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As has been reported on Twitter and elsewhere, the Victoria Line is currently suffering delays due to concrete damage in a signal control room at Victoria. Whilst we cannot confirm these apparent photos of the incident on usvsth3m, TfL have indicated the following:

Nigel Holness, LU’s Operations Director, said: “This afternoon our contractors were working on the new station in an area next to the Victoria line signal control room. These works involved the use of water and cement which leaked into the room, damaging equipment. This has meant there are no signals working on the southern section of the line.

“The line is currently suspended between Warren Street and Brixton. Our engineers are working hard to resolve the situation as soon as possible to get services back up and running, but the line is expected to be affected for the remainder of the day while repairs are carried out.

“I am sorry for the delays which will result and I would ask that passengers seek alternative routes on the Northern and Bakerloo line.”

In contrast to reports on Twitter, it is worth noting that this has not resulted in the closure of the entire line. Nonetheless, until the scale of the damage is known – and the level of damage caused by concrete will likely be different to that caused by regular flooding – the indicated reopening date should probably not be treated as being set in stone.

The complexity of the work necessary to upgrade Victoria and some of the tolerances (or lack thereof) within the project is highlighted very well by this article from the ICE, from which the image below is taken.

victoriacomplexity

The various drillings required at Victoria

When a full report into the incident is released, we will cover it here.

Thanks to Windsorian for highlighting the excellent ICE piece

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There are 70 comments on this article
  1. John Bull says:

    I see they didn’t bother to confirm the level of closure…

  2. Scott says:

    “Set in stone”. Snrk!

  3. swirlythingy says:

    …the indicated reopening date should probably not be treated as being set in stone.

    That was deliberate, wasn’t it?

  4. Windsorian says:

    This may be relevant as the incident is apparently at Victoria station

    http://www.ice.org.uk/topics/BIM/Case-studies/Victoria-station-upgrade

  5. John Bull says:

    the indicated reopening date should probably not be treated as being set in stone.

    *innocent face*

  6. John Bull says:

    Thanks Windsorian – that really highlights the complexity of the Victoria work nicely. I’ve updated the article to reference it.

  7. Castlebar (Caisleán an Bharraigh) says:

    So there’s no date SET for the re-opening?

  8. Lawyerboy says:

    No, the situation is fluid. I think the authorities will be pouring all over this.

  9. RichardH says:

    So in aggregate, no one knows when it’ll be fixed.

  10. Lemmo says:

    Headline: “Concrete mess: Boris steps in”

    And breaking news: “Cement brings the Victoria Line to a halt. Mortar follow”.

  11. Greg Tingey says:

    Indeed, the whole situation began by being entirely fluid, but they are expecting a phase-change to a more solid certainty very soon, as indeed, may have already happened.

    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

    Mind you, I’ve heard some pretty pathetic excuses & evasions from LUL in my time, but this really fill up my incredulity-pot to overflowing.

    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

    It’s all over the press now – pieces in Telegraph / Guardian / Metro / BBC News etc.
    At first it looked as though it was at the main new control room @ Northumberland Park, but that is obviously not the case.
    It’s in the equivalent of one of NR’s equipment boxes.
    However, even if they succeed in flushing the cement out with water, before it all sets, I think those racks & their contents are totally buggered (as the technical term would have it)
    So they’ll have to get new kit, wipe everything down to dry, re-fit new stuff, & then system test.
    Could take some time

  12. Greg Tingey says:

    Lemmo
    AARRRRGH!
    ( Yours appeared whilst I was typing. )

  13. valentine says:

    Its interesting (and very good) that they can still keep a sizeable section of the line open with an unforseen event like this happening – people from the north can still get to Kings Cross Euston Pancras and continue their journeys on other lines.

    Just curious if anyone knows whether that was a deliberate piece of resiliance built into the design of the new signalling system, or if it existed pre-upgrade?

