro area.
Be aware that the older 377s (/1s initially) are going though Selhurst at the moment for their early mid-life overhaul & respray which is causing a small shortage of stock as is Thameslink not having taken over every service from Southern yet. As Coastway services tend to be the least busy they will always be the first see planned shorter services.
Re Timbeau @2314,
An excellent explanation!
The only thing I’d add is that capacitors are better thought of as closed pressure vessels rather than an open reservoir. As with a pressure vessel if the pressure (voltage) is to high it goes pop/bang, which is exactly what was happening with the SWR 455s.
The analogy would be that the wall thickness of the pressure vessel was made too thin so it failed at a lower pressure than designed. (The thickness of the insulating film in the capacitors was too thin because a production line technician decided to adjust the settings without checking…)
PS to add to Timbeau’s fluid analogy:
1) A diode is a one way valve
2) the maths behind the failure mechanisms of the dielectric (insulating layer) in capacitors is very very similar to fracture /fatigue* maths which also fits nicely with the pressure vessel reservoir concept for visualisation purposes.
*The gradual damage done every charge and discharge cycle above a critical pressure in the pressure vessel or voltage in the capacitor case.
The expected nasty failure rate for those capacitors is circa once every 50 years (beyond the expected equipment life) not once every few months in practice.
@Greg (andAlice)
“Electrically, power is Voltage times current ( V*i) but Resistance is V/i ( Ohm’s law reformulated), so power becomes (V^2)*i –”
Some odd algebra there:
Power is V*I, and V=IR. From these we can also express power as
P= (V^2)/R or
P=(I^2)*R
Which formula you use depends on whether you are interested in the current or the voltage. To reduce power losses in a transmission line of given resistance you want to keep the current low – as the losses are (I^2)*R – and this means a high voltage. (The voltage drop along the line will be proportional to the current)
Just to comment the discussion of Ohm’s law. I think several contributors are working towards an explanation of why higher voltages are better than lower ones for transmitting power and minimising resistive losses. Typically they are, but as always many other considerations (cost, safety, history etc) also enter into such a decision.
But that was not the original question. We wanted to understand why these dramatic explosions were happening – and I think such an understanding is now closer than it was. Both a proximate cause (faults in capacitor manufacturing) and at least a tentative more distal issue (suspected unwise design decisions).
Re Malcolm,
Cause of explosions – Exactly
The design is still problematic even after capacitor replacement.
@Balthazar – better get your abacus out then! 😉
And, though several parallel capacitors would be more expensive, it would also be more reliable & less prone to fail dramatically ( explode )
Any result that prevents 22kg of metal-cover flying across Dorking station platforms would seem to be a very good idea to me.
Re: Jonathan H, NGH – I have a vague feeling that Coastway is limited to four car trains. Intermediate platform lengths could be managed with SDO but isn’t there a specific platform at Brighton that could be an issue?
Then the question is: would the ROSCO want to offer only 120 cars if there might still be the chance of leasing all 150 somewhere else?
@Balthazar –
Layout at Brighton here
https://www.opentraintimes.com/maps/signalling/bli_1#T_BRGHTN
(According to Wikipedia) all platforms at Brighton can take 12-car trains, but Platform 3, which is the only platform which serves all routes (and in particular both the West Coastway route and the route to and from the depot at Preston Park), is limited to four cars for trains heading west.
Just to add to Timbeau’s comment, platform 3 at Brighton is also very seldom used for through passenger services travelling between East and West Coastway.
As an aside, I also thought that platform 2 is restricted to 8 car trains, despite being the longest platform in the station. I don’t know the reason for this, but I am sure it was stated in an RUS when assessing the case for an Arundel chord when used as a diversionary route.
@Malcolm – the puzzle for a layman like me is that something like Ohm’s law that ought to be basic physics seems to be subject of so much disagreement amongst the experts.
@SOUTH COAST ED 31 July 2018 at 11:37
“As an aside, I also thought that platform 2 is restricted to 8 car trains, despite being the longest platform in the station. I don’t know the reason for this, but I am sure it was stated in an RUS when assessing the case for an Arundel chord when used as a diversionary route.”
Platform #2 has a connection to the depot part way along. That’s why there’s an extra signal 661. #2 can hold an 8 car at the buffer stop end behind signal 661, but the platform continues to full 12 car length at signal 665. It is possible that next to the turnout part way along, the platform edge had to be cut back a little to clear the end throw of cars heading to the depot. That may result in an unacceptable horizontal stepping distance for passengers. As SDO systems can’t, as far as I’m aware, disable odd doors in the middle of trains it means the outer section of the platform can’t be used in normal service so the effective limit is 8 cars. I guess a 12 might be put in there in an emergency but it would have to go back to where it came from or be split in the platform to be able to access the depot.
Thanks for the explanation Mark. I had always wondered. It irked me that the RUS only stated that there was only one West Coastway platform with 12-car capability without elaborating on the reason, or what, if anything, could be done to rectify it. In fact I don’t think it stated whether it was platform 1 or 2. I deduced it was platform 2 with the restriction because I have been on a 12-car from platform 1.
Mark did not mention it, but the connection to the depot is not shown on the open-train-times map linked by timbeau. This could be because it would not be relevant to trains in service, which is (I think) the focus of that site.
@NGH 31 July 2018 at 07:36
Can someone please explain to me why the following (taken by memory from another LR thread) is misconceived.
There is an apparent shortage of class 700s for final Thameslink operation. GN peaktime services make use of a small fleet of class 365s. Retractioning 707s and reforming them to 9/11 carriages (i.e. units, 4, 5 and 6 carriages long) would create an almost common Thameslink/GN fleet.
Obvious disavantages: retractioning costs; probably some software modifications required. No full walkthrough, as there would be two intermediate cabs.
” reforming them to 9/11 carriages ”
Existing Thameslink services are all 8 or 12 cars. So if your were to adopt the 707s you would want to reform them as 4-car or 6-car (presumably fifteen of each), giving you twelve 12-car trains or seven 8-car and seven 12-car trains (with one or two spare units).
If 4-car trains on coastway was particularly desirable to avoid SDO and fit behind signal 450 in platform #3 at Brighton, perhaps each unit could lose a TSO (trailer standard open) which could be used to strengthen a number of 8 car Thameslink units to 12-car. I’m assuming a 707 formation is DMSO-PTSO-TSO-TSO-DMSO (driver motor standard open, pantograph trailer standard open). Some TSOs would have to be converted to MSO (motor standard open) by addition of power bogies. Up to seven 700/0 units might be so treated with a couple of spare coaches remaining. Power to weight ratio of the 707s would be improved too. Could more 12s on Thameslink be useful?
When contemplating reforming 707s for Thameslink, don’t forget the need for the middle coaches to line up with the wheelchair humps. Is is still crayonism when you are redesigning trains?
I believe Hornbyism is the preferred term.
For information
Just platform 6 at Norwood Junction is 9 cars long.
Anerley, Penge West, Sydenham up and both fast line platforms at New Cross Gate are 8 cars long.
For more, slightly off topic, information
Norwood Junction platform 3 is 10 cars long and the first 10 cars of the train are opened as indicated on the train but all platform customer information screens and announcements tell you that you must join the front 9 carriages if alighting at Norwood Junction as this station has a short platform.
It has been that way for years.
Anonymous 16:04
I thought that was the case at Sydenham. Anerley and Penge West don’t matter that much as passenger numbers are low.
I don’t really understand why they didn’t extend further on the London end of Sydenham up platform but maybe there is a track circuit or signal issue.