  14. Greg Tingey says:

    Valentine
    The Vic-Line opened in stages:
    Walthamstow – Highbury 1/7/68
    Highbury – Warren St 1/12/68
    Warren St – Victoria 7/3/69
    [ AND Victoria - Brixton 23/7/71 ]
    So it was deliberate – the line can (just) be operated in 4 separate sections.

    { I have the official, “pictorial “record large-format thin book issued on the formal opening … they must be getting rare, these days. }

  15. Greg Tingey says:

    Oops – I forgot.
    Let’s hope, after reading the “i.c.e.” article, that no-one manages to breach the Tyburn River, while they are at it!

  16. Melvyn says:

    Anyone who has looked down at worksite from a bus can see how just the hoarding lining the ticket hall in use separates the operative station to this massive building site .

    As for parts of the line still operating I remember when the line first opened it happened in stages and so I suppose places to turn trains exist at several points on the line and fortunately the depot is at the Northern end .

    This incident also shows the effect removal of Artic buses has had given how these used to sweep crowds caused by incidents like a duck to water !!

    I suppose there is a valid reason as to why this control room was not relocated away from work site area given scale of reconstruction !

  17. Ian Sergeant says:

    Made me wonder – should we expect some business continuity in cases like this? I certainly wouldn’t be allowed to put in an IT system where the failure of a single component could take out half a system for a day.

  18. alan blue mountains aust. says:

    its not punny (smile) Seriously someone is in for overtime to sort that mess out hope they don’t have to jackhammer it out, could be a day or two involved there in getting it up and going again

  19. marko says:

    The rack in question appears to be track-circuit relays.

    Reading between the lines of the ICE article, this was caused by concrete and water from ground stabilisation works finding their way into the signalling equipment room . The article states that the resulting concrete is relatively low strength, but sting enough to keep works sites sitting in the boundary between clay and gravel beds watertight.

    As for business continuity – It’s a safe bet that the electronic and communications portions of the system are redundant. Probably less that can be done with the train detection end of it.

  20. Malcolm says:

    Sympathetic though I am to those whose transport is disrupted, I think the cries (not just here) of “it shouldn’t have been allowed to happen” are a bit over the top. On first sight, at least, this was the sort of accident that would have required an amazingly clever risk-analyst to even dream up, let alone estimate the (im)probability of. It would seem that, as far as we know now, nobody was hurt, or trapped in a train in a tunnel, or anything. And hopefully everyone will get home safe.

    The person who took the pictures and (presumably) got them out without official sanction might be in for a bit of a talking-to, if “management” happen to find out who it was. They probably won’t, and we can go on chuckling.

  21. The other Paul says:

    Surely technically an equipment/apparatus room rather than a “control room”?

  22. marko says:

    Perhaps if there is any lesson to be learned here, it’s that signalling equipment rooms need too be waterproof. Particularly at stations like Victoria which are below the water table and already have large volumes of water pumped out of them.

  23. Walthamstow Writer says:

    Oh come on folks – can we stop being so “wise” after the event when there has been no sort of detailed statement made about what really went “wrong”? Yes there has been a press release but that’s not what I mean.

    I am sure there will be a very thorough investigation into the root cause(s) of this incident and the requisite lessons will be learnt. I would guess there have already been measures taken to identify any initial issues and to institute short term mitigations. And then there will be the delightful commercial discussions to sort out the time and financial implications of this incident.

    As Malcolm says you would have to be a very skilled risk manager to come up with this particular scenario and then assess the probability and impact properly. I’ve done a fair number of risk workshops and reviews in my time and I doubt this incident *and* its impact would have been predicted to any great accuracy.

    There could be a multiplicity of causes including something as daft as someone not quite building the signalling equipment room [1] (I assume it’s one of the old IMRs at the end of one of the Vic Line platforms) properly back in the 1960s. No one would have expected Victoria station to be taken to bits and rebuilt way back then and if there was a weakness it’s been hidden for nearly 50 years. It would only take some unexpected structural weakness that could not take the pressure of the grouting work and hey presto you’ve got grout where you don’t expect it. This does not necesssarily invalidate any work done by others to assess the original construction plans or surveys before undertaking this work. Please note I’m merely speculating as to a possible very unusual root cause and as I’m not an engineer of any sort may well have it all wrong anyway. No one need correct my ramblings but I trust you can see the point I am making.

    [1] I agree with The Other Paul that this is not a control room and is most likely a signalling equipment room (SER).

  24. Greg Tingey says:

    WW
    Agree re. faulty description – “control room” made me think “Northumberland Park”, whereas it’s a signalling/circuit “box”.
    However, IF I’m interpreting the “Illegal/unofficial” [NOTE] photographs correctly, it is clear what happened.
    Someone, quite properly (?) removed/cut-out a breeze-block or two from the switchgear room, to allow for a new cable-run – by the looks of it, anyway.
    Then … someone else came along & quite proper;y poured large quantities of very liquid concrete-slurry in to the adjacent hole – which overflowed into ….
    & OOPS!

    [NOTE: Given the ubiquity of camera-phones, the attempt to prohibit pictures, just about anywhere is incredibly stupid. But public officialdom & private firms really don’t seem to have caught up, & this is merely another example of the same.
    For a much worse example, see:
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/10588998/Man-interrogated-by-FBI-for-wearing-Google-Glass-in-cinema.html
    AND
    http://www.businessinsider.com/amc-mpaa-bob-hope-homeland-security-google-2014-1
    Oh dear

  25. ngh says:

    Re Greg
    Looking at the photos, given the condition of the surrounding blocks / mortar joints above and to the sides of the 3 missing blocks it looks like it might have burst through with the 3 missing blocks floating off. I.e. the wall might have looked intact when someone surveyed hence this is probably a very unexpected and unpredictable event

  26. Jim Banana says:

    re Melvyn
    23 January 2014 at 22:02

    A certain blue and silver bus company operating the rail replacement today did indeed have two artic coaches on it……..

  27. Sleep Deprived says:

    Good to see the line is back up and running this morning. I’m guessing some people were working through the night to make sure that happened.

  28. Greg Tingey says:

    SD
    Indeed.
    Current notice on TfL website says: “No major service disruptions”
    Which surprises me, I must admit.

  29. Toby says:

    Good news that Vic is back up this morning. Presumably LU were chipping wway at the problem through the night….

  30. Littlejohn says:

    @Jim Banana. The two blue and silver artics were bought from Stagecoach Scotland for C2C rail replacement work starting on 25 January. They just happened to be in the right place and available at the right time

  31. Windsorian says:

    I see press reports this morning that workers rushed to buy sugar from a local supermaket to delay the grout mixture from setting. The Building Research Establishment have a publication listing sugar as a cement “Set Retarder”; unfortunately it is not possible to cut & paste their wording.

    http://www.buildingresearch.com.np/newfeatures1.php

  32. Windsorian says:

    My apologies, the publication is not from the UK Building Research Establishment, but rather a foreign body; I hope this prevents any confusion.

  33. Pedantic of Purley says:

    Well my brother-in-law uses washing up liquid as plasticiser for mortar mixing if I have forgotten to order the mortar plasticiser. I only forgot once – washing up liquid is so much more expensive.

    The other standard building site solution to unwanted concrete is, or was, to call out the fire brigade and to get them to flush the concrete but they charge for this (and of course they give priority to call-outs). Not much help if there is nowhere to flush it out to though.

  34. Pedantic of Purley says:

    For more light amusement from Railway Eye.

  35. Sleep Deprived says:

    I once heard that ready mix wagon drivers carried bags of sugar on them in case they got delayed, to ensure the concrete hadn’t gone off by the time they got to site. You could imagine it would ages to set though and really not help your long term strength. Fortunately that’s not an issue here.

  36. timbeau says:

    @windsorian
    Did they have to sweet talk the shop staff to be allowed to clear the shelves of their setting retardant?