Re: Answer=42 – It may or may not be misconceived; but if the appropriate bid team(s*) have other options in front of them, it may not make the cut. It’s relative, not absolute. The neatest solution in the world may work out more expensive than, say, a new build scenario.
*Last autumn the DfT made public its view that TSGN would be split into “at least two” franchises, and more recently merging of GN into LNER has been put forward, seemingly seriously.
There are not actually that many stations on the Coastway routes with platforms shorter than 5 cars, and I think they are all 4 car length and lightly used. Aldrington, Fishersgate, East Worthing and Southease spring to mind. There are probably one or two others. If SDO is not desirable, but money could be found to reconfigure the 707s to 4-cars, might spending it instead on platform lengthening where possible be a better use of funds?
Talking of door-openings & train-lengths (etc)
Has anyone looked at today’s DG posting – where, it seems the “gap” is too big, so the doors are not opening, except that something seems to have gorn worng …..
Greg,
If memory serves the problem is on another platform but the SDO system can’t tell the difference between some of the Paddington high level platforms it is the only “station” they aren’t using long term so no point in properly sorting.
Re Balthazar,
Agreed – other options may make more sense at that time in the future.
Re South Coast Ed @1752,
Precisely and they have ASDO so very easy to roll out in current 5 car format on Coastway, hence my original suggestion.
PoP, for reasons unknown, the SDO system can cope with different platform lengths at the same station but the PIS cannot! So for example at Battersea Park, it still assures everyone that they can only alight from the front 8 coaches, even though the down platform is 10 and all 10 coaches open. The up is still 8, so it defaults to the “safest” for all. This is irritating and a bit risky, as when people realise the PIS is crying wolf, they don’t take any notice of it. Then at places like West Norwood, 8 down, 7 up, they find themselves locked in and have to charge down the train, hopefully making it to the first unlocked coach in time. I’m generally waiting there for longer now whilst I watch all the late leavers appearing from the “last” coach.
Crying wolf is doubtless a factor in people not acting on “Due to a short platform” announcements. But maybe not a very big one. Either someone hears and acts on the false announcement, and after getting off typically turns their back on the coach with the supposedly unusable doors, so does not notice that they might actually open. Or they do not hear it, get off as normal, and also fail to spot anything wrong.
The only ones who do notice the wolf-crying may be train geeks, who are probably also aware that PIS-behaviour at one station is not a reliable guide to PIS-behaviour at another station.
I do agree that an inaccurate announcement, of any kind, is well annoying to anyone who is part of the team trying to provide the public with a decent service.
@ KEVIN DESMOND 26 July 2018 at 14:37
Don’t suppose you mean a Scottish pint, which was in use until the early 19th century – a ‘joug’ is equivalent to 1696mL or around 3 Imperial pints, so it could handily fit the 1000mL of 21st century liquid.
Point taken, regardless.
This seems to be a good enough point in the thread to ask a question I have always wondered about: why is SDO permitted on a 10-car train from London Bridge to London Victoria at West Norwood (which only opens doors of the front 7 cars), but Thameslink (or Southeastern) services via Denmark Hill are limited to 8-cars because the platforms can’t be lengthened everywhere? Why is SDO not applied equally everywhere?
Re Giovanni
History and money…
You need trains that are SDO capacble.
London Bridge – Victoria etc. – Platforms on most stations are now 10 cars including most of the busy Stations (excluding 1 at Sydenham and 1 at Streatham Hill) and some of money was spent on lengthening them between 2009 and early 2013 unless the cost was stupidly high (Sydenham x1 8 car, Streatham Hill x1 9 car and West Norwood x 2 7/8car platforms weren’t done). All the stations were original LBSCR or affiliate built so many were easily extendable. 10 car Rolling Stock with SDO being procured for those services.
Thameslink / SE Catford Loop (LCDR built, “via Denmark Hill”):
1. Far more difficult high cost platforms to extend than LBG- VIC etc, SDO is only really suitable if relatively few quiet platforms can utilise it as cheaper alternative, if most stations and mainly busy ones need SDO then it won’t really work e.g. Catford Loop
2. TL Didn’t have someSDO capable rolling stock till the last few years (still some 319s till last year but 8 or 12 car so no 10 car alternative. None of the SE stock used is SDO capable.
3. Same problem with TL stations on the MML in North London with plenty of 8 car but difficult to extend platforms so ideal to pair with each other as a TL route.
4. The LCDR via Herne Hill route is generally far easier to extend platforms* on than the Catford Loop so far cheaper to go for 10car with SDO in places there than the Catford Loop. * A surprising number are effectively 9 car long platforms already where as many of the Catford Loop platforms are a very lean 8car.
5. The new SE franchise having SDO capable metro stock opens up the door to longer services as Lewisham and further east are all 12 car already leaving just 3 stations on the busy section with Nunhead and Denmark Hill being easy/cheapy to extend but Peckham Rye being harder
With regards to inaccurate onboard announcements about SDO, I have noticed from traveling on SWR that a 12-car 450 will announce which carriage’s doors will open as if it was a 10-car 444 although the announcement will only play in the correct carriages. An extreme example is encountered at Milford southbound which can take 8-cars of 450 but only 6-cars of 444. The “please move forward to alight” message (correctly) only plays in the rear 4 coaches but incorrectly states that only doors on the front 6 coaches will open.
I think another future use of the Class 707s might very well be the next Southeastern franchise. It’s a fairly safe bet that all three bidders will choose to get rid of the Networkers, and they may very well have chosen to replace them (in part) with the 707s.
ORR have just rejected the Grand Southern: Southampton – Waterloo Open Access request:
http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/28450/2018-08-01-grand-southern-decision-letter.pdf
1. Failed abstraction test (20p new revenue per £ abstracted from SWR)
2. the required number of 442s no longer available and no new stock plan
3. Massive performance pollution issues as they wanted to use the fire breaks i.e. recovery gaps /slots in the timetable to run their services and rejected the concept of fire breaks as existing.
Re Straphan,
The Bidders has signed up with Alstom (Stagecoach) or Hitachi (Govia and Abellio) to provide the additional rolling stock.
@NGH
But I note no mention of a lack of power precluding the services from running. Was this because the bid was submitted on the basis of the current(ish) timetable rather the planned upgraded one?
Re Snowy,
Already dead in the water on 1. – 3. before any other reasons.
4. All of the on going discussions between NR SWR and ORR on Infrastructure and the December 2018 & 2020 timetables
@ngh/straphan
Aren’t Siemens and Alstom planning a merger?
@Timbeau
According to this month’s Railway Magazine, the EU has called it in due to potential monopolies in rail vehicles and signal equipment.
@ngh: All three bidders have signed up with specific manufacturers to procure new trains; but you don’t know for certain that they are only buying new trains; and not sourcing used trains from elsewhere…
@Straphan
As the trains that need replacing are the Networkers (and maybe the 376s), it would make no operational sense to buy some new trains AND reuse the 707s to replace them. If the bidders had planned to reuse the 707s, presumably they would have teamed up with Siemens for their bid? Besides the SE inners need 12 car stock
As an aside if the 376s are also replaced, they could be moved to Southern to help replace the 455s, maybe with aircon retrofitted, seeing that they are 5 car units?