    Just helping the solid state interlocking live up to its name.

    And we thoughta ll the concrete jokes had been exhausted after this incident
    http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/110804_R132011_Oxshott.pdf

  37. Fandroid says:

    Having been on the wrong end of several incidents like that one, I can safely say that these things do happen, and we probably don’t hear about most of them! Full marks to LUL and the contractors for getting the Vic back up to full service relatively swiftly.

    My suspicion is that the Victoria site is probably a painfully horrible place to build anything below ground, what with all that ancient railway infrastructure, massive sewers, and an ancient river valley full of all that rain that we’ve had in the last two months.

    Fun and games now commence for the claims lawyers.

  38. Long Branch Mike says:

    I take it that LR had concrete evidence on how to go about fixing it…

  39. Greg Tingey says:

    timbeau ( & LBM )
    My signalling-engineer friend sent me the comment that it gave a whole new meaning to “route setting”
    Ahem

  40. Pseudonymous says:

    @Walthamstow Writer: Not only is it easy to talk in hindsight, but if people did design against every possible risk like this, you can only imagine the resulting cost increase in any similar project, followed by cries from the exact same people of ‘but they did it over a weekend for a fiver in the Victorian era’ …

  41. Moleman says:

    ah those victorians, they always did everything correctly. never went over budget and always built things future proof

    http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/jun/20/archive-flood-metropolitan-london

  42. HughS says:

    Much to my surprise all back to normal when I travelled from Walthamstow Central to Green Park yesterday morning! How did they fix it so quickly?

  43. @HughS,

    It is probably one of those situations that looked worse than it was. The repair is described in detail on the BBC website. In essence I suspect that providing the concrete didn’t set it wouldn’t be too hard to remove given the manpower available. The relay units are probably sealed to prevent dust affecting them so it may be that some of them could just be cleaned off.

  44. Moleman says:

    think the “three rows of relays” covered was an exaggeration? IF they were standard and spares available then probably just swapped out and the connections cleaned?

  45. Malcolm says:

    Well maybe so. But as the BBC report implies, and I entirely believe, the main bit of work required was the detailed circuit-by-circuit checking. Safety would have demanded this however few relays/wires (even zero maybe) were actually changed.

  46. stimarco says:

    The trick with Business Continuity is to look at each component in a system like this and consider what the reaction should be if it were damaged or destroyed somehow.

    After all, you’d still be doing much the same thing to get it all up and running again whether the damage was caused by concrete grout, vandalism, a bomb, or a fire.

    The “why” and “how” are less about engineering and more about legal and insurance issues: as far as the engineers are concerned, they just need to make sure the component is restored to normal operation. The “why” only matters for the report they write about how such an incident could be avoided in future, and whether other procedures need to be modified, but this, again, is mostly a managerial duty.

    In this case, they’ll probably want to look into the Business Information Modelling (“BIM”) system that is being used for the Victoria Station Upgrade. It’s a pioneering approach, but this incident shows how a computer model is only as good as the data used to create it.

    The ICE.org article, which was also linked to in one of the first comments above, explains how they’re pushing BIM very hard for this upgrade. It’s what generated all those multi-coloured 3D images in the article and the grouting that caused this incident is one of the projects that relies very heavily on that model data to determine where each drill should go, at what angle, at what pressure the concrete grouting needs to be pumped, and for how long.

  47. Windsorian says:

    Somewhere I read the re-build of Tottenham Court Road station is making passive provision for Crossrail 2.

    The same probably applies to Victoria Station, should Crossrail 2 be routed there; this is where BIM modelling is or may be essential – so the wheel does not need re-inventing.

  48. Anonymous Duck says:

    First of all I would recommend you watch the Peter MacNaught video in Windsorian comment above.

    Those Westinghouse Multipole Contactors (Heavy duty relays with parallel ganged switches) are pretty robust and are in practiced sealed and suitable for sea level use in sheltered environments. Whether they are sealed or not, they like light bulbs have a limited life and must be replaced sometime. The problem would be mishandling them and their external contacts. Corrosion of the wires and external contact surfaces would be a greater problem.

    If we look into the problem, it can be split into two parts. The immediate one is the grouting going solid and covering the wires and relays. This in practice would probably not affect the operation, but health and safety would throw a wobbly. (and, I would have a nervous breakdown).

    The longer term problem is that the external contacts and wires would corrode very quickly and become unreliable and intermittent. Basically you would not know if the signal or point had operated or not. Having had problems myself with the dreaded green gunge, this is a real nightmare. Another problem is the wire insulation, would the grout chemicals attack the insulation or the slight movement of cement particles and wires rub the insulation off? Corrosion from water or the chemicals in a foaming grout let alone the possibility of the cement particles isolating wires from relays is a huge problem.

    Personally, going forward I would have a de-humidifier in that room, and priority order spare relays and racks.

  49. Mark Townend says:

    Looking at the pictures there were a number of relays and fuse and terminal connections affected, which are often mounted on racks the stretch down to floor level. Assuming this is new signalling equipment installed at the latest modernisation, these are probably interface components for the Westrace equipment used for safety interlocking. Although not illustrated, the computer equipment itself was probably mounted (thankfully) a little higher up to be at a more convenient working height for viewing dignostics, changing cards etc. I couldn’t find any reference to the size of the equipment room in any reports, but I would assume local functions alone were affected and the room may be little more than the equivalent of two or three lineside cabinets worth on the surface. The various comments about disabling everything south of Victoria are probably much less about the extent of control affected, rather that the trains which were all north of the problem when it occurred could get through the affected area. The plug-in relays themselves could be changed out very quickly. There would be a concern about any remaining contamination left on the plugboard terminals, but I would be most worried about what effect the harsh concrete could have on wiring insulation. Hence the work could have, at its most extensive, involved changing the affected 3 rows of relays (say x30), their corresponding plug bases (x30) and all rack wires terminating within those and on the fuse terminals. As they are interface or track circuit relays rather than more complex logic functions (which are taken care of in the computers), the number of wires per relay will be fairly limited, say typically 6 per unit, but we’ll round to 10 so making approximately 300 wires to change, worst case scenario. That amount of work to install and test should have been achievable within the timescales reported.

  50. Mark Townend says:

    Oops – should have read:

    ” . . . rather that the trains which were all north of the problem when it occurred could NOT get through the affected area. “

  51. Fandroid says:

    That Telegraph article on why sugar was used is a superb example of good scientific journalism in a national paper (and no, I never normally read the Telegraph!).

    The before and after photos show that a really good job was done on the clean-up.

    I don’t really have much knowledge of BIM (Business Information Modelling), but I strongly suspect that it was not a cause in itself of the construction error. Working in construction in the real 3D world with 2D drawings was just as difficult, if not several orders of magnitude more risky. I speculate; but possibly the root cause will be found to be the absence of suitably risk-aware supervision, with the sort of operational knowledge that appreciates the critical function of that equipment room, and its vulnerability to any misplaced fluids!

  52. Anonymous says:

    Fandroid-BIM stands for Building Information Modeling

  53. stimarco says:

    @Fandroid:

    I actually explained what BIM meant (hover over the initials in my post) and re-linked to the same Institute of Construction Engineers article that was linked to near the start of this thread. That article includes images of the 3D data provided by the BIM system they’re using.

    BIM is basically the process of consolidating all the information about a site into a unified database. That database can then be used to produce accurate 3D models of any part of the site – specifically all the stuff that sits below ground. (Anything that’s above ground can be surveyed using either the traditional theodolite + stripy stick, or more modern GPS-based systems.)

    In fact, the Victoria Station Upgrade project is actually using that BIM data to produce the information needed for each grouting rig setup, including position, angle, depth, etc.