Re Straphan,
Indeed but as the 707s don’t meet the new SE metro stock specification in their current state and would need modification to fit more grab rail /handles in the vestibule area (problematic due to cable routing about the ceiling in the vestibules, have a lower power to weight ratio than networkers or 376s so unlikely to be able to meet current timings and host of other issues (floor space allowance allocated to each seat as regards the heating duct and window seat being very close to the wall leads to a very small standing allowance combined with the grab rail issue).
But if the 707s are on the menu then Victoria (Blackfriars peak only) – Herne Hill – Bromley South – Orpington would be a good place to segregate them too especially as many of the platforms are already 9 car length and a few could be easily exteneded to 10car. [Oblique references to some platform extension and SDO in places in the ITT for options to be modelled).
As the biggest issues is around extra depot and stabling capacity extra used stock would probably have to align with one of the new manufacturers or Bombardier (Ramsgate (SE) and Chart Leacon (Bombardier)) or Ashford (Hitachi – who alredy do some work on the electrostars, given the closeness of Bombardier and Hitachi)
@Mikey C: The SE Metro trains can be up to 12 cars long, but do not need to be. I also don’t see how using 707s and another train fleet would make no operational sense. This is rolling stock leasing: if the money is right, it’s a deal worth considering; if it’s not, then even nearly-new trains get put into sidings…
@ngh: Have a look at the current schedules, e.g. on realtimetrains. You will see all SE metro trains are timed for 90mph. Trouble is, Networkers are only capable of doing 75mph. My guess is that the SRTs in the area were carried over from the previous slam-door stock (Class 423s had a max speed of 90mph). Can the 707s match Class 376 timings? Probably at a push. Can they match 423 timings? Most likely yes.
As far as where to put them: Herne Hill station has a platform length of around 180m for all platforms, with junctions immediately either side of the platforms. Not a good idea… I’d put them on those London Bridge side diagrams that do not require 12 cars. Heck – even Tunbridge Wells trains are timed for ’90mph max’ units – you could even shove them there at a push.
NGH
The low power/weight ratio of the 707’s keeps emerging as a problem.
Why were they ordered, given this known deficiency, compared even to pre-existing older stock, such as the networkers?
Greg…..The plan was to use 707s to be compatible with re-tractioned class 455, so they were provided with the power they needed. Like you, I’m surprised that some reserve of power wasn’t provided, but it wasn’t needed for the original plan. This was the plan developed by SWT to respond to the increased demand. As it was done in cahoots with NR I can’t conceive that it was done without DfT’s blessing. What amazes me is a) that they managed to obtain the class 707s without a section 54 “guarantee” and b) having had this plan carefully worked out, the DfT then allowed bidders effectively to throw it away and start again. Perhaps they realised that both the class 455 and the 707s weren’t suitable for what is, in effect a metro operation (wide doors, high acceleration), on the slow lines, at least
Were the 707’s under-powered because SWT knew there wasn’t any point in getting more powerful trains due to the power supply issues? Also, would they still be considered under-powered if one trailer car was removed to make them into more usual 4-car units?
Re 130, Greg, Jimbo,
The retractioned 455 performance was meant to be the same /better than the original it wasn’t about improved performance as such and they are still paired with the 456s that haven’t been touched.
On most of the latest generation stock (from B/H/S at least) there is one giant power converter box that supplies 4* separate traction motors and 3/4 separate auxiliary voltage supplies (everything from 415V 3phase 50Hz downwards) for brake compressors, air con, battery charging, lighting etc. It also now tend to have better acoustic insulation.
On the previous generation of stock it tended to be 2TMs per traction power grey box and separate auxiliary converters.
*6 is also an option on Aventra which was very cunning Bombardier thinking…
Hence traction motors are now most economically in groups of 4, which works very well for 4 /6/8/10/12 car units with 50% powered axles but not so well for 5 car units i.e. 707, hence if performance doesn’t need to be sparkling why not go for 8x rather than 10x Traction motors so 2 converter boxes and save plenty by not having the extra converter box and cabling, 2 fewer TMs and gear boxes but only 40% powered axles compared to the other Desiro City units at 50%. The choice was also made to go with smaller traction motors as that would be enough to match 455 timings.
Hence at the time matching 455s could have seemed sensible (if they had a s54 -oops). Not future proofing was bad idea in hindsight certainly an element of living with the power supply as it was at the time (it is already better now)
Re Straphan,
The 90mph SRT is from the 16x dual voltage 365* Networkers that were with SouthEastern for 8 years from new before going to GN
*(100mph on 25kV AC or 90mph on 750V DC )
The SRTs were completely revised for the Networkers on introduction as they had 50% more traction power than the 415/416 (EPBs) they replaced.
376s have 1/3 more power than 707s i.e. roughly what sensible 707 should have been (if it matched the other Desiro City units)
“Next week we will explore SWR’s wider issues in more detail.”
Are the wider issues still being thought up? This write-up was due last week, we’ve had nothing.
Re Ryan,
a) I’ve been a tad busy (far busier than expected)
b) More issues have been coming out of the wood work!
NGH am happy to wait for a comprehensive and well set out follow up, it sounds like it is still unwinding as to the details. Surprised that 707s were under powered with small traction motors for what was expected to be 30 + years in service in front of them.
@ngh: Thanks for clarifying the SRT issue.
Sounds like the 707s can only really be reused elsewhere if they ditch a trailer car.
Could they be fitted with more powerful motors, or would the whole traction electronics need replacing?
Herned
The cheapest solution is to remove a car.
New motors would be almost as expensive as changing the electronics, I would have thought.
Re Greg & Herned,
The motors are comparatively cheap compared to the electronics.
Traction electronics will be fine with bigger motors, they all (apart from the Japanese builders who all use Mitsubishi IGBT chips) ultimately use the same IGBT chips from a firm formerly part of Siemens no matter who actually make the power electronics.
Re Alan,
The 707s were really the very last order of the old era and there was bit of failure to notice the goal posts had already mostly moved with DfT (700) /TfL (345) sponsored orders that demanded higher specs.
There have been some recent dubious rolling stock orders but it is known there are issues (i.e. cheap as cost was big parameter).
@ NGH, thanks
@Greg
But then you have to write down the ~£2m ish cost of that car, so it is a real loss/cost. Does fitting higher-powered motors cost more or less than that would be the question? And obviously is there anywhere else where they are the solution
Further though: Getting some lease income for 4 cars is obviously better than getting none for 5 cars.. so yes, concur with Greg if that is the case
Herned
But that is only half the argument – do you lose, say £1.5 m per car = £45 m or, as is being suggested, scrap the entire fleet at a cost of at least £225 m & probably more than that?
Or do you re-traction at a cost of – anyone got a ball-park figure?
@Herned, @Greg
If more 12-car trains on Thameslink was a useful proposition, the removed cl.707 TSOs might be transferred to strengthen some cl.700/0 units from 8 to 12 cars, with a proportion converted to MSO by addition of new power bogies and electronics (to the higher TL performance spec of course).
Mark T et al, adding traction packages to cl 7XX trailer cars is more than traction package, motors and gearboxes. Also new wheel sets to accommodate the gearboxes and eliminate the brake discs and new tread brake actuators. There would be some significant rewiring too, plus changes to the train control and monitoring system. As to costs, to give an indication, LU is spending in the order of £150mn on new traction systems and motors for the 680 cars of central line trains. This doesn’t include gearboxes and I think the traction equipment cases are being reused
GREG TINGEY
did you mean pounds 1.5M per train rather than per car?. Before you retraction you would need to identify an end user and possibly convert to 25Kv at extra cost.
Apologies if this is a question that has been answered upstream but I couldn’t find it. Presumably someone, somewhere is paying a financial penalty for SWR not using the 707’s. Can you tell me who is paying and how much? You can either post an answer or tell me at the pub tonight!
A O
No the cost of each carriage/car is certainly over a million pounds, these days …..
@Mike
Trains usually last longer than franchises, so they are usually owned by leasing companies (Angel Trains in this case) who make their money by hiring them out to the train operating companies.
Strictly speaking, no-one will actually be paying a financial penalty, but a leasing company can only make money if the leasing fees earned by hiring out the trains, totalled over their working lives pay for the capital cost of building them. If they were charging, say, 4% of the capital cost of the train per year, and the trains go off-lease after only five years, only 20% of the money the company invested in building the trains has been recouped.
In the longer term, if leasing companies think this is likely to happen again, they will adjust their leasing fees upwards to manage that risk, which means the TOCs will have to pay more, which will eventually be reflected in higher fares and/or government subsidies.
Angel Trains have a real headache with the 707s.
As there is as yet no new jome for these trains, their carrying value was impaired as soon as they came off long term lease – i.e. when the franchise changed hands.
The accountants will have to review what future income they are likely to generate, including eventual resale or scrap value, future costs of mothballing or adapting them and the amount and likelihood of future rentals.
I would expect that the loss arising is substantial.
And in light of earlier comments regerding their obsolete specification, it appears quite possible that they will share the fate of the first generation Eurostars, premature scrapping.
Nameless
Except the “Chunnel” opened in 1994, so the 1st-gen Eurostar trains had at least 20 years service, but the 707’s were not introduced until 2016 – & thus a service life of under 3 years, so far.
A slight difference & much more wasteful
@nameless
20 – 25 years for specialised traction with little or no scope for cascading isn’t bad – the Deltics barely lasted that long, nor did the A4 Pacifics. The Blue Pullmans lasted only 13 years – so did the 1983 Tube stock.
GNER briefly used a Eurostar set to augment its fleet, but it was severely restricted in its use – in particular its greed for electricity meant it was only allowed south of Peterborough when there were fewer other trains competing for the available watts, and not allowed at all north of York because of loading gauge restrictions.
@timbeau/Greg T – that’s as may be, but the business case for the Eurostars (and indeed most rolling stock) is based on a 30 year life; scrap early and you have to be able to demonstrate that it is better to replace them than to keep them. Usually possible, to reflect reductions in maintenance costs but – as noted – much much more difficult when the kit to be replaced is only a year or so old. All this from the operators’ point of view, of course; from the financiers’ viewpoint, things look very different – typically their “sweet equity” payoff kicks in in the last 5-10 years of the asset life – that is to say the deal throws off nothing but profit – and for them, losing the last few years of the assets’ cash flow is disastrous. Where, in the case of the 707s, the deal between the manufacturers and their backers put the liability for the undelivered cash, is unknowable without commercial disclosure.
@GT, @Timbeau
Wasteful – yes.
But how much UK demand can be foreseen for a batch of 30 five car indifferently specified EMU’s, whether 3rd rail or pantograph,?
And where can they be stored?
Some rolling stock prematurely cast aside by operators in favour of something shiny and new (but not necessarily better) has found further use, sometimes competing with their former owners.
The former West Coast Mark 3s on Chiltern’s Birmingham services being a case in point. You would never guess they are more than twenty years older than the Pendolinos.
The Adelantes of Grand Central and Hull Trains are another example, whizzing up and down the East Coast Main Line despite the DOR (East Coast) operation deciding that running the services for which they were previously destined was too much trouble.
In Scotland, we will soon be seeing re-purposed HSTs operating internal services on the Highland and Aberdeen lines, alongside new Azumas (class 800) on LNER services beyond Edinburgh.
Other classes seem to pop up anywhere: class 313s spread their wings far wider than the Moorgate-Welwyn services they were built for, and class 317 seems to have popped up in all sorts of unlikely places since the original (1988) Thameslink scheme made them redundant on the line they were built for only a few years before. And who would have expected 365s, which started life in Kent, to end up in Scotland?
Quite what use will be found for the 707s remains to be seen, but the re-purposing of the Gatwick Express Junipers (class 460) shows what can be done (although they are now looking for new homes again……………).
@timbeau /nameless – the strategic point in all this is that, whilst there are fairly universal vehicle types (the HSTs and the14x/15x classes -however indifferent), the mix of 3rd rail/25kv/non-electrified, platform lengths, and different markets to be served has made for many rigidities in the UK market (compounded by a very limited overseas market, of course). Whilst there have been cases where stock has had an afterlife, most builds have very little transfer value at an acceptable price – I might mention the struggling Renatus project. The TLK sets – especially the FLT sets – would be very hard pushed to find another large scale taker at any price.
Things may change in the future, especially if (a) DfT cease to micromanage the market, and (b) we can get away from a plethora of small bespoke builds, but I see no sign of that yet.
– and I nearly forgot the biggest rigidity in the system of all – franchising – which ties up the release to stock to a particular date, which may or may not suit the prospective new lessee.
It’s a market, Jim, but not as we know it.
@Graham H
@GH The Mark 3, in all its incarnations (hauled, HST, 15x, 317-322, 442, 455, 456), having been designed for British Rail in general rather than bespoke for a given line, is still remarkably versatile (there was even a plan to use the Wessex 442s, in push pull mode, on Transpennine services!)
Ironically Regional Railways went a different way from Network South East with its EMU procurement, ordering the class 323s whose Holec transmission system was the first to be given a “universal” safety case, in the hope of repeat orders. They remain unique to this day
Renatus. These are 321s, I think, which are suffering the same problem (look! shiny new trains) on Greater Anglia that their dc cousins (recently retractioned class 455s) have on SWR. But former London Midland 321s are getting a new lease of life in Scotland, reduced to three cars and added to its existing fleet of class 320s.
Other projects reviving/converting old rolling stock seem to have stalled – both class 230 and 769 were supposed to have been in service by now, and it’s not clear what is happening to the 442s either.
@timbeau – very much my point – BR came fairly close to universal fleets; the DfT hasn’t – even though it’s in the taxpayers’ interest that they should do so….
@Graham H
“BR came fairly close to universal fleets”
Indeed, although they had their quirks – NSE turned its back on Regional’s Sprinter family and designed the Networker Turbo instead, whilst conversely Regional Railways spurned NSE’s Networker EMU design and went its own way with the Holec 323s.
The only crossover was the Class 159 on the South Western, as the Networker Turbos had been built to the more generous loading gauges available on the former GWR and GCR routes. Indeed, for some mysterious reason only understood by accountants, the 159s were built as Regional 158s and then converted.
I find a certain irony in HST’s being re-purposed for Aberdeen services … the last express use of the A-4’s being there to Glagow [ A-4’s in service 1935-66 – and worked hard for most of that time …]
@NGH (7 August 2018 at 13:39)
If the 707s don’t meet the SE metro stock specification, what does this say about the newly introduced Class 700 Thameslink fleet, which apart from the power to weight ratio are basically identical to the 707s, and thus presumably share the issues with the grab rail in the vestibule area, intrusive heating ducts etc
Re Mikey C
” what does this say about the newly introduced Class 700 Thameslink fleet,”
That lessons have been learned. This has come as bit of a shock to certain RoSCos.
DfT get some things right.
The newer entrants have been much better about specifying future proof stock and flexibility than most of the other older ROSCOs were till recently (Porterbrook notably the most enlightened of the old guard?), they understood the end of section 54 agreements was a market changer.