    I suspect it won’t be too long before governments the world over start requiring such BIM databases be maintained by all town and city planning departments for future construction projects, and that the data be kept up-to-date and made available to construction contractors on request.

  54. Moleman says:

    lu standards call for signaling bits ‘n’ bobs to be stood off the ground by a few hundred mm for flood (water rather than concrete) ingress so will mean that the damage way have been limited. no idea if the equipment complied to that though but may explain why service was restored so quickly. well done to all involved

  55. Walthamstow Writer says:

    @ Moleman – given the equipment will have been provided as part of the upgrade I would expect it all to meet the required LU standard *unless* there was a very compelling reason to grant a concession to the standard. I’m no signalling expert but I would hope that a modern system would take up rather less space than the old interlocking / signalling kit that was in these rooms on the Victoria Line. Victoria is obviously one of the more complicated areas on the Vic Line given the sidings, points and crossovers north and south of the platform area. As everyone has said LU has done a good job to effect the clean up in a matter of hours.

  56. Greg Tingey says:

    WW
    Yes, the engineers were allowed to get on with it, & no “management” present, I strongly suspect …..

  57. @Greg Tingey,

    If referring to the actual incident itself then I suspect that if good incident management was present the outcome would be the same. One vital question to ask at any unusual incident management meeting. “Has anyone experienced anything like this before?” I am sure engineers have experienced flooded equipment before. A good management team will then provide the assistance and support to the people who actually know how to resolve the problem. Advice from a railway incident control manager of a major railway company: never let the financial director get involved in any way.

  58. Pedantic of Purley says:

    Meant to add that the is so much more to dealing with a incident than just allowing people to “get on with it” meaning get on with dealing with the initial incident. For starters one needs to ensure that no passengers are stuck on trains in tunnels. Potential passengers have to be informed, the press informed and a plan to sort out the initial problem (e.g. let them get on with it). After that and with an estimate of when it might be fixed there is are the issues of :

    - getting stranded trains (which may be due to recieve a maintenance exam) back to the depot so as not to mess up the following days service
    - arranging a test train for when work is complete
    - cancelling or, if one is lucky, reassigning any affected overnight engineering works
    - making contingency plans in case the service cannot start the next day

    There are almost certainly more items I haven’t thought of.

    Basically it needs someone to be away from the action to consider the totality of the situation and all the implications and someone else in charge of actually getting those decisions implemented whilst at the same time leaving the people who know what they are doing to just get on with the actual incident.

  59. moleman says:

    @POP

    agree, the “management” “workers” BS is somwthing that the RMT like to roll out, even the TSSA on occasion – ironically as they are a white collar union. its a fuzzy line between the two, everyone is on a salary. setting up false distinctions does no one any good. if unions are to survive, and they need too, then they need to stop that nonsense as there are many expolited staff in “management” roles. i wonder how many “ambassadors” have been specifically asked by the organisation to “volenteer” during the strike, indirect pressure and dubious even if you are against the strikes in principle

  60. @moleman,

    When I worked on the railway “management” always seemed to mean two grades above the grade of the person referring to it.

  61. Walthamstow Writer says:

    @ Greg – I “suspect” you are wrong. There will have been an incident manager appointed as PoP says. Given this incident was serious but without any injuries to staff or passengers it may not have required the hierarchy of incident management which is sometimes used. Clearly the contractor will have been expected to get the room tidied up but there would also be safety people, engineers, project people and the operators with a level of involvement in the clear up process. PoP is also right about things like shifting stranded trains, drivers and assessing planned overnight engineering work to see if it could continue. Given the enormous press / media / social media interest I expect the press office people had a torrid time and will have been busy overnight and would be provided with regular updates so they can brief the papers and TV. The other aspect is ensuring customer services / front line staff / TfL social media people were kept briefed on what was going on. In my old job I would have been getting phone calls asking for the Lost Customer Hours impact of the incident and I guess those numbers will have been calculated for those who needed them. What LU is better at than it used to be (IMO) is making sure people look after their areas of responsibility and you don’t get oodles of people second guessing each other and trying to influence what goes on.