The new RoSCos have tended to have a preference for Bombardier being able to hit the right note as regards future proofing and performance commuter EMUs.
NGH….re new Roscos and Bombardier hitting the right note on future proofing, do you think this extends to on time delivery and working out of the box?
Re 130,
Of course not! – also applies to all other manufacturers too. I suspect CAF might get the closest in the near future but their UK orders are for tried and tested technology for less demanding requirements (e.g. replacement of pacers / sprinters, Scottish sleeper coaches, 100mph LCHS coaches and EMU with less critical performance specs).
Bombardier/ Siemens / Hitachi / Stadler all having issues the first 3 on “out of the box” and the 4th on making stuff for the UK (e.g. having to reduce Anglia Bi-mode diesel tank size to reduce axle loading) and zee dwell time chessnut and many more).
CAF’s Heathrow Express units are falling to bits which doesn’t bode well.
As thought for the weekend:
707 (SWT) cost about £1.6m per car (5 car units)
710 (TfL) cost in 5 car format is about £1.41m per car (5 car units dual voltage)
701 (SWR) cost in 5 car format is about £1.35m per car single voltage (big order)
So Angel have to write off about 200-250k per car to match new build price and then pay for mods to match the spec…
Your earlier comment – There is far more than meets than what you listed to do in terms traction mods and retro fit e.g. suspension settings so the easy option might be to sent the bogies back to factory due to the scale of mods. Bombarider have a big design advantage in this area – Siemens actually wanted to license their design…
I am glad there is some professional consensus about Bombardier having “nice designs” but being unable to provide working trains that build in service reliability. If they don’t fix the problems with the 345 and 710s then they are going to have an extremely disgruntled customer in the shape of TfL (and court action over the Picc Line won’t be helping TfL’s temperament). We are literally weeks away from a potentially very embarrassing episode for Bombardier. And then we can throw in a series of fed up ROSCOs / TOCs and the DfT if the planned stream of mainline orders also turns into a mess. I assume someone, somewhere in the Bombardier empire is actually concerned about this and is “doing something” to get solutions out in the field?
Re WW,
“Working trains” Most of the problems (as with most modern stock) are software related so Bombardier have probably been trying to do the right thing by sorting the software before letting the trains loose into service with the 710s. Again 345s very limited use till foibles sorted hence the huge data gathering.
Hitachi were playing a similar game in Scotland using NR electrification work delay excuse to bide time to sort out the software but not fessing up which unfortunately meant the double vision windscreens were discovered later than they would have been as they had very few units doing testing (just for software stuff) leading to much egg on face.
I think there are going to be some very loud screams when the 710’s finally appear, because of TfL’s insistence on ( IMHO – horrible, uncomfortable ) longitudonal seating, rather than transverse 2×2 seats.
After all, if Paris Metro & Berlin S-Bahn trains can have transverse, why is longitudonal “necessary”?
Re Greg,
1. Pushes the need to look at 10/12 car to deal with growth further into the future (TfL is skint and longitudinal seating is very good (better) value for money as an alternative.)
2. A certain local football club has a shiny new stadium with approximately double the capacity opening soon…
@ Greg – I disagree. I think GOBLIN users will be delighted to just be able to get on a train in relative space and comfort, even if standing, compared to the ludicrous peak time crush on a 172. Nice trains that the 172s are they are not remotely satisfactory for the demand levels.
I am not aware of people moaning about the 378s and their seating layout. People seem to cope with it perfectly well and, again, in the peaks they are more concerned about being able to board the train than having a palatial seat. They are also more concerned about the trains running on time and not being delayed and cancelled. Look to the GTR debacle to see what the real priorities for passengers – no one’s moaning about class 700 seats any more. They just want a train service that they can trust.
I concede there may be the odd moan from people on West Anglia but that will pass. I expect people from Edmonton Green southwards will be glad of the extra space in the peaks as their trains are full to bursting. The only people I ever come across who whinge incessantly about the Overground / Crossrail seat layout are railway enthusiasts on forums. I think “normal punters” have other things to worry about.
@ Ngh – Ta. I do understand it is software problems that are the source of the difficulties. I understand that suppliers are reluctant to discuss their problems in public but the deafening silence about the progress of Aventras is not terribly reassuring. I also recognise that the difficulties of resolving software issues are on a scale outside of my personal experience as there are more system interractions (esp to signalling and control systems). I’ve had a fair share of more conventional system software problems on projects or bespoke systems. However Bombardier are heading towards deadlines / commitments either of their own making (class 710s running “by November”) or public ones (Crossrail opens Dec 2018). There’s not much time left and I assume you do actually need some public and staff interraction with trains in service to spot all of the glitches and issues that require resolution. How else do trains get down the “bathtub curve” unless they are being used in service?
Re WW,
I think Greg is awaiting his other half’s complaints on seating! (Namely not getting a seat any more).
Still some complaints in GN land about 700 seats but much quieter elsewhere.
Indeed that is purpose of 345s operating Liverpool Street to Shenfield with an engineer and fitter on every service. Part of the reason the MTIN is so bad is that the engineer and fitter investigating and documenting even the most minor fault to learn from it, is that every fault now causes a delay over 3 minutes creating an MTIN.
If a set of doors isn’t working it isn’t a case of carry on with the red door not working lights showing (what will happen long term) it is investigate – document -fix if possible.
The 7 car 345s only have another ~10 months in service so software development on the 7car software build isn’t really a focus unless critical, the big focus is on 9 car and signalling. The reliability of the 9 car units is almost double the 7 car units.
The 710s are the first units with a 3rd generation body mounted DOO Camera system with some much improved features hence the desire to get it right especially before they enter service. Which should stand the 701 (SWR) /720 (GA) / 730?(LNWR) builds in good stead.
345 testing in the CR core was recently stepped up with more units. The signalling + control interfaces are off the shelf and proven to work elsewhere (ETCS & TPWSv4 on Thameslink using same on train equipment modules, ditto Trainguard MT modules all with standard interfaces).
[GW-ATP/ETCS interference in the Heathrow tunnels is a different issue.]
Acronym time:
Miles Per Technical TRUST Incident [Number] (MTIN),
@NGH The reliability of the 9 car units is almost double the 7 car units.
Is that later more developed software?
Are the 9 cars on test compared to 7s in service?
Is the reporting regime the same?
I still find it hard to believe that some organisation would finance the construction of a fleet of trains for a specific route knowing there was only a guaranteed income from them for 3 or so years.
Did they think there wouldn’t be a change of Operator? Did they think that even if there was a new Operator it would have to rent their trains? Did they think that if the trains went off-lease they would be able to find a new home for them with little modification? Did they think they would be bailed out by someone else – DfT, reinsurance?
If the answer to all of these is no then the shareholders should be asking serious questions of the Directors.
@ngh Aug 10th
What are Section 54 agreements, and what is the significance of their ending?
I have looked up Section 54 but must be looking at the wrong Act of Parliament.
Re Aleks,
7 cars in service, 9 cars on test till ORR signs off for Paddington – Hayes & H so different regimes so not straight comparison hence using almost double as not worth being too detailed.
9car a mix of later software and no passengers.
Re Timbeau and Roger B,
Section 54 of the Railways act 1993
Agreements that tie the franchise’s successor(s) to a leasing deal longer than the remaining period of the original franchise that negotiated the deal. These agreements needed approval from DfT.
For Example the SWT 450s and 444s orders were covered by a Section 54 agreements till 2025 (i.e. 3 franchise retenderings later). So the RoSCo gets capital repayment covered and few years of very high profit at the end.
They won big time on the 450s and 444s but look like losing on the 707s,
Re Roger B,
I don’t think they though it would go wrong on all those fronts (and many more).
NGH
Yes, that … there seems to be an interminable delay in ORR “signing-off” an (apparent) minor variation in an existing design – do we know why they are dragging their feet?
@NGH
I am a lawyer of sorts, but even after re-reading Section 54, I would never have worked out that it allowed the DfT to force a franchisee to use a particular fleet of trains.
@NGH
Is it possible the relevant people just assumed there would be a Section 54 agreement for the 707s too and didn’t bother to check?
Is this the biggest financial cock-up in UK railway history?
@ Roger B
At a cost of ‘only’ £200m, no, not by a long way!
Regional Eurostars, channel tunnel night stock, modernisation plan marshalling yards, Railtrack… it probably isn’t even in the top 20 post-war cock-ups
@Herned
Thanks for putting it into perspective. But maybe for ‘private’ money?
@RogerB – the possibility of a s54 agreement was – at least for the rolling stock builds on which I advised – the first question asked by manufacturers and their advisers alike – it would be a serious, and very surprising, fault not to have asked that in regard to the 707s. The answer was usually no, of course – s54 was never intended to underwrite rolling stock leases as the ROSCOs were there to take on risk, weren’t they? The original purpose, when we were experimenting with the asset content of franchises, was that it would cover certain items that were essential to the operation of the franchise (eg wheelskates) and so prevent them being stripped out at the end of the franchise. Using the s54 route for new build/asset creation has certain expenditure implications – it would count as public expenditure, for example. Quite why DfT has succumbed to grant s54 agreements so freely these days is unclear; the change in policy has been silent.
@Herned – one doesn’t have to go as far back as the modernisation Plan – delayed DLR to Bank; DLR extensions; Stratford Accidental – to find examples of planning failure, In London, too many of them are associated with a strategic failure to plan Docklands properly/excessive political influence. The costs are many billion.
Re Graham H,
But they have stopped freely granting them now (last 3 years ish)…
@RogerB: No, their cock-ups are even larger, they are just better at hiding them on the balance sheet…
Financial companies are the worst, remember RBS? They should never have bought ABN-AMRO! None of the Dutch banks wanted to, they all knew how bad it was behind the facade…
@Herned
£200m? Seems a bit low to me.
Re Nameless,
£240m less several years leasing payments so not far off…
@SHLR 🙂 to mention the way the thundering herd piled into rail franchising in the mid-90s would be simply indecent. [Even in small ways, the so-called business sector seems to have remarkably little commercial expertise – I well recall one of the directors of the merchant bank in which I started my employed career returning from a business efficiency (irony alert) exhibition having been struck by the particular shade of blue of the stationery on one of the stands; to see was to act and a ton and a half – 18 months supply – was ordered. When I left a year later, the bank’s operational research department was still trying to find a way for the automatic billing machinery to accommodate and fold the paper to fit the envelopes.].
If they are still on the original SWT lease terms.
Were the IEPs (specified by the DfT rather than whoever was the franchisee that week*), subject to a S54 arrangement?
*National Express, I think
Re Timbeau,
PFI contract between DfT and Agility (Ditto 700s DfT & Cross London Trains). They aren’t normal leasing contracts so no s54 as DfT opted for 27 years.
Talking of new trains … class 710 stop-boards have started appearing on the “chenford” lines.
@NGH 10 August 2018 at 20:13
But surely the 700s were specced by the DfT?
And while the similar (but underpowered 707s) are now facing an uncertain future, Siemens are currently building a fleet of new trains for the Moorgate Line (the 717s) which presumably have very similar interiors to the 700s and 707s? With the same issues with grab poles and heating elements etc
Concerning the 710s and their longitudinal seating, I wouldn’t be happy if I was a West Anglia commuter. Especially as the new trains on the neighbouring line to Moorgate won’t have such seating, bearing in mind they currently have very similar 313 and 315 stock. To me the new Spurs stadium is a convenient excuse for TfL to save money and have a common fleet of 710s, rather than two different version, one for West Anglia, one for Goblin.
Re Mikey C,
“But surely the 700s were specced by the DfT?”
Indeed the work on the spec started with some research and data gathering in 2007 and finalised by 2010 is with a few minor changes in 2011. (and then the tables + WiFi post introduction agreed changes)
1) they didn’t get everything right
2) they learn lessons from the things they didn’t
3) they realise times change
On 2) for example they realised since then that you need to be super pedantic on the making sure standing space is usable hence the grab rail in vestibules and floor space correlating to a seat being taken out of standing floor space if it isn’t under the seat.
The 700s of course have an option in the contract to replace with longitudinal seating at some point in the future at DfT’s asking!
“717 with the same problems” – agreed
710s Convenient excuse – Partially agree but it saves them changing the seating in a few years to deal with overcrowding.
Pardon my ignorance please but where is “Chenford”?
Is it Chelmsford/Shenfield?
@Hughs: Don’t worry we all have problems understanding Greg’s particular version of English/Railway maps/whatever..
It’s the London Overground Lines out of Liverpool Street, heading up the Lea Valley[1]. I think Chingford is one of them…
[1]: At least that’s what I’ve noted in my most current copy of the Gregtionary.
Yes, sorry. I should have ensured Chenford was made clear – or deleted the comment for being too obscure.
From now on (moderator’s hat on) I will ban Chenford unless explained – in which case one might as well refer to the proper name in the first place.
I have a bit of sympathy for Greg on this occasion as there doesn’t seem to be a satisfactory way of describing the lines in question other than by very long names.
PoP & others
I was quoting the late sainted G Feinnes, who used that shortened version ….
Sorry about that,
( CHingford/ENField/stortfORD)
… so it’s now in the records …..
Just to be sure, does Greg’s shorthand mean CHeshunt, ENfield and chingFORD? I’m guessing this is the group of lines in North East London that overground took over.
@poP
“there doesn’t seem to be a satisfactory way of describing the lines in question other than by very long names.”
Illustrating yet another reason why the spaghetti-in-tomato sauce that is the Overground map needs clear differentiation. (Noticing on the Victoria Line yesterday that there is no way of telling which of its five “Overground” interchanges you need for any given destination)
From left to right Enfield Town,Cheshunt,Chingford which were all taken over by London Overground from Greater Anglia’s West Anglia portfolio.
IslandDweller,
I am sure those are the lines he is referring to even if I am not 100% sure exactly what Chenford refers to.
timbeau,
Yes, seems a shame when the DLR has (finally) done a reasonable job. Even the Metropolitan has decent car line diagrams showing the peak-only fast services.
In fairness the Overground map does identify the lines though some individual colouring would help.
But we have covered the topic of diagrams rather too many times so we will have to leave it there.
West Anglia Metro is the most common terminology.
Never heard the term West Anglia Metro before. They’re referred to by Arrival Rail London as West Anglia Inners (WAI) or simply West Anglia
Re Anon,
But the industry outside ARL needs a name for those services and Abellio Greater Anglia does operate so me “inner”services too hence the West Anglia Metro.
When will London join the rest of the civilised world and just number these services?
@Straphan
The Southern always did number its services, and they are still displayed on the destination blinds of SWR’s class 455s
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/SWT_455729_Clapham_Junction.jpg
A route number can display in two digits (i.e visible from much further away) much more information than a 19-character destination display. And can mean differentthings to different people.