    A look at the Victoria Line twitter feed for the day shows a huge volume of tweets including many making the obvious “jokey” comments. They look to have been handled with good humour despite the inevitable pressure to keep replying to people. That LU has managed to emerge from the debacle with favourable press articles about the clean up process and little public criticism shows the aftermath was handled well. I think many of us have also learnt something about concrete in the process :-)

  62. timbeau says:

    In an incident like this where time is of the essence senior management are well-advised to let the men on the ground (or under it) get on with it and concentrate on getting them what they need, whilst managing the public and press, and that seems to be what happened here. (I’d love to have seen what happened in the local supermarket when someone requisitioned all their sugar, or indeed what their expenses claim looks like!)

    I am reminded of an incident where the police refused to let railway staff near a train after an accident as it was a “potential crime scene”. By the time they were allowed in it was too late to determine whether the brakes had been warm – which could have been essential in determining the cause of the accident.

  63. DVD says:

    Concrete ‘ingress’ ? Yes we all have a vague idea of what it meant (and the thread was a good read with interesting contributions) but ‘ingress’ and ‘egress’ ? Prithee may I alight from this thread, with apologia for my pedantry. [And I beg forgiveness for my off-topic perambulation]

  64. stimarco says:

    @DVD:

    Many of the commenters and contributors on here have an engineering background. “Ingress” is a common term in that field. One of the reasons for such terms is that it’s often useful to separate causes from effects…

    E.g. “Water ingress” = “OMG! Water’s getting in!”

    That phrase makes no attempt to explain how it’s getting in, or why, or where from, because in many situations, that’s not relevant. It might be natural seepage through the tunnel lining, or it might be a burst water main. But if you’re an engineer responsible for maintaining signalling equipment, all you care about is the “water’s getting into the signalling equipment!” aspect. Will sandbags suffice, or will you need to bring in the pumps? You’re not going to be responsible for treating the cause; you’re responsible for mitigating its effects.

    This is important when drawing up rules and regulations too: you want to keep emergency duties and roles as clearly defined as possible and not get bogged down in the whys and wherefores. The lawyers can take care of all that.

  65. Fandroid says:

    @DVD. ‘Ingress’ It’s an industry jargon thing. Such jargon probably ought to be avoided in a public discussion (or at least explained), but sometimes us engineers fail to realise that some of these words don’t exist (or even worse- have a different meaning) in the ‘normal’ world.

  66. Kit Green says:

    “Ingress” is not just industry jargon. The problem is that the population seems to be using a smaller vocabulary as time goes on. This means that the richness of the language is diminished to the point that where once a single word could be used to describe something we now often have try and understand a whole phrase or sentence that only manages to give an imprecise meaning.

    One area that GT bangs on about is linked to this in the verbose but unclear announcements heard on trains and on platforms. As an example what is wrong with “This train terminates here” when you can use twice as many words to say “This service is now at its final destination”?

    Buses are as bad. In Southampton the First buses now display “This bus is not in public use” rather than “Not in service” or “Empty to depot”. Who is paid to rewrite these things, and why?

    /rant (sorry)

  67. timbeau says:

    “Peterborough is the next station stop” Do you really need both words? Yes, we might not yet have passed Huntingdon, and we might stop at a signal outside Peterborough, but would anyone seriously be confused?

    But then, I know someone who doesn’t understand that “I’m in the last carriage” at a terminus means the one nearest the barrier – I’m not sure if it is because it’s the first bit of the train you come to, rather than furthest away, or because it was the “front” when it came in.

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London 2050 (Part 3): Tracks to the Future

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How might we shape the pattern of London’s growth and development to help bring about a more sustainable outcome? In this part (and the next) of our continuing series we’ll look at the ‘quantity and quality’ schemes arriving at this electronic platform now for rail (above ground and below), surface transport and integration and interchange.