But for some reason, they don’t think it’s necessary to advertise them to the public – apparently, it would be “confusing”: it would seem bus operators give their clients more credit for intelligence than train operators do. Instead we are treated to announcements about the “0757 from Waterloo to Waterloo”, which gives you no useful information at all about which of the four possible routes it will take (21, 32, 87, 89) – indeed at one time there were six possible routes because there were some circular services (in both directions) via the Chertsey loop as well.
Likewise there are still three routes to Guildford (16, 42, 72) although passengers actually going to Guildford should avoid trains actually saying “Guildford” on the front as they are better advised to take a Portsmouth train (81).
At any one time half of SWR’s trains display “Waterloo”. It is usually obvious that is where they are going, What is important is what their calling pattern is. The headcodes would tell you (e.g the 81/82/83/84 hierarchy on the Portsmouth line).
Even when SWT was actually run by a bus company, they made little use of the route numbers in their publicity.
Timbeau & everybody, actually.
Why do the TOC’s refuse to do this?
Is it simply because everyone else ( in Europe ) does it, so we can’t possibly”? Or something else?
What is even dafter, of course, is that the real actual Southern Railway used “proper” headocdes & everyone knew what they meant, so why were they withdrawn?
Would an FoI request, very carefully worded, make any difference do you think?
@Timbeau (and others)
Having looked through my collection of timetables, I managed to find the Dec ’03 and May ’04 times for the Portsmouth Direct and noted that the first row in the tables does show the headcode for each service. However, they are absent from Dec ’04 onwards which just so happened to correspond to a major timetable recast.
In these days of detailed electronic information as to calling points, etc on platforms and inside trains, do that many passengers still rely on the destination blinds on the front of the train as a major source of information? If I get down on the platform just as a train is coming in at the platform end, the last place I look for information about where the train is going to is the front of the train, I look at the platform indicators. It might have made much more sense in the era of manually displayed finger boards on platforms (or, very often, nothing at all) and nothing inside the train, but we can do much better these days.
@Quinlet
But a single two-digit number still provides much more information much more quickly than a scrolling list of stations served (for which in order to parse properly you also need to consider which stations are missing) for regular users.
For more occasional users, a scrolling display is still necessary, but commuters generally know and make use of shortcuts like route numbers where they exist. In every case it’s still easier and quicker to say “take one of routes X, Y or Z” than “check the train stops at A, B and C”
Every time I have suggested this on this site, I have been roundly condemned on complexity grounds. I am unrepentant. I appreciate that London is trickier than, say Muenchen because of the sheer size of the system, and that prevents a Berlin-style of numbering the principal routes with a single digit, with the variants as derivative double digits, but – hey – there aren’t more than 26 radial routes (I hear the rustling of maps – good) and the variants can then receive 2 digits as differentiators. Take the A1 to Reading, the A2 to LHR, the A3 to Shenfield, A31 to Upminster etc.
Totally agree. I had quite an argument in the early Thameslink days about route codes or stopping pattern indicators as it would make things so much more simple. There’s only really 4 stopping patterns on the north side of Thameslink, so call them X (express), F (fast), S (semi) and A (all stations). If you get the Bedford F is the Luton A, you know where it is calling. Same can work everywhere that has consistent stopping patterns. Timetable doesn’t matter. If something has to call off patterns, use “?”.
But apparently, my brain works in a Germanic fashion, and the majority of the travelling population don’t / won’t / can’t understand it. Ich bin nicht sicher.
Let’s bring back Liverpool Street’s “Jazz” light codes then! Actually, reading this reminds me that in the late 70s I’d be looking to check the headcode on approaching trains.
For the avoidance of doubt, here’s how the Southern Region did it for generations – and frequent travellers never doubted the route the train was going to take – first few photos will suffice – those numbers weren’t exactly obscure:
http://www.rmweb.co.uk/community/index.php?/topic/544-southern-region-photos-1980s/page-11
Here is more detailed information:
http://semgonline.com/headcodes/eheadcodes.html
It didn’t take long to learn the routes the headcodes represented in one’s local area and change was comparatively rare.
This is a bit ridiculous. In a modern railway where you’ve got to recover things to keep the whole show on the road. We’ve got a 63 that’s running fast and missing Norwood – New Cross Gate. A 72 that’s calling additionally at Penge West, and a 1 that’s diverted via Elephant and Castle.
What exactly is the point?
Put the stations the train is calling at in Darwin (therefore platform screens and apps, internet, etc) and get on with it
@Anon – Exaggeration is always worth a few laughs (and in the case of TLK, diversion and failure is probably nearer the norm these days) but in a rational world, differentiation of routes without having to list all the stops is very much to the point. Imagine the LU system with no route differentiators and the great long clanking list of stations that would result. Imagine if everyone unfamiliar with a system had to wait for the list to display and read it.
@AlisonW – some of us even bothered to learn the LU light headcodes…..
@Anon
The headcodes were originally devised to inform the signalmen which train was which. And thus if the stopping pattern or route was changed, the driver had to change the headcode.
But now: – trains running late are often made to skip stops, in order to recover time but, quite apart from the delay this causes to passengers who wanted to use it at intermediate stations, the plan is usually frustrated by the failure to give it the necessary priority to regain the time, so it crawls along behind an “all stations”, and recovers no time at all. (Easy to see what is going on, and whether a slot on the fast line could have been used, using real time train trackers) Changing it from e.g 2H57 to 1H57 would possibly help to prevent such nonsenses. Trains can change headcode en route – if the train in the example above were to be taken out of passenger service the resulting empty stock working would be coded 5H57.
In any case, passengers on some lines are well used to trains on the same route having different stopping patterns – see the “not stopping at” displays on the Metropolitan Line for example.
Surely any kind of route indicator would be in addition to the current displays, providing additional info, so why not do it? Yes, there is a cost to making the change, but it wouldn’t be that significant.
The Southern’s headcodes had one other very useful feature – it really had been thought out carefully. Except on the South Western, which only had one London terminus, odd numbers always signified “City” trains (Cannon Street, Blackfriars/ Holborn Viaduct, London Bridge, according to which division* you were on), and even numbers “West End” trains (Charing Cross or Victoria).
Before the days of roller blinds, headcodes were displayed by means of stencils in front of a translucent glass panel. Each cab needed just nine – 0 to 8 (6 could be re-used as 9), as multiples of 11 (and 96 and 69) were not used. This provided a convenient set of numbers for the diesel operated routes (Hastings 22, Oxted 66 etc) when they were introduced, as all diesel units were fitted with roller blinds from the start.
*For most purposes, the former LCDR and SER networks could be treated separately, and even duplicated headcodes between them (70 was both the Bexleyheath line and the Victoria-Orpington service)
so for my journey home from London Bridge in 1980, I should be looking for:
4 (change at Ashford)
5 (change at Ashford)
6 (change at Ashford)
7 (change at Ashford)
18 (change at Ashford)
19 (change at Ashford)
68 (change at Ashford)
78 (may or may not stop at my station)
86 (may or may not stop at my station)
87 (may or may not stop at my station)
90 (may or may not stop at my station)
91 (may or may not stop at my station)
or, a year later:
4 (change at Ashford)
5 (some, but not all trains, change at Ashford if it goes that far)
8 (change at Ashford)
18 (change at Ashford)
19 (change at Ashford)
90 (may or may not stop at my station)
91 (may or may not stop at my station)
Simples, eh? No, confusing and unreliable. I prefer the platform indicators even if I have to watch them scroll.
@Timbeau: Slightly less than half the trains on SWR have Waterloo as the destination… Think IoW… 😉 Sorry, I just couldn’t help it…
SHLR: I doubt if the IOW services are numerous enough to outweigh the Waterloo-Waterloo services (all of which, rather than half as with other services, have Waterloo as destination).
Re SH(LR),
Worth remembering the Kingston and Hounslow loop services that are Waterloo to Waterloo help push the Waterloo numbers up
Most of the Waterloo-Waterloo loop services don’t advertise Waterloo as the final destination on the front until they reach the station at the halfway point – for obvious reasons. At Clapham Junction and Earlsfield, the Kingston-Richmond-Waterloo services are advertised as Strawberry Hill, and by Wimbledon, these services are advertised as destination Richmond. It is only at Kingston that you get Waterloo services in both directions.
@quinlet – no one is attempting to defend whatever the Southern region did in 1980 – and that has zilch to do with a rational approach now.
Actually the loop trains often display the wrong destination, because nobody changed the display half way round. A route number would solve that particular problem.
(It is also not unknown for the automated announcements to get confused and think they are on the way out when they are on the way in – it can be disconcerting to be told the next station is Clapham Junction when in fact you have just left it – even more to be told to “mind the gap” at Queenstown Road when the gap in question is three or four tracks wide and the train isn’t going to stop anyway).
Meant to add – the Lymington/Brockenhurst and Aldershot/Ascot shuttles also don’t display “Waterloo” in either direction
Timbeau
😝
Or any “SWR” services from/to Bristol TM, either ….
( Have we now covered the set of Non-Waterloo services? )
@ Greg / Timbeau
The Bristol services, IIRC, are extensions of the Waterloo-Salisbury ones.
The Salisbury-Romsey ‘b’, the Soton-Portsmouth stopper are two we missed. I believe there’s some local services downstream of Yeovil. And, of course, this summer has seen the Corfe Castle shuttle (though the 4-reverses services from Salisbury originated/ended in Waterloo even if not advertised as such).
And who can forget Shanklin to Ryde Pier Head!
😛
Nobody did forget Shanklin. That was where we came in – though some may have been eating popcorn.
@Si: I believe there’s some local services downstream of Yeovil.
Indeed there are. Exeter St Davids to/from Honiton and Axminster. Just a couple of services daily, though. Single track from Honiton to Pinhoe an obstacle to service development, particularly necessary with the development of Cranbrook and the route as a commuting corridor into Exeter.
And of course the Avocet Line is really Southern Railway, not Great Western.
Anyway, enough, too far from London. Even further than IoW.
SWR ideas of adaptation of 159/158 units at Salisbury Depot to bi-mode (DC to London from Basingstoke) are presumably now a waste of time (and money as well, but they are already lacking that) if there isn’t enough power in the 3rd rail…?
Turning a diesel hydraulic DMU into a DEMU and then making it bi-mode always seemed a hard way of proceeding.
@simon/ anonymice
I had not heard of this scheme, but as well as the point raised by Simon itseems unlikely to be a runner for several other reasons
1. Such substantial re-engineering of trains already more than half way through their design life is unlikely to pay its way.
2. SWR seem to have little enthusiasm for re-enginering – on the contrary they are planning to get shot of the recently re-engineered class 455s and 458s they have inherited.
3. The electric capability would be useful only over a relatively short stretch of the Waterloo-Exeter route. If reducing emissions at London termini were the objective, an electric loco could be used to tow the train in from Basingstoke and push it back again. (As far as I am aware, no Exeter line train is longer than nine 23m coaches, and the platforms can take ten (eg 2x class 444)
If an electrodiesel conversion were desirable, the 442s would be a better starting point. But given the glacial progress made with 319 flex (not to mention the delays with vivarail) starting a third project before either of the first two have turned a wheel on service (or at all, in the case of 319 flex*) would seem foolhardy.
* At present the class 19 testbed looks to be closer to entering revenue service than the 319flex!
@Timbeau
re point 1 – that’s not stopping VivaRail 😉
re point 3 – it is, however a considerable amount of Waterloo-Salisbury that is electrified, and that surely makes up a reasonable proportion of those trains.
That said, I agree that it would be a very surprising move.
@timbeau
Point 1 should have stopped the 455 retractioning. On the same basis, I have doubts about the 319 bimodalisation exercise. This seems a bit Nimrodish to me: the class appears to have been chosen just because many of its members are sitting around. If there was an effective market in rolling stock, then something like the teenage class 360 would have been a better bet, perhaps using the 319s to substitute during conversion.
But then what do I know?
@Si
Vivarail add a diesel generator set to an existing electric transmission. Conversion of the 159s would presumably keep the diesel engines but replace the entire (currently hydraulic) transmission.
But are the diesel engines not the bits most likely to wear out? There is a reason diesel units typically have shorter working lives than electrics, unless, like class 57s and HSTs, they got midlife engine transplants. And is a diesel engine designed to work with a hydraulic transmission a good match for an electric generator?
SWR might be better off using Meridians as a basis for a hybrid conversion – assuming the new East Midlands franchise haven’t had the same idea – or maybe 442s, although their electric motors are underpowered by modern standards.
But the 158s are not ideal for the job anyway – their narrow doorways make for long dwell times at the frequent station stops in East Devon, Dorset and Wiltshire.
@NGH
Still waiting for the SWR follow up report that was due early August – unless I’ve missed the link…?
Timbeau ……..belated comment…..Vivarail started out with the intention of adding a diesel generator with a DC/DC chopper feeding the existing traction motors. Whilst probably not the only reason, with an increasing emphasis on being able to maintain from the side and the LU traction motors requiring access from underneath to change the motor brushes, Vivarail now offer the three phase drives and AC motors – all via Strukton in the Netherlands, I understand.
Still eagerly awaiting the write-up on the south-western fiasco. Is there a revised plan to publish?
Chris,
We sort of got overtaken by events. There is now a well-written review generally known as the Holden Review which contains all the facts. We have a copy. I am told it is on the SWR website but haven’t had time to verify this. The problem is that there is now so much to write about it will take ages. And, to some extent, the review is so well-written that there isn’t a lot of value in just rewriting it. So stage 1 is really tracking down a publicly available copy.
@PoP: The button on the SWR web-site links back to the page you are looking at…
On the SWR website
https://www.southwesternrailway.com/other/about-us/independent-performance-review
There is a link to the Holden Review on that page, copied here.
https://www.southwesternrailway.com/~/media/files/other/about-us/performance-review/swr-performance-review-report.pdf?la=en
Passing through Waterloo, there still seems to be an awful lot of scaffolding and hoarding around platforms 21 and 22 for a project whose target completion date is now just a month away.
Re Chris /PoP,
In reality given the amount of information (including lots of stuff not in the Holden review) it will be several articles
An interesting snippet here
https://www.surreycomet.co.uk/news/17261941.mp-confirms-oyster-card-and-contactless-payment-to-be-rolled-out-at-epsom/
Is this a peace-offering to his long-suffering constituents?
But will he still be in post when it comes into effect at the end of March?
Why does the word Greyling leap off the screen with the exuberance of a mating salmon leaping mistakenly (and repeatedly), into a sewerage outlet?
A little unfair I suppose, given that breaking the network up to generate an artificial market in a public service is the real culprit as you point out. Nevertheless Grayling and his ilk demonstrate another strategic failing of this privatisation: that monetarism tends to assume that management is perfect, that the human factor is irrelevant.